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Assimilationist Bias
I. INTRODUCTION
Equal protection heightened scrutiny jurisprudence currently privileges
the talismanic classifications of race and, to a lesser extent, sex. In
considering arguments that other classifications be accorded heightened
scrutiny, the courts have required claimants to demonstrate the similarities
these classifications share with race and sex. Commonalities between the
two paradigm classifications thus play a powerful gatekeeping role.
Two commonalities emphasized by the courts are that race and sex
ostensibly mark individuals with immutable and visible traits. A
classification will therefore be less likely to receive heightened scrutiny if
its defining traits can be altered or concealed. By withholding protection
from these classifications, the judiciary is subtly encouraging groups
comprised by such classifications to assimilate by changing or hiding their
defining characteristic. This is an assimilationist bias in equal protection,'
which I will critique in this Article.
Under current equal protection doctrine, the question of whether a
classification deserves heightened scrutiny precedes the question of whether
the legislation is sufficiently related to its objective. Indeed, the answer to
the first question determines the force with which the second is asked.
Thus, if a classification is deemed to merit "strict" scrutiny, the state must
meet the exceedingly high standard of showing that its classification is
necessary to promote a "compelling governmental interest." 2 If the
classification garners "intermediate" scrutiny, the state must show that the
classification "serves important governmental objectives and
is... substantially related to... those objectives.",3 Finally, if the
classification is merely accorded "rational review," the government need
only show that the classification bears "a rational relationship [to] ... some
1. As the indefinite article suggests, this is not the only assimilationist bias in equal protection
doctrine. I discuss three forms of assimilationist bias further at the beginning of Part M. See infra
notes 60-73 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (plurality opinion); see
also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (noting that statutes
using classifications subjected to strict scrutiny such as race, national origin, and alienage will be
upheld only if "suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest"); Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S.
216, 219 (1984) (noting that statutes discriminating on the basis of alienage, a classification
subject to strict scrutiny, will be upheld only if they "advance a compelling state interest by the
least restrictive means available").
3. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 516 (1996) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (noting that statutes using
classifications subject to intermediate scrutiny, such as sex or illegitimacy, will be upheld only if
"substantially rlated to an important governmental objective"); Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982) (noting that "statutes employing gender classifications will be
upheld only if the classifications serves "important governmental objectives" and "the
discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives"
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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legitimate governmental purpose." 4 As a practical matter, "strict scrutiny"
almost invariably leads to the invalidation of legislation, while "rational
review" almost invariably leads to the upholding of legislation. The
determination of the level of scrutiny is therefore a crucial threshold step in
the analysis of whether legislation will survive.6
4. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993); see also Lyng v. International Union, 485 U.S.
360, 370 (1988) (noting that when a statute does not impact a fundamental right or a protected
class, a court's inquiry is confined to determining "whether the statutory classification is
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest" (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
5. Historically, the application of strict scrutiny led to such consistent invalidation of
legislation that the standard was understood to be "'strict' in theory but fatal in fact." Gerald
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (coining
the phrase); see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(noting that conventional strict scrutiny is "strict in theory, but fatal in fact" (citing Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362 (1978))). Similarly, the rational review standard
resulted in such uniform upholding of statutes that it was understood to constitute a free pass for
legislation. See CONSTrrUIONAL LAW 606 (John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda eds., 5th ed.
1995) (noting that the correlation between the application of rational review and the upholding of
legislation appeared to be perfect between 1937 and 1976).
More recently, both understandings have required revision. The Supreme Court has
expressly disavowed that strict scrutiny is always fatal in practice. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237
(" [W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory but fatal in fact.' (citing
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519)). Legislation has also been struck down on rational review, see
Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), leading some commentators to
believe that a fourth tier of review-the so-called "rational basis with teeth" standard-has been
created, see, e.g., Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST.
COMMENTARY 257, 260 (1996) (citing David 0. Stewart, Supreme Court Report: A Growing
Equal Protection Clause?, 71 A.B.A. J. 108, 112 (1985)).
These exceptions, however, have not seriously altered the status quo. The Supreme Court's
observation in a post-Adarand case that "[s]trict scrutiny remains, nonetheless, strict," Bush v.
Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 978 (1996), is bolstered by the fact that, even after Adarand, legislation has
been systematically struck down when strict scrutiny is applied, see, e.g., id. at 952; Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518
U.S. 1033 (1996). Similarly, the Court's statement in a post-Cleburne case that rational review
remains highly deferential, see Heller, 509 U.S. at 319-21, is supported by the fact that, even after
Plyler and Cleburne, legislation has been repeatedly upheld when rational basis review is applied,
see, e.g., Heller, 509 U.S. at 312; Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997); Washington v.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). But see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). Indeed, the
reality that the new nomenclature of "rational review with teeth" was necessary to describe
rational review leading to the invalidation of legislation reflects the power of the intuition that
rational review simpliciter never results in such invalidation.
6. Since the formal recognition of intermediate scrutiny in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976), the Supreme Court has divided scrutiny into three rhetorical categories-strict,
intermediate, and rational. See cases cited supra notes 2-4. In the aftermath of United States v.
Virginia, however, it has become unclear whether there is any real difference between strict and
intermediate scrutiny. The majority in Virginia stated that in order to survive the intermediate
scrutiny test triggered by gender-based classifications, the state must proffer an "exceedingly
persuasive justification" for its action. See 518 U.S. at 531 (citations omitted). As Chief Justice
Rehnquist's concurrence noted, the majority's holding "introduce[d] an element of uncertainty
respecting the appropriate test," because this standard seems quite close to strict scrutiny. Id. at
559 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
It is unclear not only whether there is now any real difference between strict and
intermediate scrutiny but also whether there ever has been. Cass Sunstein has pointed out that
while the Virginia Court "did not merely restate the intermediate scrutiny test but pressed it closer
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To date, the Supreme Court has extended some form of heightened
scrutiny to classifications based on race,7 sex,' national origin,9 alienage,10
and illegitimacy." The Court has not, however, provided a clear
overarching rationale for why these five classifications, and not others, are
particularly deserving of judicial solicitude. 2 It has instead deployed, again
without much explanation, a set of factors to determine whether a group is
worthy of heightened scrutiny. These factors, which are not requirements,
include the history of discrimination suffered by the group, the group's
political powerlessness, and the immutability and visibility of the
characteristic defining the group.13
to strict scrutiny," this rapprochement was "not a dramatic innovation." Cass Sunstein, The
Supreme Court 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 75
(1996). This is because "[t]he revision of the standard of review is unlikely to produce different
results from those that would have followed under the intermediate scrutiny standard, which has
operated quite strictly 'in fact."' Id. (citation omitted).
It seems useful to recognize rhetorically the Court's practical conflation of these two terms. I
therefore use the term "heightened scrutiny" in this Article to encompass both strict and
intermediate scrutiny. This usage is not meant to express disagreement with the position that
intermediate scrutiny could mean something different from strict scrutiny. See generally Jay
Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial Minimalism, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 298 (1998) (arguing for an intermediate scrutiny standard that is distinct from the
current strict scrutiny standard). Rather, it is predicated on the pragmatic assumption that the
Court is unlikely to differentiate between the two standards.
7. See, e.g., Vera, 517 U.S. at 952 (subjecting voting districts drawn with race as the
predominant factor to strict scrutiny); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 200 (subjecting federal contracting
program designed to help racial minorities to strict scrutiny); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944) (subjecting legislation excluding individuals of Japanese ancestry from the U.S.
West Coast to the "most rigid" scrutiny).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 515 (subjecting a public college's gender-
based admissions policy to intermediate scrutiny); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127
(1994) (subjecting gender-based peremptory strikes to intermediate scrutiny); Craig, 429 U.S. at
190 (subjecting gender-based discrimination in statutes regulating the sale of alcohol to
intermediate scrutiny).
9. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (subjecting to heightened
scrutiny a public school's preferential layoff protection scheme for employees based on, inter alia,
their national origin); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (subjecting a land-transfer statute
that discriminated on the basis of national origin to heightened scrutiny).
10. See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984) (subjecting a statute that required
notaries public to be U.S. citizens to strict scrutiny); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977)
(subjecting a statute barring certain resident aliens from state financial assistance for higher
education to strict scrutiny); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (subjecting legislation
that conditioned welfare benefits on citizenship to heightened scrutiny).
11. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (subjecting to heightened scrutiny a statute
that imposed a six-year statute of limitations for establishing paternity); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S.
259 (1978) (subjecting to intermediate scrutiny a statute that required illegitimate children to
prove paternity before inheriting from their putative fathers); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
(1977) (subjecting to heightened scrutiny a statute that permitted legitimate, but not illegitimate,
children to inherit from their intestate fathers).
12. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2441 (1994).
13. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602-03 (1987) (quoting Lyng v. Castillo, 477
U.S. 635, 638 (1986)) (denying application of the heightened scrutiny standard when reviewing
statutory classifications in the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children program); Lyng,
477 U.S. at 638 (reaching the same conclusion for statutory classifications created by the federal
Food Stamps program). For other applications of these factors, see, for example, High Tech Gays
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An assimilationist bias in equal protection jurisprudence manifests
itself in the immutability and visibility factors. These factors make courts
more likely to withhold heightened scrutiny from groups that can change or
conceal their defining trait. (I will call such groups indistinct, in contrast to
distinct groups that cannot assimilate in either of these ways.) Through
these factors, the jurisprudence creates an incentive for indistinct groups to
assimilate into the political mainstream when faced with burdensome
legislation. The primary normative argument of this Article is that the
assimilationist bias embodied in the immutability and visibility factors is
pernicious and that these factors should both be retired.
Although I want to consider both factors, I place most of my emphasis
on visibility. This emphasis should be uncontroversial, as the immutability
factor has already been subjected to extensive criticism. Academics have
made eloquent substantive arguments against it. 4 And the courts have
variously cast doubt on immutability by citing academic critiques of it, 5 by
interpreting it expansively, 6 by emphasizing that it is a factor rather than a
requirement,17 and by simply omitting it from their formulations of the
v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 1990); Watkins v.
United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1444-48 (9th Cir.), amended by 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.
1988), vacated and aff'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc); Ledesma v.
Block, 825 F.2d 1046, 1052 (6th Cir. 1987); Cervantes v. Guerra, 651 F.2d 974, 979 (5th Cir.
Unit A July 1981); and Spence v. Miles Laboratories, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 952, 962 (E.D. Tenn.
1992).
14. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRAcY AND DISTRUST 150 (1980) (arguing that
because a plurality of the Court in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality
opinion), explicitly noted that intelligence and physical disability are not suspect despite their
immutability, and because race and gender are mutable at some level, immutability is not actually
a factor and that the real test is relevance to legislative purposes); J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of
Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2323-24 (1997) (noting that immutability is neither necessary nor
sufficient because the issue is really whether a trait can sustain a stable social meaning); Chai R.
Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality, and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 237,
278-79 (1996) (arguing that immutability can describe traits that are either beyond the bearer's
control or passive rather than behavioral, and that the first meaning may be read broadly to
include characteristics that are difficult to change); Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet:
Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 926-
27 (1989) [hereinafter Halley, Politics of the Closet] (arguing that courts are retreating from the
immutability factor and that under a process failure theory, mutable groups may have less political
power); Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the
Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503, 507-16 (1994) [hereinafter Halley, Politics
of Biology] (arguing that the courts have replaced immutability with a concern for political
process failure); Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 550
(1992) (arguing that the question of immutability is less important than the question of coercion).
15. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442-43 n.10 (1985)
(quoting ELY, supra note 14, at 150); Watkins, 837 F.2d at 1446 (citing Laurence Tribe, The
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1073-74 n.52
(1980)). For Tribe's critique of immutability, see infra note 83.
16. See, e.g., Watkins, 837 F.2d at 1446.
17. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. See. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375, 377
(9th Cir. 1990) (Canby, J., dissenting); Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 863 (E.D.N.Y.
1997), rev'd on other grounds, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543,
1548 (D. Kan. 1991), rev'd, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992).
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heightened scrutiny test.18 Indeed, the question more likely to arise is why I
discuss the immutability factor at all, as such a discussion seems
tantamount to cataloguing new ways to flog a dying horse. My purpose
here, however, is not to hasten the factor's imminent demise but to enable a
comparison between immutability and visibility. 19 By making that
comparison, I seek to show that the visibility factor also should be retired.
In Part II, I briefly describe how the courts define immutability and
visibility. Although the courts appear to begin with the ordinary definitions
of immutability as an inability to change 0 and of visibility as an ability to
be seen,21 they then add two definitional restrictions to each term. First, the
courts do not interpret either immutability or visibility to mean that the
characteristic must be strictly incapable of being changed or hidden.
Second, the courts tend to think of immutability and visibility as corporeal
traits, rather than as social ones. These restrictions are only two of the many
ways in which the terms are conceptually intertwined. It is therefore
unsurprising that while the courts distinguish between these two terms as a
formal matter, they constantly conflate them as a practical matter.
In Part I, I turn to the ways in which the immutability and visibility
factors might be justified, noting that the factors can be defended on either
substantive or processual grounds. The substantive defense rests on the fact
that the immutability and visibility factors isolate classifications defined by
traits largely outside an individual's control. Treating individuals unequally
based on qualities they cannot influence, it is argued, violates a norm of
equality. This defense is easily defeated on the grounds that it is both over-
and underinclusive.
The processual defense, however, presents a more difficult case. It
asserts that the courts must direct their solicitude solely towards those who
are disadvantaged in the political process. It then maintains that distinct
groups are relatively disadvantaged because they do not have the option of
assimilation. When faced with state discrimination, indistinct groups may
simply disappear-temporarily or permanently-into the mainstream.
Judicial protection is thus withheld from these groups because they have the
capacity to engage in self-help.
18. See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307,312-14 (1976); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24-28 (1973).
19. That immutability has been soundly critiqued at the academic level, however, does not
mean that it is not still a live issue at the litigation level. See William B. Rubenstein, Divided We
Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns,
106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1642-43 (1997). Thus, if my points about immutability persuade anyone to
jettison the immutability factor, that outcome will be welcomed as a positive externality of this
argument.
20. See 7 THE OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 693 (2d ed. 1989).
21. See 19 id. at 687.
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The next three Parts seek to respond to this processual defense, which is
no less misguided for requiring a more elaborate rebuttal. That rebuttal does
not maintain that indistinct groups are more powerless than distinct groups,
but rather that no generalizations can be made either way. It thus seeks to
dissolve, rather than to invert, the hierarchy between distinct and indistinct
groups posited by current doctrine. In attempting to do so, the rebuttal
disaggregates the assumption that distinct groups are more vulnerable than
indistinct groups into its two components: (1) the tenet that immutable
groups are more vulnerable than mutable groups; and (2) the tenet that
visible groups are more vulnerable than invisible groups.
In Part IV, I consider the claim that immutable groups are more
disabled than mutable groups in the political process. That claim rests on
two rationales: (1) the rationale that immutable groups are less able to
evade discrimination; and (2) the rationale that immutable groups are less
able to alter discriminatory attitudes about them. Close examination reveals
that both rationales are deeply flawed. It is thus unsurprising that equal
protection jurisprudence has begun to retire the immutability factor. Though
the visibility factor has not been subjected to serious criticism, it is
similarly untenable.
In Part V, I turn to the claim that visible groups are uniquely vulnerable
in the political process. The rationales for that claim parallel those adduced
in the immutability context. Thus, visible groups are said to have less power
to evade prejudices than invisible groups. They are also said to have less
power to alter those prejudices. While these arguments are stronger for
visibility than the analogous arguments are for immutability, they still are
ultimately unpersuasive. Whether a group's visibility (or invisibility)
empowers or disempowers it in the political process is a deeply contextual
inquiry. It is therefore impossible to generalize about the effects of visibility
(or invisibility) across those contexts.
Because the visibility factor has not yet been seriously criticized, I
provide in Part VI a concrete example of how visibility distorts the
heightened scrutiny inquiry. Although the courts do not recognize that the
net effects of invisibility can be debilitating in some contexts, the state
clearly does. When the state has animus against an invisible group, it can
manipulate the context in which the group functions to ensure that the net
effects of its invisibility are disempowering. The most egregious injustice
of the visibility bias manifests itself in these scenarios, in which courts
defer to such state action because they assume that invisibility is
empowering, even as the state is banking on the opposite presumption.
This dynamic is illustrated by the case of gays in the military. By using
the framework laid out in Part V, I make a detailed showing that the
military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy manipulates the context in which
gays operate, amplifying the disempowering aspects (and dampening the
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empowering aspects) of their invisibility. I then point out the untenable
nature of the judicial assumption that invisibility is always empowering to
gays by highlighting the military's investment in precisely the opposite
dynamic.
By Part VII, the need for doctrinal reconstruction should be evident. I
begin with the question of why the courts have relied on immutability and
visibility. A look at the origins of the factors reveals that they were created
to capture the similarities between race-based and sex-based classifications.
They were then retained because of their gatekeeping function of
privileging these classifications while excluding others. The courts will
therefore be reluctant to jettison the factors without developing an
alternative gatekeeping mechanism. I suggest that this alternative
mechanism should be a refinement of the currently existing inquiry into the
group's political powerlessness, which would operate in lieu of the
immutability and visibility factors. I conclude on a pragmatic note by
pointing out that this solution should be attractive even to the groups-
indicatively blacks and women-that traditionally have been favored under
the immutability and visibility frameworks.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION IMMUTABILITY AND VisiBLrrY DEFINED
As employed by the courts in the equal protection context, immutability
and visibility are terms of art that share many features. Indeed, when the
terms are defined and compared, it becomes clear why the courts often tend
to confuse them.
A. Immutability
Heightened scrutiny's immutability factor is easy to find. One prong of
the standard test asks whether the classification relies on an immutable
characteristic." Understanding what the factor means, however, is more
difficult. To my knowledge, the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Watkins v.
United States Arm- provides the most extensive judicial analysis of the
22. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (citing Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S.
635, 638 (1986)). For other applications of this test, see cases cited supra note 13."
23. 837 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir.), amended by 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated and affd
on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc). After 14 years of exemplary service,
Perry Watkins was discharged by the Army because of statements he had made about his own
homosexuality. See Watkins, 837 F.2d at 1429. Although he had informed the U.S. Army that he
was gay when he enlisted, Watkins was permitted to serve until new regulations were
promulgated in 1981, requiring the discharge of all homosexual servicemembers. See id. Watkins
then brought suit challenging his discharge on, inter alia, equal protection grounds. See id. at
1433. In considering the equal protection claim, a panel of the Ninth Circuit found that
homosexuals were a suspect class deserving of heightened scrutiny, in part because they were
marked by an immutable trait. See id. at 1446. Subjecting the regulation to such scrutiny, the
1998]
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factor. While this definitional discussion does not provide a perfect
description of the manner in which the courts deploy the term
"immutability," it provides a useful starting point. The Watkins court
distinguished among three different kinds of immutability--" strict"
immutability, in which the bearer must be unable to change the trait;
24
"effective" immutability, in which changing the trait is possible but
difficult;'8 and "personhood" immutability, in which the bearer's ability to
change the trait is irrelevant, as long as it is central to her identity.26 The
Ninth Circuit panel cogently reasoned that the Supreme Court could not be
requiring strict immutability, because that requirement would disqualify
many members of all categories-race, sex, national origin, alienage, and
illegitimacy-currently given heightened scrutiny.27 It therefore concluded
that one of the other two kinds of immutability was involved.
Although it was not necessary for the Watkins court to distinguish
between effective and personhood immutability," it seems clear that the
Supreme Court could not be referring to personhood immutability. The
Ninth Circuit's conjecture (without citation) that the case law, read "in a
more capacious manner,"29 supported personhood immutability seems
overly generous to that jurisprudence. The personhood theory has nothing
to do with whether a person can change a trait; it focuses instead on
whether she should change the trait.3" The Supreme Court's jurisprudence,
however, emphasizes the descriptive issue of whether a person can control
a characteristic rather than the prescriptive one of whether- she should do
SO.
3 1
A further refinement is necessary, because courts do not characterize all
traits that are hard to change-such as race, sex, national origin, religion,
alienage, and illegitimacy-as immutable. To the contrary, the courts in the
equal protection context have only accorded race, sex, and national origin
panel struck down the regulations. See id. at 1448-51. The panel's decision was then appealed to
the Ninth Circuit sitting en bane. The en bane court found that the case was better decided (again
in Watkins' favor) on equitable estoppel grounds, and the panel's decision was withdrawn. See
Watkins, 875 F.2d at 711. Because the en bane court did not address the equal protection issue,
however, it should not be read as registering disapproval (or approval) of the panel decision's
discussion of immutability.




28. See id. ("Under either formulation, we have no trouble concluding that sexual orientation
is immutable for the purposes of equal protection doctrine.").
29. Id.
30. The Watkins panel's deployment of personhood immutability can be read as a valiant
attempt to circumvent assimilationist bias, as personhood immutability diverts the courts'
attention away from the group's ability to assimilate and redirects it toward the validity of the
legislation.
31. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion)
(describing race, sex, and national origin, but not alienage, as immutable characteristics).
[Vol. 108: 485494
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uncontroversial status as immutable traits.32 Religion and alienage, on the
other hand, are generally not recognized as immutable,33 while illegitimacy
has been deemed quasi-immutable.34
In grouping the categories in this way, the courts appear to be making a
distinction between "corporeal" and "social" traits. If a trait is perceived to
be defined by nature rather than by culture, then the courts will be more
likely to call it immutable. Race and sex, for example, are clearly viewed as
biologically determined. If, on the other hand, the trait is perceived to be
more defined by culture, the courts will withhold the immutability
designation. Religion and alienage, for example, are viewed not to have a
biological substrate and, thus, are not deemed immutable.
I emphasize that I am not endorsing this distinction between corporeal
and social traits, or saying that it is stable. I believe that the courts are
reasoning from a widely shared intuition that religion and alienage are
socially constructed classifications, while race, sex, national origin, and
perhaps illegitimacy are biologically determined ones. Yet as a number of
32. See, e.g., id.
33. The existence of the First Amendment has generally prevented courts from entertaining
the claim that religious classifications deserve heightened scrutiny. See Benjamin Hoom Barton,
Note, Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges After Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama:
An Equal Protection and First Amendment Analysis, 94 MICH. L. REV. 191, 204 (1995) (noting
that the failure of courts to grant religious classifications heightened scrutiny "is traceable to the
fact that religious discrimination cases have traditionally been decided under the First
Amendment"). Nonetheless, religion has sometimes been recognized as a mutable characteristic
in the equal protection context. See, e.g., Holmes v. California Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126,
1137 (9th Cir. 1997) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (suggesting that members of religious groups may
be less oppressed than members of racial groups because they at least have the option of
conversion).
Similarly, alienage has not been generally recognized as an immutable characteristic. See,
e.g., Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that "alienage is not
immutable"), rev'd on other grounds, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998). Compare Frontiero, 411 U.S.
at 682 (plurality opinion) (noting that alienage, race, sex, and national origin are suspect
classifications), with id. at 686 (noting that race, sex, and national origin are immutable but
omitting alienage). Frontiero only listed four (rather than the current five) suspect classifications
because the cases finding that legitimacy was a suspect classification had not then been decided.
See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988); Lalli v. Lam, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762 (1977).
It is true that some courts have stated, without further explanation, that alienage is
immutable. See, e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979); Berman v. United States, 572
F. Supp. 1486, 1489 (N.D. Ga. 1983). The absence of analysis in these cases, however, leads me
to suspect that these courts are erroneously inferring that a group is immutable if it has received
heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Parham, 441 U.S. at 351 (noting that race, like the four other
classifications based on "immutable human attributes," is a suspect classification); Berman, 572
F. Supp. at 1489 (noting that wrongful death plaintiffs are not a suspect class because the
classification is not based on "immutable human attributes" such as those defining the five
suspect classifications).
34. Although illegitimacy has been characterized as an immutable characteristic, see, e.g.,
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360 (1978); Bridges v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 733 F.2d 1153, 1155 (5th Cir. 1984), the Supreme Court has correctly noted that it may not
always be immutable from the perspective of the parent of the illegitimate child because some
states permit parents to legitimate children born out of wedlock through a court order, see
Parham, 441 U.S. at 353.
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commentators have shown, these latter categories are not solely biologically
determined." I agree with those commentators, but I do not seek to
replicate their work. Rather than challenging the judicial definition of
immutability, I accept it in order to contest most directly the manner in
which it is deployed. These two observations-that the Court targets
effective and corporeal immutability-will undergird the remainder of this
Article.
B. Visibility
The standard heightened scrutiny test requires courts to consider: (1)
whether the group has suffered a history of discrimination; (2) whether the
group is politically powerless; and (3) whether the group is distinguished by
an "obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristic[]., 36 The bias
favoring visible groups is most explicitly stated in the third prong, where
the words "obvious" and "distinguishing" stand as proxies for the concept
of visibility. Yet the Supreme Court has expressed solicitude for visible
groups under the other two prongs as well. In Mathews v. Lucas,37 for
example, the Court hypothesized that the history of discrimination suffered
by illegitimate children was less severe than that suffered by women or
blacks "perhaps in part because illegitimacy does not carry an obvious
badge."38 Similarly, in Frontiero v. Richardson,39 a plurality of the Court
noted that "it can hardly be doubted that, in part because of the high
visibility of the sex characteristic, women still face pervasive, although at
times more subtle, discrimination." 4 This conclusion served as a predicate
for finding women to be politically powerless.4
35. On the socially constructed nature of race, see, for example, IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ,
WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996). On the socially constructed nature
of sex, see, for example, JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION
OF IDENTITY (1990). National origin and illegitimacy are very easily seen as socially constructed
categories, as the borders that define nations and the relations that define legitimacy are obviously
creations of culture rather than of nature. See Anne Reichman Schiff, Frustrated Intentions and
Binding Biology: Seeking AID in the Law, 44 DUKE L.J. 524, 530-31 (1994) (noting that
biological kinship is neither necessary nor sufficient for a legal determination of legitimacy);
Frank H. Wu, The Future of the American Mosaic: A Moderate Proposal for Immigration Reform,
7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 35, 55 n.132 (1996) (noting that national origin is not a biological
matter).
36. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (citing Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638
(1986)). For other applications of this test, see cases cited supra note 13.
37. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
38. Id. at 506.
39. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
40. lkI at 686; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(noting that the Frontiero plurality recognized "that the pervasive and persistent nature of the
discrimination experienced by women is in part the result of their ready identifiability").
41. This is not to say that invisible groups are barred from receiving heightened scrutiny, as
indicated by the cases of illegitimacy and alienage. That these classifications have attained
protected status, however, simply means that invisibility operates as a factor, as opposed to a
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An analogue of the set of definitional restrictions placed on
immutability applies to visibility. For the reasons stated by the Watkins
court, the courts cannot mean "strict" visibility or "personhood" visibility.
If the courts meant strict visibility, the ability of some blacks and women to
"pass" would undermine the claims of these groups to heightened scrutiny.
Similarly, it is unlikely that the courts mean personhood visibility, as
invisible traits that could be constitutive of an individual's self-
conception-such as illegitimacy-have been deemed not to satisfy the
visibility factor.42 I thus assume that by visibility, the courts mean effective
visibility.
I also distinguish between "effective corporeal visibility" and
"effective social visibility." By corporeal visibility, I mean the
perceptibility of traits such as skin color that manifest themselves on the
physical body in a relatively permanent and recognizable way.43 Social
visibility, on the other hand, designates the perceptibility of nonphysical
traits. 4 By visibility, the courts mean corporeal visibility rather than social
requirement, in the analysis. And insofar as it operates as a factor, invisibility cuts against a
finding that a classification deserves heightened scrutiny. Thus, illegitimacy was accorded
heightened scrutiny as a classification in spite of its invisibility. See Mathews, 427 U.S. at 506.
The case of alienage is slightly different, given that, as I later argue, alienage was accorded
heightened scrutiny before the inauguration of the visibility factor. See infra note 330. Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), which held that alienage was suspect, preceded Frontiero,
which I argue introduced the visibility factor, by two years. It is significant, however, that
academic commentary contending that the visibility factor dates back to United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), maintains that alienage should not have received heightened
scrutiny precisely because of the social inability to identify aliens on sight. See, e.g., Louis Lusky,
Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLuM. L. REV. 1093, 1105 n.72 (1982);
cf infra note 322 (considering the pedigree of the visibility factor).
42. See, e.g., Mathews, 427 U.S. at 506.
43. As this definition indicates, corporeal visibility is not exhausted by traits discernible
through the sense of sight. I borrow Erving Goffman's disclaimer:
Since it is through our sense of sight that the stigma of others most frequently becomes
evident, the term visibility is perhaps not too misleading. Actually, the more general
term, "perceptibility" would be more accurate, and "evidentness" more accurate still.
A stammer, after all, is a very "visible" defect, but in the first instance because of
sound, not sight.
ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTrry 48 (1963).
44. Social visibility includes "declarative visibility," which arises when a corporeally
invisible trait is made visible through speech. For example, an immigrant who self-identifies as
such is declaratively visible. Social visibility also includes what Kathryn Abrams has dubbed
"political visibility" and "programmatic visibility." Kathryn Abrams, The Supreme Court,
Visibility, and the "Politics of Presence," 50 VAND. L. REV. 411, 414-15 (1997). Political
visibility "arises when a person claims group membership as a central and constitutive feature of
her identity." Id. at 414. An immigrant who articulates her world view as shaped by her
immigrant status would thus be politically visible, while an immigrant who feels that she just
"happens to be" an immigrant could be described as declaratively visible but politically invisible.
Programmatic visibility, in turn, "arises from group members' efforts to connect their group-
based identities with a particular political interest or program." Id. An immigrant who militated
against the ban on HIV-positive immigrants might be seen as programmatically visible, while one
who views her immigrant status as identity-constitutive only in her personal life might be
declaratively and politically visible but programmatically invisible. For the purposes of this
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visibility.' This can be inferred from the fact that the Court deems visibility
to be disempowering.46 Far from being viewed as disempowering, social
visibility has traditionally been understood by the courts to be a proxy for
political power. For example, the courts consider such forms of social
visibility as a group's presence in the "[n]ation's decisionmaking
councils"'47 or its ability "to attract the attention of... lawmakers ' 4' as
indicia of political power.
Once again, the distinction between social and corporeal visibility is
retained not because it is accurate, but because it accurately describes the
intuition of the courts. There is no such thing as a purely biologically
visible trait, for visibility is always relational, requiring a performer and an
observer. Whether a trait is visible will thus depend not only on the trait but
also on the "decoding capacity of the audience,"49 which in turn will
depend on the social context. Thus, to use Erving Goffman's example, one
presumes that the syphilitic will be invisible to passers-by but not to a
medical specialist."0 If both observers fail to notice the syphilis, the first
failure will be ascribed to the invisibility of the trait, while the second will
be ascribed to the blindness of the observer (as evidenced by the fact that
the syphilitic can sue the doctor for failing to diagnose him correctly).
Visibility, like immutability, is therefore always socially determined.
C. Commonalities
Having defined immutability and visibility, I now turn to the ways in
which the courts often blur the distinctions between the two concepts. The
Supreme Court's test for heightened scrutiny runs the two concepts together
by asking whether a classification creates classes marked by "'an obvious,
immutable, or distinguishing characteristic."' 5 1 Immutability and visibility
thus not only occupy the same prong of the test, but also coexist as
Article, the subdivisions of social visibility will be less important than the distinction between
corporeal and social visibility.
45. It bears note that the relationship between these two kinds of visibility is highly complex.
There may well be a correlation between corporeal visibility and the various forms of social
visibility: The corporeal invisibility of pedophiles may contribute to their social invisibility, and
the corporeal visibility of blacks may contribute to their social visibility. But the correlation, if it
exists, is imperfect, for corporeal visibility is neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure social
visibility. A corporeally visible trait like eye color can have so little social significance that it is
not socially visible. Conversely, a corporeally invisible trait like belonging to the Communist
Party might be so fraught with significance as to be highly socially visible.
46. See Mathews, 427 U.S. at 506; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)
(plurality opinion); supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
47. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 n.17 (plurality opinion).
48. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,445 (1985).
49. GOFFMAN, supra note 43, at 51.
50. See id. at 50-51.
51. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (quoting Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638
(1986)).
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disjunctive requirements, with the implication that they are sufficiently
related such that only one requirement need be met.
The connection between immutability and visibility can be seen even
more clearly in Watkins v. United States Army,52 where the Ninth Circuit
panel relied on the language of visibility to define immutability. Thus, the
opinion began by noting that "by 'immutability' the [Supreme] Court has
never meant strict immutability in the sense that members of the class must
be physically unable to change or mask the trait defining their class." 53 The
opinion then maintained that national origin is not strictly immutable, not
because it can be changed, but because it can be concealed: "People can
frequently hide their national origin. .... , 54 The court made a similar point
in the race context: "Lighter skinned blacks can sometimes 'pass' for
white, as can Latinos for Anglos, and some people can even change their
racial appearance with pigment injections."'55 Thus, the definition of
immutability is laced with the rhetoric of visibility-masking, hiding,
passing, and appearing.
It is easy to understand why the courts might conflate these two
concepts. First, visibility as defined by the courts refers to corporeal
visibility that is effectively permanent. To see this point, consider whether
the courts would deem visible a Jewish person who was visible as such only
when he wore a yarmulke, or a Christian who was visible as such only
when she wore a crucifix. But if visibility must be effectively permanent, it
becomes a subset of immutability. When the courts abandon immutability
in favor of visibility, they thus are not shifting to another justification but
merely narrowing the old one; it is now not immutable characteristics
generally but rather visible immutable characteristics that are deemed
worthy of judicial solicitude.56 Second, both visibility and immutability
protect historically protected groups such as those based on race and sex57
while freezing out traditionally unprotected groups such as those based on
sexual orientation or class.5" Third, both factors direct judicial attention to
52. 837 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir.), amended by 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated and aff'd
on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
53. Id. at 1446 (emphasis added).
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. Id. (emphases added).
56. No court has noted that visibility is logically nested within immutability. To engage
judicial analysis on its own terms, I therefore use the words as the courts do. Thus, when I state
that the courts have jettisoned the immutability factor, see infra text accompanying notes 136-137,
I do not mean that they have retired visibility as well, but that they have scuttled immutability as
they define it.
57. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685-86 (1973) (plurality opinion).
58. Gays have been denied heightened scrutiny both on the basis of their mutability and
invisibility. See, e.g., Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289,
293 (6th Cir. 1997) [Equality Foundation Il] (denying gays heightened scrutiny, in part because of
their invisibility), on remand from 518 U.S. 1001 (1996), vacating 54 F.3d 261, 167 (6th Cir.
1995) [Equality Foundation 1], cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3749 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1998) (No. 97-
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the corporeal body rather than to the body politic. In other words, the
immutability and visibility factors both focus on how traits are situated
within group members. In contrast, the other aspects of the heightened
scrutiny test-history of discrimination and political powerlessness-look
to how group members are situated in society. Fourth, both factors justify
themselves through the fact that the groups they define are unable to take
advantage of the ostensibly empowering aspects of assimilation.59 It is to
this final justification that I now turn.
HI. EQUAL PROTECTION'S ASSIMILATIONIST BIAS
Before contesting the assimilationist bias inherent in the immutability
and visibility factors, I wish to note two limitations I have placed on my
critique of assimilation. First, although there are (at least) three different
kinds of assimilationist bias in equal protection doctrine, I focus on only
two. The three biases are converting, passing, and covering. Converting
bias means that a group is asked to change the trait that defines it.
Converting bias is at issue, for example, when gays are forced into
psychotherapy to alter their sexual orientation.' Passing means that a group
is forced to hide its identity. Passing is at issue, for example, when gays are
permitted to serve in the military as long as they do not disclose their
orientation." Covering means that a group is permitted both to retain and
articulate its identity as long as it mutes the difference between itself and
the mainstream.6' Covering is at issue, for example, when an employer
retains "out" gays, but not a lesbian who "flaunts" her homosexuality by
entering into a public commitment ceremony with her same-sex lover.63
1795); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990)
(denying gays heightened scrutiny, in part because "[h]omosexuality is not an immutable
characteristic").
The homeless have also been denied heightened scrutiny on the basis of mutability. See
Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 357 (N.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 61
F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995). Homelessness is obviously only a rough proxy for class, but I rely on it
here because the Supreme Court case denying the poor suspect status did not clearly articulate the
basis for its holding. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
59. See infra notes 91-120, 143-221 and accompanying text.
60. See JONATHAN KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY 129-207 (1976) (documenting case
studies).
61. See infra Part VI.
62. The coinage of the term "covering" appears to be Erving Goffinan's. See GOFFMAN,
supra note 43, at 102-04.
63. See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1111 n.27 (11th Cir. 1997) (upholding the
dismissal of a lesbian attorney and noting that she was dismissed not because of her sexual
orientation but because of her participation in a public same-sex commitment ceremony), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 693 (1998). Another example of forced covering for gays occurs in the family
law context, where gays are permitted to retain visitation rights with their biological children only
as long as they do not "flaunt" their homosexuality while in the presence of their children. See,
e.g., Pennington v. Pennington, 596 N.E.2d 305 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (requiring absence of
father's male and allegedly gay friend during periods of visitation); S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 SAV.2d
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Covering is perhaps a less familiar concept than either converting or
passing, and it is also easily confused with passing. For these reasons, it
may be helpful to describe it further. As Goffman notes, even when a trait is
visible (and therefore passing is not at issue), there is the further question of
its obtrusiveness-that is, the issue of how much the visible trait impedes
the flow of "normal" interaction.64 Thus, "at a business meeting a
participant in a wheelchair is certainly seen to be in a wheelchair, but
around the conference table his failing can become relatively easy to
disattend." 65 This distinction between keeping a trait invisible and keeping
a trait unobtrusive is the distinction between passing and covering. The
businessman is not attempting to pass as a person who is not disabled, but
he is covering the obtrusiveness of his disability.
As indicated by the examples given above, all three assimilationist
demands may be made on indistinct groups. Gays, for example, can be
asked to convert, to pass, or to cover. In contrast, converting and passing
are generally not assimilationist demands made on distinct groups. Blacks
and women, for example, are not commonly required to change or to hide
their race or sex. Covering, however, is an assimilationist strategy that can
be used against distinct groups as well as indistinct groups. When a black
woman is told that she is "too black" or "too feminine," a demand to cover
is being made.
To see how members of distinct groups can be asked to cover even
when they are not asked to convert or to pass, consider the following
statement by Patricia Williams:
A man with whom I used to work once told me that I made too
much of my race. "After all," he said, "I don't even think of you as
black." Yet sometime later, when another black woman became
engaged in an ultimately unsuccessful tenure battle, he confided to
me that he wished the school could find more blacks like me. I felt
myself slip in and out of shadow, as I became nonblack for
purposes of inclusion and black for purposes of exclusion; I felt the
boundaries of my very body manipulated, casually inscribed by
definitional demarcations that did not refer to me.66
Covering, rather than conversion or passing, is at issue here. Williams's
colleague was not asking her to convert to being white or to pass as white.
Rather, he was suggesting that she might cover her blackness by not
164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (limiting child visitation rights of an openly gay mother); In re Jane B.,
380 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (requiring the absence of any homosexual other than the
lesbian mother herself during visitation period).
64. See GOFLIAN, supra note 43, at 49.
65. Id.
66. PATRICIA J. ,ILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OFRACEAND RIGHTS 9-10 (1991).
1998]
The Yale Law Journal
making "too much of [her] race." 67 That expression is telling-Williams is
entitled to her race, but not to "too much" of it; there is a set of unspecified
race-related traits that extends beyond the acceptable bounds of black
identity. Covering also inheres more subtly in the colleague's wish that the
school be able to find "more blacks like"68 Williams, which, by his own
admission, is defined at least in part as a category of persons whom he does
not even think of as black. The colleague's statements, while contradictory
in the way Williams notes, nonetheless arise from a consistent assumption
that there is such a thing as "excessive blackness." That excess both
disrupts the relationship he and Williams could otherwise have and
disqualifies the other black woman from that relationship. It is this excess,
which extends beyond skin color alone, that needs to be covered.69
All three assimilationist demands inhere in current equal protection
doctrine. The demands to convert and to pass are explicitly made in the
immutability and visibility factors, respectively. The immutability factor
withholds protection from groups that can convert, leaving them susceptible
to legislation that pressures them to do so.7" The visibility factor similarly
withholds protection from groups that can hide their defining trait, making
them vulnerable to legislation that induces them to pass.7 '
In contrast, the demand to cover has a more subtle and pervasive
presence in equal protection doctrine. It is not captured in any discrete
factor, but rather in a classification-based--as opposed to class-
based-view of equal protection. A classification-based view of equal
protection seeks to treat all classes created by a classification the same,
while a class-based view privileges the disadvantaged class(es) created by a
67. Id. at 9.
68. Id. at 10.
69. One reason why converting, passing, and covering are often confused is that they are not
only all strategies of assimilation, but strategies that are theoretically understood by analogy to
each other. Thus, when examining Williams's rhetoric, one sees that while she is formally
speaking of covering, she invokes the language both of conversion and of passing to describe the
demand to cover. In the confines of one sentence, the colleague's words are understood through
the rhetoric of mutability (conversion)--"I became nonblack for the purpose of inclusion and
black for the purpose of exclusion," and that of visibility (passing)---" I felt myself slip in and out
of shadow." Id. For an analogous example of a court deploying the language of visibility
(passing) while speaking of immutability (conversion), see supra notes 52-55 and accompanying
text.
70. See Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269-70 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that English-only
employment rules do not violate Title VI's prohibition of national origin discrimination because
speakers choose the language they use); see also Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the
Garcia Cousins Lost Their Accents: Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions
Approving English-Only Rules as the Product of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal
Indeterminacy, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 261,281-85 (1998) (discussing the use of the immutability factor
to disadvantage groups with mutable traits); Halley, Politics of Biology, supra note 14, at 517-18
(describing anti-gay attempts to justify discrimination on the grounds that sexual orientation is
chosen and that "waverers" therefore can be legitimately deterred by the state).
71. See Equality Foundation 11, 128 F.3d at 293 (noting that gays should not get heightened
scrutiny, in part because they are not corporeally visible).
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classification. Because it tends to ignore differences between the classes
created by a classification, the classification-based view often results in the
demand to cover. The ideal of "colorblindness" is perhaps the best example
of such a classification-based view. In attempting to be colorblind, the
judiciary often garners results that not only ignore the real disparities
between whites and blacks but evaluate blacks by implicitly white
standards.72 In order to succeed, blacks are forced to meet those standards,
and thereby must mute any cultural and historical differences between
whites and blacks. In such a scenario, blacks are not being asked to convert
or to pass, but they are being asked to cover.73
Although I am critical of all three assimilationist demands, I restrict my
critique primarily to the first two. This is because the biases to convert and
to pass inhere in the immutability and visibility factors, which offer
themselves as a unified doctrinal target. As will become evident below74
however, an argument for retiring these factors is an argument against a
classification-based view of equal protection. In assailing the doctrinal bias
toward converting and passing, I thus build the foundation for a challenge
to covering. The job of comprehensively critiquing covering, however, is
left for another day.
The second substantive limitation of the Article is my focus on the
judiciary. This focus does not presume that the assimilationist bias is one to
which the judiciary is particularly prone. To the contrary, I assume that the
assimilationist bias is pervasive, and that its doctrinal traces merely reflect
the judiciary's complicity in contemporary American culture. Providing a
programmatic critique of assimilation in society at large, however, is
beyond the scope of the Article. My critique is therefore ultimately
doctrinal, rather than political. Its narrow prescription is that the judiciary
limit, rather than further, the effects of social bias.
Having entered these caveats, I can now begin my critique.
Constitutional theories of judicial review provide two means of justifying
the immutability and visibility factors.75 The first is a substantive theory,
pursuant to which the courts strike down legislation that violates a
constraining constitutional value,76 here the equality principle embedded in
the equal protection guarantee. The second is a processual theory, pursuant
to which courts protect groups that are disadvantaged in the political
72. See Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Black People in White Face: Assimilation, Culture and the
Brown Case, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 665, 669 (1995).
73. See id. at 676-81; Enid Trucios-Gaynes, The Legacy of Racially Restrictive Immigration
Laws and Policies and the Construction of American National Identity, 76 OR. L. REv. 369, 386-
87 (1997).
74. See infra notes 356-360 and accompanying text.
75. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 740-46
(1985).
76. See id. at 741.
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process.7 This Part shows that the immutability and visibility factors
cannot be justified on substantive grounds and then prepares the way for the
more complex challenges presented by the processual argument.
A. The Substantive Defense and Its Shortcomings
The substantive defense of the immutability and visibility factors and
much of the critique of that defense are set forth in Janet Halley's important
work, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology.78 The defense begins
by pointing out that classifications based on immutable traits (which, as
noted above, include classifications based on visible traits) 79 divide people
into groups based on traits that are effectively beyond their control. It then
notes that these classifications violate "'the basic concept of our system
that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility."' 80 In other words, treating people differently because of
traits they cannot change violates fundamental norms of fairness and
equality.
This defense is both over- and underinclusive. It is overinclusive
because it is impossible for society to operate without discriminating on the
basis of some immutable characteristics. The Frontiero Court admitted as
much when it stated that many immutable characteristics, such as
intelligence and physical disability, may provide the basis of legitimate
discriminatory decisions.1 Immutability thus extends protection to more
groups than we wish to protect.
The defense is also underinclusive. The immutability and visibility
factors presume that legislation is less problematic if it burdens groups that
can assimilate into mainstream society by either converting or passing. That
presumption seems misguided, as the ability of a group to respond to
legislation-through assimilation or through other means-seems irrelevant
77. See id. at 740-41.
78. See Halley, Politics of Biology, supra note 14, at 507-09.
79. Halley's discussion of this defense and critique restricts itself formally to immutability. It
is also applicable to visibility, however, if visibility is correctly understood to be a dnd of
immutability. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
80. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion) (quoting Weber v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
81. See Halley, Politics of Biology, supra note 14, at 507-08 (citing Frontiero, 411 U.S. at
688 (plurality opinion)). Halley rightly notes that the Court's examples are "a little dubious,"
given that intelligence and physical disability are not definitively immutable traits. Id. at 508. Yet
the infelicity of the examples does not detract from the correctness of the Court's statement that
society must retain the ability to discriminate on the basis of some immutable traits, such as adult
height. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 472 n.24 (1985)
(Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting that immutable
traits such as height can be valid bases for government classification).
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to the question of whether legislation is legitimate.82 Jews generally can
change or conceal their religion, while blacks generally cannot change or
conceal their race. This surely does not make anti-Semitic legislation more
legitimate than racist legislation.83
To the contrary, if legislation is illegitimate, it should be invalidated
regardless of whether its object is an indistinct or a distinct group. In that
circumstance, it is the state, not the burdened group, that is engaged in
wrongdoing, and thus it is the state, not the group, that should alter its
behavior. To ask the indistinct group to adapt to the state's wrongdoing is to
blame the victim.
In making this criticism of the immutability and visibility factors, I
emphasize that the problem does not inhere in state-sponsored assimilation
per se. Such a wholesale objection would be overbroad. Assimilation has
positive, as well as negative, aspects.' 4 For example, one does not
commonly hear complaints about the state's forcing would-be criminals to
become law-abiding through the criminal law system, or about the state's
requiring the illiterate to become literate through the public education
system. A categorical objection to state-sponsored assimilation would also
be utopian.85 To protect plural notions of the good, the state must enforce
certain ground rules of mutual respect. Those rules, however, have a
substantive content that will burden some conceptions of the good more
than others. Thus, although they attempt to preserve heterogeneity, these
rules will be seen by some as enforcing homogeneity. For example, rules
that protect all racial identities as equally entitled to respect will be
82. See Halley, Politics of Biology, supra note 14, at 509 (making this point in the context of
immutability).
83. Another way of approaching the same insight is to ask, as Laurence Tribe has done,
whether racism would be constitutionally unproblematic if blacks could easily alter their race. See
Tribe, supra note 15, at 1074 n.52 (noting that "even if race or gender became readily mutable by
biomedical means, I would suppose that laws burdening those who chose to remain black or
female would properly remain constitutionally suspect"); see also Watkins v. United States Army,
837 F.2d 1428, 1446 (9th Cir.) (citing Tribe for the proposition that "[riacial discrimination, for
example, would not suddenly become constitutional if medical science developed an easy, cheap,
and painless method of changing one's skin pigmen'), amended by 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.
1988), vacated and aff'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
84. Assimilation, which is defined as the act of becoming similar, is understood to have two
connotations. The positive connotation views assimilation as "a process which liberates
individuals from the binding force of particularistic traditions," thereby inducting them into a
community with shared values. Nomi M. Stolzenberg, Un-Covering the Tradition of Jewish
"Dissimilation": Frankfurter, Bickel, and Cover on Judicial Review, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
809, 814 (1994). The negative connotation casts assimilation as "substituting the dominant
culture's values for those of the subordinated subgroup, rather than transcending the values and
beliefs of any particular culture." Id. at 814-15.
85. Both classical and modem proponents of liberalism share this view. Compare, e.g.,
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 227-28, 376 (C.B. MacPherson ed., 1985) (1651) (giving an
account of how the state requires individuals to give up certain rights in order to protect their
abilities to pursue their various notions of the good), with, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 133-40 (1996) (noting that the coercive power of the state is the predicate for
political liberalism, which holds that multiple notions of the good should be respected).
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experienced by racists as a substantive imposition on their beliefs. The
paradox of liberal heterodoxy is that it must be built on a foundation of
assimilationist orthodoxy.
86
The objection to the assimilationist bias, then, is not to state-sponsored
assimilation but to state-sponsored assimilation that fails adequately to
question whether the assimilation in question is appropriate. Because of the
assimilationist bias implicit in the immutability and visibility factors, the
courts are not asking this question with sufficient force. Once a group is
found to be indistinct, the likelihood is high that it will only receive rational
review. Once it receives rational review, the likelihood is overwhelming
that the legislation allegedly burdening it will be upheld. The descriptive
claim that a group can assimilate thus transmutes into the prescriptive claim
that it should assimilate without much intervening investigation by the
courts into the legitimacy of the legislation. This analysis marginalizes an
inquiry that should be central-whether the assimilation at issue is
appropriate.
It is tempting to end the argument here, for it seems irrefutable as a
matter of substantive equality that groups cannot be denied protection
simply because they can evade discrimination by assimilating into the
political mainstream. But there is another means of justifying the
assimilationist bias, to which I now turn.
B. The Political Process Defense
The alternative defense is grounded in political process theory, which
limits judicial review to cases where the normal political process has
proven inadequate.8 7 The theory begins with the premise that minorities can
be expected to lose in a liberal democracy. A given minority group,
however, should not be expected to lose all the time, because majorities are
coalitions of minority blocs. These coalitions will shift as blocs realign on
86. This paradox replicates itself in the Constitution. The most obvious hallmark of the
Constitution is its heterodoxy, leading one commentator to maintain that the antitotalitarian
principle is a "transcendental doctrine" of the Constitution. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right to Privacy,
102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 805 (1989). And it is true that the explicitly antiassimilationist principles
embodied in, for example, the Free Speech, Freedom of Exercise, and Establishment Clauses, are
far more prominent than the explicitly assimilationist principles articulated in, for example, the
Bill of Attainder and the Titles of Nobility Clauses. But even the most obviously heterodox
principles of the Constitution, when closely examined, reveal themselves to be based on a
conception of orthodoxy. For instance, in the First Amendment context, the Court has
acknowledged that the question is not whether, but how much, assimilation is appropriate.
Compare Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (upholding a flag salute provision
against a First Amendment challenge because it deemed the flag salute to be integral to
inculcating a crucial sense of citizenship), with West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943) (reiterating that certain measures inculcating citizenship are appropriate but overruling
Gobitis because flag salutes are not among them).
87. This theory is elegantly set forth in Ackerman, supra note 75, at 719-20.
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different issues. If a minority consistently loses, this may indicate that other
minority groups are not forming coalitions with it out of prejudice-in
other words, that the democratic process has failed that group.
Unless the process has failed, the judiciary should not intervene to
protect a minority group. Such an intervention would disrupt the democratic
process of wheeling and dealing through which different minority groups
pursue their agendas. Burdened as it is with the countermajoritarian
difficulty, the judiciary suffers a legitimacy deficit whenever it causes such
a disruption. The only time the judiciary may intervene is when the process
has broken down. In cases where a minority bloc is consistently unable to
form coalitions with other blocs because of the prejudice those blocs harbor
towards it, the legislative process itself suffers from a legitimacy deficit. In
correcting that deficit, the judiciary is keeping, rather than breaking, faith
with the democratic process.
Process theory is not casually invoked by name these days. Subsequent
critiques of it have cast doubt on whether courts are indeed capable of
discerning when there has been a failure of the ordinary political process."&
These critiques raise the concern that courts may simply be effectuating
their own substantive judgments under the guise of curing process failure.
Yet some version of this form of legitimating judicial review clearly
endures.89
In considering the validity of assimilationist bias, process theory does
not ask whether the legislation burdening the indistinct group is just or
unjust. Indeed, it eschews that question as calling for precisely the kind of
normative judgment that courts ought to avoid. Rather, process theory seeks
to discover and protect groups that are systematically disempowered in the
political process. Only such groups deserve the court's solicitude; other
groups must use their political power to fend for themselves.
Under this standard, the assimilationist bias seems more plausible. It
can be justified by arguing that distinct groups are politically powerless
because, inter alia, they cannot evade discrimination. When confronted with
discrimination, an indistinct group may temporarily or permanently escape
88. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions
of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1064-65 (1981) (noting that
"process-oriented strategies [are] covertly value-laden"); Tribe, supra note 15, at 1063-64 (noting
that a process-based theory of constitutional law actually masks substantive decisionmaking).
89. See Ackerman, supra note 75, at 740-41 (arguing that judicial protection is necessary to
protect the participation and bargaining abilities of some minority groups in the modem political
process); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on
Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CAL. L. REv. 686 (1991)
(arguing that the political process framework provided by Carolene Products should be retained
for use in cases of racial discrimination); Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political
Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REv. 747 (1991) (arguing that, although certain forms of process
theory have been criticized justly for reliance on substantive judgment, "pure" process theory is
sufficiently powerful to achieve the goals of the equal protection guarantee).
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it by changing or hiding its defining trait. Distinct groups do not have this
chameleon-like ability and are thus subject to the full force of
discrimination.
To defeat the claim that distinct groups are uniquely disempowered, I
lay out the best arguments for the opposite case, which posits that indistinct
groups are less politically powerful than distinct groups. It bears emphasis,
however, that the success of my argument does not turn on proving the
opposite case. My aim here is to call into question the assimilationist bias of
the equal protection jurisprudence. To accomplish that goal, all that I need
to show is that indistinct groups cannot be assumed a priori to be more
powerful than distinct groups. My objective is not to invert the
jurisprudence's current hierarchy between distinct and indistinct groups but
rather to dismantle it.
I thus proceed by breaking the assimilationist bias into its two
components: (1) the "immutability presumption" (underlying the
eponymous factor) that immutable groups are more politically vulnerable
than mutable groups; and (2) the "visibility presumption" (also underlying
the eponymous factor) that visible groups are more politically vulnerable
than invisible groups. In both analyses, two different forms of power will be
in play. "Evasive power" describes a group's ability to elude
discrimination directed against it, while "transformative power" describes
a group's ability to convince others to cease discriminating against it. The
distinction is between a group's capacity for flight and its capacity to fight.
Of these two types of power, transformative power seems to relate
more directly to the political power at issue in the processual framework.
Indeed, a critic might fairly ask why this analysis considers evasive power
at all. My response is that when a group has low evasive power, it is
subjected to discrimination that impinges on its self-esteem and aspirations.
The inroads that such assaults on identity make on a group's political power
will be assumed to be no less potent for being difficult to measure."
Analyzing the presumptions in terms of evasive and transformative
power will reveal that both presumptions implicate the same issues. Both
presumptions are bolstered by the intuitively powerful claims that
immutability and visibility deprive their groups of evasive power. These
claims, however, need to be qualified by noting the costs that evasion
imposes on mutable and invisible groups.
Both presumptions also support themselves with the claims that
immutability and visibility deprive their groups of transformative power in
two ways. First, both qualities allegedly preclude their groups from
90. It also bears note that the analysis below will show that evasive power, standing alone,
provides the strongest justification for both the immutability and visibility presumptions. Thus,
even if the critic persists in believing that evasive power is irrelevant to this analysis, his disbelief
only strengthens my ultimate argument that the presumptions should be retired.
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capitalizing on the "infiltration effect," through which groups penetrate
institutions of power to create social and political change. Second, both
qualities putatively impair their groups from forming cross-group coalitions
because of the "auto-identification effect," in which nongroup members
experience more empathy for conditions that they themselves could acquire.
Finally, both the immutability and visibility presumptions are undercut
by two other effects relating to transformative power that favor distinct
groups. These two effects show that evasive power and transformative
power are negatively correlated, such that a distinct group's lack of the
former results in compensatory gains in the latter. One such correlation is
the "exit/voice effect," in which a lack of evasive power contributes to a
group's transformative power by securing accountable members for it. The
other is the "manipulation effect" in which the ability of indistinct groups
to assimilate tempts third parties to interfere with their social identities.
While the immutability and visibility presumptions converge in these
ways, they also diverge in others. The divergence between them is
sufficient to warrant independent discussion of each. Part IV thus addresses
the immutability presumption; Part V considers the visibility presumption.
IV. THE IMMUTABILITY PRESUMPTION
The immutability factor presumes that immutable groups are more
vulnerable than mutable groups in the political process. In testing that
claim, I consider the two varieties of power described above-evasive
power and transformative power.
A. Evasive Power
The linkage between immutability and evasive power has a surface
plausibility. After all, immutable groups are by definition locked into their
statuses in a way that mutable groups are not. When faced with a legislative
burden, a mutable group has the option to assimilate, while the immutable
group does not. This intuition underlies language in a recent opinion by a
federal appellate judge. Considering the constitutional claims of
homosexuals, he maintained that "there is no more justification for
discrimination against individuals because of their sexual orientation, which
is most frequently a happenstance of birth, than there is for discrimination
against blacks, Hispanics or Asians-or against Catholics, Jews, or
Muslims, who at least have the option to convert."9 Although the judge
was certainly not condoning discrimination against religious groups, he
91. Holmes v. California Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1137 (9th Cir. 1997) (Reinhardt,
J., dissenting).
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nonetheless implied that their ability to convert might blunt the effects of
discrimination against them.
The problem with this argument is that it fails to consider the toll that
such assimilation exacts from mutable groups. When those costs are
considered, it becomes clear that mutable groups have a similar claim on
our sympathies. Quite simply, conversion results in the dissolution of a
group's identity. This basic fact problematizes the statement that mutable
groups have more evasive power in two ways. First, many technically
mutable groups will not consider evasion to be a real option, as they will
find the cure of conversion worse than the disease of discrimination.
Indeed, some groups may fear conversion so much that they will engage in
defensive separatism to protect the integrity of the group, even if this
strategy results in heightened discrimination. The biggest impetus behind
the early growth of the Catholic school system, for example, was the fact
that public schools were being used to inculcate Protestant tenets.92 Second,
even if a group feels that it can and should exercise the option to convert,
the conversion may be experienced less as an evasion from discrimination
than as an effect of that discrimination.93 If a Communist recants on her
political ideology because of anti-Communist sentiment, is her conversion
an escape from that prejudice or the ultimate capitulation to it? The
advantage of evasion that mutable groups possess is thus highly
questionable.
B. Transformative Power
The argument that immutability increases transformative power rests on
two grounds: (1) the infiltration effect; and (2) the auto-identification effect.
The infiltration effect recognizes a positive correlation between a group's
evasive power and its transformative power. The effect presumes that if
group members can evade discrimination, they can bypass discriminatory
gatekeeping and penetrate the institutions that affect a group's
transformative power.
This infiltration effect, however, is much more powerful in the context
of invisibility than in the context of mutability. In the context of invisibility,
a group member can presumably infiltrate such an institution simply by
masking an unchanged essence.94 In the context of mutability, however,
92. See Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64
N.C. L. REV. 303, 327 (1986).
93. This may be especially true if the discrimination intends to effectuate that transformation.
See infra notes 124-126 and accompanying text.
94. I will later qualify the statement that masking a trait leaves its essence intact, see infra
notes 193-197 and accompanying text, but not in a way that damages the relative claim pertinent




infiltration requires that this underlying essence be changed. This will make
it less likely that individuals will help their original class through
conversion, given that the conversion itself is a significant breach of
solidarity with that class. Indeed, it seems intuitively plausible that when a
group assimilates into an institution by changing its defining characteristic,
it is just as likely to be coopted by the institution as to subvert it, whatever
its original intentions. For practical purposes, the advantage of the
infiltration effect may be unavailable to either mutable or immutable
groups.
The second effect that supposedly impinges on the transformative
power of immutable groups is the auto-identification effect.95 The effect
begins with the axiom that we are most likely to identify with individuals
like ourselves. Various courts engaged in antidiscrimination analysis have
expressed this axiom. In the equal protection context, some courts have
assumed that racial and ethnic groups tend to favor group members.96
Similarly, in the Title VII context, some courts have assumed that
individuals cannot subordinate members of their own sex on the basis of
sex.
97
A corollary to this axiom is that, after the traits we possess ourselves,
the traits we might possess (or have possessed) are most likely to inspire
empathy in us.98 And among the traits we do not possess, we are more
likely to possess (or to have possessed) mutable traits than immutable ones.
Therefore, the argument goes, we are more likely to have empathy for the
95. The argument about the auto-identification effect tracks John Hart Ely's argument. See
ELY, supra note 14, at 160.
96. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 138 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); United
States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541, 554 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting that the assumption "that each
race... may tend to favor its own" does not violate equal protection); Partida v. Castaneda, 384
F. Supp. 79, 91 (S.D. Tex. 1974) ("Here, the Mexican-Americans are a governing majority, and it
cannot be presumed they would purposefully and intentionally discriminate against themselves."),
rev'd, 524 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1975), affd, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). In Batson, Justice Rehnquist
noted in dissent that:
The use of group affiliations, such as ... race... as a 'proxy' for potential juror
partiality, based on the assumption or belief that members of one group are more likely
to favor defendants who belong to the same group, has long been accepted as a
legitimate basis for the State's exercise of peremptory challenges.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 138 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
97. See, e.g., Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry., 926 F. Supp. 1044, 1049 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (noting that
if the theory of harassment is subordination of one sex, "same-sex hostile working environment
sexual harassment is not actionable under Title VII"); Quick v. Donaldson Co., 895 F. Supp.
1288, 1296 (S.D. Iowa 1995) ("As a male in a male-dominated environment, Quick cannot
successfully complain that he was discriminated against based upon his gender."), rev'd, 90 F.3d
1372 (8th Cir. 1996); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 833 (D. Md.)
(noting that the male defendant "certainly does not despise the entire group, nor does he wish to
harm its members, since he is a member himself' (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)), aff'd, 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1994).
98. See GOFFsIAN, supra note 43, at 19-20.
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mutable traits we do not possess than the immutable traits we do not
possess.
Based on this logic, the auto-identification effect posits that mutable
groups are less likely than immutable groups to encounter empathy failure
from nongroup members. Age is perhaps the classic example of a mutable
trait that inspires empathy.99 Age divides people into groups, but the
members of these groups are constantly changing. Individuals look up at the
elder generation and see their potential future selves, or look back on the
younger generation and see their past selves. In contrast, immutable traits
will not create such bonds. Thus, a fifty-year-old white might be expected
to have more empathy for a sixty-year-old white than for a fifty-year-old
black, because the likelihood that he will someday be sixty exceeds the
likelihood that he will someday be black.
Yet the syllogism underlying the auto-identification effect is open to
two challenges. We might begin by contesting the axiom that we have the
most empathy for those traits we have ourselves. This principle of self-
respect may not extend to socially stigmatized aspects of the self. Self-
hatred is a common response to such stigmatization,"' as exemplified by
the instances of the self-hating black,"' Jew, 2 or homosexual." 3 This point
99. See ELY, supra note 14, at 160. Although age seems to be the classic example, it is also a
problematic one. As Ely recognizes, it may be something more than mutability alone that makes
us empathize with persons of different ages. Specifically, it is not just age's mutability but also its
inevitability that engenders empathy-so long as we live long enough, we will at some point in
our lives have been the same age as everyone around us. The Supreme Court recognized this point
in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam), where it
found that age was not a suspect classification because old age "marks a stage that each of us will
reach if we live out our normal span." Id. at 313-14. In so saying, the Court was not adducing
age's mutability but rather aging's universality as the reason why age-based classifications were
relatively unproblematic.
100. See Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets,
and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 136 (1982) (quoting PHILIP MASON, RACE
RELATIONS 2 (1970)).
101. See ADELBERT H. JENKINS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AFRO-AMERICAN: A
HUMANISTIC APPROACH 24 (1982) ("Many observers have concluded that there is a considerable
amount of 'self-hatred' in the Black community, even among Black children."); Paul Butler,
Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J.
677, 694 (1995) ("'Black-on-black' violent crime ... can be attributed to internalized racism,
which causes some African-Americans to devalue black lives-either those of others or their
own."). As Patricia Falk notes:
[A] major mechanism through which racism may affect mental health.., is to
compromise the self-esteem of individuals in the persecuted group. If racism is
premised upon the notion of racial superiority, it is not surprising that one sequela is
self-contempt on the part of minority-group members.... This self-hatred may lead to
feelings of despair, depression, hopelessness, and helplessness.
Patricia J. Falk, Novel Theories of Criminal Defense Based upon the Toxicity of the Social
Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and Black Rage, 74 N.C. L. REV. 731,
778 (1996).
102. See SANDERL. GILMAN, JEWISH SELF-HATRED (1986).
103. See EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 81, 242-46 (1990)
(describing the phenomenon of homophobic homosexuals); Aklilu Dunlap, The Bellows of Dying
Elephants: Gay-, Lesbian-, and Bisexual-Protective Hate Crime Statutes After R.A.V. v. City of
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appears to have trickled into judicial consciousness, for while some courts
have presumed that groups will not discriminate against their own,"° the
Supreme Court has cautioned against this presumption. Thus, in the equal
protection context, the Court has noted that "[b]ecause of the many facets
of human motivation, it would be unwise to presume as a matter of law that
human beings of one definable group will not discriminate against other
members of their group." '05 And in the Title VII context, the Court has
asserted that "nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of
discrimination 'because of... sex' merely because the plaintiff and the
defendant... are of the same sex." 1
06
This in turn underscores the limitations of the axiom's corollary, which
is that we are more likely to have empathy for those traits that we do not
have but might possess. In the case of a possessed stigma, respect for the
self and disrespect for the stigma are in conflict. The possibility thus exists
that the individual's affinity for himself will force him to reconsider his
aversion to the stigma. 7 In the case of the threatened stigma, however,
there is no need for such reconciliation, as self-respect and contempt for the
stigma are aligned. Self-preservation will dictate the disavowal of the
stigma into which the self is in danger of falling.
Thus we should not be surprised to find that in a variety of contexts-
such as class, sexual orientation, and disease-it is not immutability, but its
opposite, that creates empathy failure. In the context of class, Jack Balkin
notes that American colonial aristocrats treated their social inferiors with an
affection and noblesse oblige that gave way to fear and distrust only when
class became a more fluid concept in the years after the Revolution.' The
shift in attitudes may be explained by the fact that in the original order, the
class system was rigid enough to make class an effectively immutable
characteristic. In such a regime, the upper classes could interact with the
lower ones while remaining "confident that their social status was
unaffected by such encounters." " As class boundaries became more
contested, this was no longer the case. Balkin maintains that the paradox of
status hierarchy is that the empathy failure between classes increases not in
St. Paul, 12 LAw & INEQ. J. 205, 220 (1993) (noting that gay individuals suffer feelings of
humiliation, isolation, and self hatred" as a result of hate crimes).
104. See cases cited supra notes 96-97.
105. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,499 (1977).
106. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1001-02 (1998) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(a)(1) (1994)).
107. See Ann E. Freedman, Feminist Legal Method in Action: Challenging Racism, Sexism
and Homophobia in Law School, 24 GA. L. REv. 849, 856-57 (1990) (explaining that internalized
sexism has influenced her professional relationships with other women, and also noting that
people are born with a sense of their own self-worth that needs to be given positive reinforcement
in order to develop).
108. See Balldn, supra note 14, at 2333 (citing GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 41-42,271-86 (1991)).
109. Id.
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spite of, but because of, the fact that the actual differences between them
have decreased.11 Thus, it is exactly when class identity is most unstable
that the privileged classes must defend themselves from the depredations of
the less privileged ones.
Speaking of sexual orientation, Leo Bersani notes that homophobia is
energized precisely by the perceived mutability of sexual orientation."'
Without denying the harmfulness of racism, he notes that racism and
homophobia are different in this regard. The perceived immutability of race
means that "not even racists could ever fear that blacks will seduce them
into becoming black." 2 In contrast, "to let gays be open about their
gayness, to give them equal rights, to allow them to say who they are and
what they want, is to risk being recruited."" 3 Here again, the empathy
failure that is homophobia seems to be excited, not quieted, by the
perceived mutability of the underlying trait.
Disease is perhaps the paradigm case, because the infection model of
disease-in which a stigmatized group endlessly wins converts from a
"normal" one-has proven so metaphorically seductive in other
contexts."4 The possibility of transmission-the mutability of the disease-
creates empathy failure, and the more contagious the disease, the more
empathy failure can be expected. Ironically, it is fear of the perfect empathy
that would be involuntarily achieved if one were infected that precludes the
imperfect empathy one might otherwise feel. This need for ontic security in
one's uninfected status is accepted as a rational precondition to imperfect
empathy. The justificatory force of this need is underscored when
prejudices toward diseases that are not particularly contagious manifest
themselves through exaggerations of that contagiousness."5 AIDSphobia,
for example, justifies itself precisely through such hyperbole."6 And
AIDSphobia, like homophobia, is aptly named, insofar as it is the fear of
becoming the other, and thus of the trait's mutability."7
110. See id. at 2333-34.
111. See LEO BERSANI, HOMOS 27 (1995).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See generally SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR (1978) (noting the multiple ways
in which illness is used as a figure for nonmedical conditions).
115. See EDWARD E. JONES ET AL., SOCIAL STIGMA: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MARKED
RELATIONSHIPS 70 (1984) (noting that the terror of being contaminated by a stigma may lead one
to perceive the threat of contamination as being greater than it actually is).
116. See Paula A. Treichler, AIDS, Homophobia, and Biomedical Discourse: An Epidemic of
Signification, in AIDS: CULTURAL ANALYSIS/CULTURAL ACTIVISM 31, 35-36 (Douglas Crimp
ed., 1988). By "AIDSphobia," I mean any irrational fear of the disease, even if that fear is not
diagnosed as the psychiatric syndrome of the same name. See Mandana Shahvari, Comment,
Afraids: Fear of AIDS as a Cause of Action, 67 TEMP. L. REv. 769, 778 (1994) (describing
"AIDS phobia").
117. Indeed, psychologists have noted that the disease paradigm may control even when the
stigma is manifestly neither contagious nor a disease. In one study, one-third or more of college
student subjects stated that they would not go swimming in a pool used by mental patients and
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This is not to say that auto-identification never obtains. But it is to say
that we cannot determine ex ante whether mutability will engender empathy
or empathy failure. This is not only because the empathy effects of
mutability vary across traits, but also because they vary within them, as
exemplified by the case of AIDS. On the one hand, the overreporting of the
disease's mutability generates empathy failure." 8 On the other hand, the
simultaneous underreporting of the disease's mutability-as in the concept
that the disease is confined to "risk groups"-also produces empathy
failure, insofar as AIDS is seen by "normals" as a disease that only strikes
others." 9 Both the auto-identification effect and its opposite are thus at
work within the confines of a single trait. In any context, the responses of
nongroup members will be shaped by any number of complex factors, not
least of all their own faculties of imagination and compassion."0 This very
unpredictability makes auto-identification incapable of supporting a blanket
immutability presumption.
The infiltration and auto-identification effects would seem to exhaust
the support for the proposition that immutable groups have less
transformative power. Before concluding the discussion, however, we must
also consider two other effects that actually undermine the immutability
presumption: (1) the exit/voice effect; and (2) the manipulation effect.
These effects show that a lack of evasive ability translates into
compensatory gains in transformative ability.
The exit/voice effect denotes an inverse correlation between evasive
power and transformative power first recognized by Albert Hirschman 2'
and subsequently applied to political process theory by Bruce Ackerman. 2
The effect arises from the fact that individuals faced with oppression will
often confront the choice of exiting the group (evasive power) or of voicing
opposition to that discrimination (transformative power). The more
available the exit option is, the less likely they are to stay and fight. By
making the exit option of conversion impossible,'23 immutable
characteristics make it more likely that group members will organize
against the oppression.
that they would wash their hands after touching a mental patient. See JONES ET AL., supra note
115, at71.
118. See Leo Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave?, in AIDS: CULTURAL ANALYSIS/CULTURAL
ACTIVISM, supra note 116, at 197, 199-201.
119. Treichler, supra note 116, at 65-67.
120. See, e.g., TIMOTHY F. MURPHY, ETICS IN AN EPIDEMIC: AIDS, MORALITY, AND
CULTURE 173-81 (1994) (describing how biomedical research and treatment priorities are
decided).
121. See ALBERT O. HIRscHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 44-54 (1970).
122. See Ackerman, supra note 75, at 730-31.
123. As I will discuss later, conversion is not the only exit option. Group members may also
conceal their defining characteristics in lieu of challenging discrimination against the group. See
infra notes 143-158, 222-223 and accompanying text.
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The other effect positing a negative correlation between evasive power
and transformative power is the manipulation effect. This occurs because
social actors see that mutable groups are open to social engineering in a
way that immutable groups are not.124 Thus, dominant groups may be
tempted to manipulate the identities of mutable groups through strategies
that would be futile if directed toward immutable groups. For example, they
might force mutable groups to change their identities, as in coerced
conversions of religion, 125 or to retain unwanted identities, as in bars on
naturalization for aliens.
126
The manipulation effect will not obtain for immutable groups. The
perception that immutable groups cannot change gives an air of futility to
social attempts to make them do so." That perception also generates the
related normative, claim that it is morally abhorrent to penalize persons for
what they cannot control.' Immutability thus garners immunity even for
conditions that would be condemned if mutable. 29 For instance, even
though regular use of illegal drugs is widely viewed as immoral, 3 ' the
124. This distinction has been drawn in the psychology literature:
In- the case of stigmas for which people cannot be held responsible, the restriction or
termination of social relations is likely to be an end itself. Racial discrimination, for
example, tends to remove blacks from competition for high-prestige jobs, and
institutionalization of the mentally retarded can remove them from the social
mainstream altogether. With stigmas over which persons have some control, however,
the restriction or termination of social relations may not be the only end. Suppose that
religious heretics are banished from a country. Such a reaction has the immediate
consequence of ridding the country of persons with deviant religious beliefs. At the
same time, it can be a means of discouraging other persons from adopting similar
beliefs.
Mark C. Stafford & Richard R. Scott, Stigma, Deviance, and Social Control, in THE DILEMMA OF
DIFFERENCE: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY VIEW OF STIGMA 77, 88 (Stephen C. Ainlay et al. eds.,
1986).
125. See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The
Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51 OHIO ST.
L.J. 89, 110-11 (1990) (noting that religious beliefs require protection from coerced conversion
because they are mutable).
126. See, e.g., Charles J. McClain, Tortuous Path, Elusive Goal: The Asian Quest for
American Citizenship, 2 ASIAN L.J. 33, 34-36 (1995) (describing the history of bars on Asian
naturalization).
127. Because we are not speaking of "strict" immutability, I frame the futility of forcing
immutable groups to change as a perception rather than as a reality.
128. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion) (quoting
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
129. The reverse is also true-the morality of a group identity, once established, moots the
question of whether the group identity is immutable. "[Tihe very question of 'how we got that
way' would in many quarters not be asked if it were not assumed that we ended up the wrong
way .... " BERSANI, supra note 111, at 57.
130. See, e.g., EDWIN J. DELATrRE, CHARACTER AND Cops: ETHICS IN POLICING 128 (2d
ed. 1994) ("Because drug use adversely affects families and the broader society, opponents say,
government has a rightful interest in prohibition."); James Q. Wilson, Drugs and Crime, in
DRUGS AND CRIME 521, 523 (Michael Tonry & James Q. Wilson eds., 1990) ("The moral reason
for attempting to discourage drug use is that the heavy consumption of certain drugs is destructive
of human character.... The dignity, autonomy, and productivity of many users, already impaired
by other problems, is destroyed.").
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often-related status of being a drug addict is protected by the (at least short-
term) immutability of the status.'
3'
Under this formulation, the argument that immutable groups are
vulnerable because they lack evasive power is revealed to be weak not
because it is false, but because it would appear to be widely accepted. Its
broad currency leads one to expect that social actors, including legislatures,
will consider it in making their determinations. This in turn calls into
question the need for the judiciary to intervene in that decisionmaking
process. As Ely has noted: "Surely one has to feel sorry for a person
disabled by something that he or she can't do anything about, but I'm not
aware of any reason to suppose that elected officials are unusually unlikely
to share that feeling." 132
Ely's position is supported by the fact that groups sometimes defend
themselves by proving immutability rather than disavowing it. The rising
fascination with genetic identity may be partially explained by an interest in
this strategy.' Stigmatized traits that have been attributed to genetics
include "mental illness, homosexuality, aggressive personality,
dangerousness,... exhibitionism, the tendency to commit arson,... [and]
shyness." 
13 4
These two inverse correlations between evasive and transformative
ability mean that when a group gains a quantum of evasive power, it tends
to lose a quantum of transformative power. This is damaging, if not fatal, to
any generalization about the relative power of immutable and mutable
groups. To see this, suppose I attempted to argue, contrary to the
conventional wisdom among judges, that immutable groups are more
powerful than mutable groups. I would base this claim in part on the limited
evasive power of mutable groups-changing their social identity is at best a
debilitating option for them. A critic could then point out that if this were
so, mutable groups would accrue compensatory gains in transformative
power through the exit/voice effect and the manipulation effect.135 This
131. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,666-67 (1962).
132. ELY, supra note 14, at 150.
133. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of Genetics, 45
VAND. L. REV. 313, 329-32 (1992).
134. Id. at 320.
135. The inverse correlation between evasive power and transformative power that obtains in
the context of the manipulation effect is complicated by the fact that the manipulation effect gives
transformative gains to groups that are perceived to have no evasive power. One could thus
imagine a scenario in which a group was vulnerable to attempted manipulation because it was
perceived to have evasive power, even if it effectively did not.
The fact that religion is perceived by many to be a mutable characteristic, for example, has
left religious groups vulnerable to the manipulation effect. See Brownstein, supra note 125, at
110-11. Many individuals, however, may not experience religion to be a mutable attribute. See
Lori Kraft-Jacobs, What Is "Religion" in Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges?, 65 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1291, 1322 n.226 (1997) (noting that while religious affiliation "is certainly not immutable
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critic would then deny that the vectors of evasive and transformative power
would net out in a predictable way. The core of her objection would thus be
that such a net effect was unlikely to obtain across all contexts. And she
would be right, which is why I am arguing not that immutable groups are
more powerful than mutable groups, but rather that no generalizations can
be made either way.
C. Immutability as Harbinger
A review of the processual defense of the immutability presumption
reveals its tenuousness. The argument that immutable groups lack evasive
power initially appears plausible. But when more closely examined, the
evasive power of mutable groups proves only to be the power of self-
annihilation.
The two arguments ostensibly supporting the proposition that
immutable groups consistently have less transformative power also
evanesce on closer examination. The hypothesis that immutable groups are
less likely to be able to take advantage of the infiltration effect proves weak
as mutable groups, who must convert to infiltrate, are also unlikely to
capitalize on the effect. The auto-identification effect similarly fails to
provide unambiguous support for the immutability presumption because the
effect simply does not obtain in a variety of contexts.
In contrast, the two contentions that immutable groups have more
transformative power than mutable groups have some analytical force. The
exit/voice effect ensures that immutable groups will draw on a more secure
base of accountable members, although this relative advantage will be
qualified by the aforementioned exit burdens on mutable groups. And the
manipulation effect shows that certain state strategies of eradication and
suppression are deployable only against mutable groups.
It is thus unsurprising that courts have begun to withdraw the
immutability factor 36 and that recent academic commentary seems univocal
in calling for its retirement even as a factor.1 37 What is surprising is that the
incipient demise of the immutability factor has not affected the visibility
factor, especially since, as noted above,1 38 visibility is logically nested
within immutability. Even as the Court has retreated from immutability, it
has not questioned, much less repudiated, its historical reliance on "high
visibility," ,39 and "obvious badge[s]." '40 And progressive constitutional
in the literal way in which race is immutable, [it] is, for most people, a matter of birth and not a
matter of choice").
136. See cases cited supra notes 15-18.
137. See sources cited supra note 14.
138. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
139. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,686 (1973) (plurality opinion).
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scholarship that approves or accepts the demise of the immutability factor
has ignored or even validated the visibility factor. Cass Sunstein, for
example, simultaneously notes that immutability is neither necessary nor
sufficient for heightened scrutiny14 1 and argues for an equality principle that
would direct its concern toward groups that are defined by "highly visible
and morally irrelevant" characteristics.142
One explanation for why courts and commentators have not retired
visibility is that the rejection of both factors would open the floodgates to a
new set of groups claiming heightened scrutiny. The demise of the
immutability factor is a blow to the equal protection paradigm that
privileges race and sex. When immutability is withdrawn, it becomes harder
to see why race and sex are protected as the two talismanic classifications,
and why others-such as sexual orientation or class-are not. Fortunately
for defenders of the status quo, the visibility factor performs the same
gatekeeping function as immutability. Like immutability, visibility retains
race and sex as privileged categories while excluding other classifications.
The failure of the courts to extend their criticism of immutability to
visibility thus might arise because the visibility factor provides a means of
retaining the status quo.
While politically expedient, that position is logically untenable. The
next Part argues that the rejection of immutability should be a harbinger for
the repudiation of visibility. The application of the analytical framework
deployed above will reveal important differences between the two factors
that make the visibility presumption more tenable than the immutability
presumption. More significant than these differences, however, are the
similarities. Visibility, like immutability, has an equivocal relationship to
political powerlessness. I now describe that relationship.
V. THE VISIBILITY PRESUMPTION
The Supreme Court has not proffered an explicit rationale for why
corporeally visible groups are more vulnerable than corporeally invisible
groups. That theoretical vacuum has been filled by lower courts and
academic commentators, as well as the Court's own intimations. When
140. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976).
141. See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 2443.
142. Id. at 2411. Given that I will ultimately disagree with Sunstein's argument, it is only fair
to repeat his caveats to the "anticaste principle." First, Sunstein proffers this principle as one of
many possible equality principles, and not the only one required by the Constitution. See id. at
2411-12. Second, Sunstein is not explicitly attempting to justify the bias toward visibility in the
equal protection context. See id. at 2432-33. These caveats demonstrate that Sunstein did not
formulate his principle with my context in mind. Sunstein's analysis, however, emphasizes
visibility's disempowering aspects without considering the debilitating effects of invisibility. As
such, his analysis provides a rationale for the visibility factor.
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pieced together, these rationales cohere into an argument that closely tracks
the earlier one about immutability. Once again, the basic claim is that
visible groups always have less evasive and transformative power than
invisible groups. Once again, this argument cannot be sustained.
A. Evasive Power
The analysis of the evasive power held by visible groups is more
complex than the analysis of the evasive power held by immutable groups.
It begins with the same point-namely, that visible groups lack the
discretion to fade into the political mainstream. But it also notes that visible
groups suffer from debilities that do not affect immutable groups, such as
their vulnerability to superficial judgment and the asymmetry of
information between them and invisible groups. It then observes that
invisible groups are more likely than mutable groups to take advantage of
their evasive ability. It qualifies these points, however, by noting that
invisible groups encounter significant epistemic and ontic harms when they
engage in this evasion.
1. Visibility's Vulnerability
In considering the evasive power of visible groups, it will be useful to
begin with an extravagant claim made in the Federal Reports. In Equality
Foundation of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati,143 the Sixth Circuit
claimed that invisible groups are invulnerable to state discrimination. In
denying homosexuals heightened scrutiny, the Sixth Circuit quoted the
Supreme Court's language that a group seeking such protection needed to
be marked by an "obvious, immutable, or distinguishing
characteristic[]." '" It noted that "the reality remains that no law can
successfully be drafted that is calculated to burden or penalize, or to benefit
or protect, an unidentifiable group or class of individuals whose identity is
143. 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995) [Equality Foundation 1], vacated 518 U.S. 1001 (1996), on
remand 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997) [Equality Foundation 17], cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3749
(U.S. Oct. 13, 1998) (No. 97-1795). In discussing the Sixth Circuit's view of invisibility in this
case, I quote from its first opinion, Equality Foundation L This may seem problematic given that
this opinion has been vacated. The vacatur, however, had nothing to do with the court's argument
that gays should be denied heightened scrutiny in part because of their invisibility. Moreover, on
remand, the Sixth Circuit resurrected that argument in Equality Foundation II, 128 F.3d at 293
(quoting Equality Foundation 1, 54 F.3d at 267) (noting that a suspect class cannot be defined "by
subjective and unapparent characteristics such as innate desires, drives and thoughts"). The
argument that gays should not receive heightened scrutiny in part because of their invisibility is
thus still good law in the Sixth Circuit. The reason that I quote from Equality Foundation I as
opposed to Equality Foundation II is that the analysis of the former was abbreviated in the latter.




defined by subjective and unapparent characteristics such as innate desires,
drives, and thoughts."' 45 Based on this analysis, it concluded that
"[b]ecause homosexuals generally are not identifiable 'on sight' ... they
cannot constitute a suspect class or a quasi-suspect class." '46 The point
appears to be that invisible groups exist outside the law, such that they are
impervious to its harms (as well as to its benefits); 47 the logic behind it
appears to be that if the state cannot discriminate between two groups, it
cannot discriminate against one of them.
The Sixth Circuit's idea that corporeally invisible groups are beyond
the law is hard to sustain. Under this definition, political and religious
groups, which are also defined by "subjective and unapparent
characteristics,"", would also be impervious to state harm or help. For this
to be true, the invisible would have to be unable to communicate their
invisible trait in any way to others; they would have to be locked into the
category of invisibility in the same way that the visible are locked into the
category of visibility. No such symmetry exists-it is much harder to
convert visibility to invisibility than to convert invisibility to visibility. As a
practical matter, "there is nothing a black woman plausibly may do to hide
the fact that she is black or female." 149 All a Catholic lesbian need do to
transform her corporeal invisibility into declarative visibility, however, is to
145. Id.
146. Id. As the Seventh Circuit recently noted, the Equality Foundation I court's "analysis
appears to conflate the requirement that discrimination be based on membership in a definable
class to trigger equal protection analysis with the requirement that the class have 'obvious,
immutable, or distinguishing characteristics' to trigger heightened or strict scrutiny." Nabozny v.
Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 457 n.10 (7th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). I ignore that doctrinal
confusion here, as it does not bear on the merits of the court's argument about visibility.
147. As bizarre as it may seem, this conception of invisibility as a grant of unfettered power
to its possessor has an ancient pedigree. In Book II of The Republic, Plato recounts the story of
Gyges the Lydian, a shepherd who finds a ring that can make him invisible at will. See 1 PLATO,
THE REPUBLIC 117-19 (T.E. Page ed. & Paul Shorey trans., G.P. Putnam's Sons 1937). Gyges
uses the ring to seduce the wife of the king, kill the king, and ultimately to possess the kingdom.
See id. According to Plato, the invisible man ultimately stands outside the law, because he can
"with impunity take what he wishes even from the marketplace, and enter into houses and lie with
whom he pleases, and slay and loose from bonds whomsoever he would, and in all other things
conduct himself among mankind as the equal of a god." Id.
It would fall to later commentators to interrogate the assumption that invisibility imbues its
bearer with absolute power. Thus, H.G. Wells's invisible man begins with this assumption, only to
be disabused of it over the course of the novel. Compare H.G. WELLS, THE INVISIBLE MAN 84
(Macdonald Daly ed., 1995) (1897) ("I beheld, unclouded by doubt, a magnificent vision of all
that invisibility might mean to a man-the mystery, the power, the freedom. Drawbacks saw I
none."), with id. at 111 ("The more I thought it over... the more I realised what a helpless
absurdity an Invisible Man was...."). Critical commentary has argued that Wells's novel was a
conscious revision of the Gyges parable. See Macdonald Daly, Introduction to WELLS, supra, at
xxix, Xxxvii.
148. Equality Foundation 1, 54 F.3d at 267.
149. Ackerman, supra note 75, at 729. Obviously, there are "passing exceptions" to this
rule-some blacks and some women are capable of passing as whites or men, respectively. See,
e.g., Watkins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1446 (9th Cir.), amended by 847 F.2d 1329
(9th Cir. 1988), vacated and aff'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
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avow membership in either group.15 This asymmetry means that the
Equality Foundation court's premise that invisible groups are
invulnerable"' to legislation is illogical. Legislation can burden invisible
groups by impeding them from exercising the option to become visible (or
to remain invisible). To the extent that corporeally invisible groups value
this option, they will be deeply affected by legislation that burdens their
declarative visibility (or invisibility). By penalizing these conversions, such
legislation can hurt those who engage in them and chill the desire of those
who would otherwise do so.
A refinement of the Equality Foundation court's point recognizes that it
is precisely the asymmetry between their abilities to manipulate their social
visibility that may make invisible groups more powerful than visible
groups. Discrimination often targets visible markers that are stable over
time. Those who are so marked "will probably trigger reactions from others
in a wide variety of spheres, even in the interstices of everyday life." '
Conversely, those who are not marked by a stable and visible characteristic
cannot be as easily policed, as "visibility is a precondition of
surveillance." 153 Members of invisible groups are therefore more likely than
their visible counterparts to be able to control public perceptions of their
identity. This discretion contributes to greater power in some circumstances
because an individual can modulate the expression of her identity in an
adaptive way.15" The refined version of the Equality Foundation principle
thus discards the absolute claim that invisible groups are invulnerable in
150. There are exceptions to this rule as well. It is hard for groups marked by invisible
characteristics to be totally "out" about their identities. This is because social norms make it
difficult to communicate invisible traits to people in a continuous and unambiguous way. For
example, even a lesbian who seeks to be "out" in every context will have a hard time making her
homosexuality as apparent as it would be if it were corporeally visible. Verbal speech is simply
not capable of disseminating information in the same way as a visible trait-social norms make it
difficult to state one's homosexuality in every encounter with "a new boss, social worker, loan
officer, landlord, doctor." SEDGWICK, supra note 103, at 68. Thus, gays may instead rely upon
physically visible-albeit noncorporeal-traits, such as an earring in the right ear or a pink
triangle button. Although continuously performative in a way that speech is not, these accessories
suffer from ambiguity. This is in part because audiences may not have the interpretive capacity to
decode them. Moreover, even if the audience possesses that interpretive faculty, the fact that
anyone may don these signifiers overdetermines them. A pink triangle button, for example, may
mean that the wearer is pro-gay rather than gay.
151. Equality Foundation 1, 54 F.3d at 267.
152. Sunstein, supra note 12, at 2432.
153. BERSANI, supra note 111, at 11.
154. The most obvious instance of this is that a black person will have a harder time making
it past a racist lynch mob than a homosexual will making it past a homophobic lynch mob. But
discretion will also be important to combat the subtle and daily forms of discrimination that take
their toll over the long term. For example, one study comparing the adjustment of children with
scars from facial bums with the adjustment of those with congenital heart disease found that the
latter were better adjusted, despite the fact that their condition was much more life-threatening.
See JONES ET AL., supra note 115, at 35 (citing Richard T. Goldberg, Adjustment of Children with
Invisible and Visible Handicaps: Congenital Heart Disease and Facial Burns, 21 J. COUNSELING
PSYCHOL. 428 (1974)).
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favor of the relative claim that visible groups are more vulnerable than
invisible groups because they have relatively less discretion over the
expression of their identities.
The hypothesis that invisible groups are relatively empowered by their
discretion finds support in the fact that efforts to disempower those who
have invisible characteristics often attempt to remove this discretion. The
original Greek meaning of the word "stigma" was a physical sign "cut or
burnt into the body," and "designed to expose something unusual and bad
about the moral status of the signifier." 15 Similarly, one of the purposes of
torture was to leave a permanent brand of the crime on the criminal's body,
so that his invisible inner state was manifested in a visible outer one. 56
Even after the rejection of physical branding, the idea endures that invisible
traits are shorn of some of their power when made visible. We have simply
substituted the forced declarative visibility of the scarlet letter for the forced
corporeal visibility of the bodily sign. 157 Modem courts deploying such
"scarlet letter" shame sanctions have adopted such measures as compelling
a drunk driver to place a bumper sticker on his vehicle that read
"CONVICTED DUI-RESTRICTED LICENSE" and compelling a
convicted sex offender to place stickers on the doors of his home and
vehicle reading "DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDER-NO CHILDREN
ALLOWED." '58
The argument that heightened discretion leads to heightened evasive
power sounds in the earlier discussion of immutability. Visibility, however,
impinges on the evasive ability of its bearers in two ways that do not have
ready analogues in the immutability context. The first is that visible
characteristics can call forth the most superficial kinds of judgments. The
second is that visible traits create power inequities between visible
performers and invisible observers.
155. GOFFMAN, supra note 43, at 1.
156. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 34 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977).
157. See Neal Kumar Katya, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2456 n.237
(1997) ("Physical torture of course is not the only means of marking people out [to reveal their
stigmatized identity] .... The 'Scarlet Letter' is a less physically invasive version of the impulse,
which, unlike torture, has broad literal and figurative appeal today (for example, Megan's
Law).").
158. See Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (per curiam)
(DUI case); State v. Bateman, 771 P.2d 314, 315 (Or. CL App. 1989) (en banc) (sex offender
case). For discussions of these cases, see, for example, Rosalind Kelley, Sentenced To Wear the
Scarlet Letter: Judicial Innovations in Sentencing-Are They Constitutional?, 93 DICK. L. REV.
759, 759 (1989). For normative discussions of modem shame sanctions, compare David M.
Boyers, Emotion over Reason: California's New Community Notification and Chemical
Castration Laws Feel Good, but Fail "Sensible" Scrutiny, 28 PAc. L.J. 740,750 (1997), and Toni
Massaro, Shame, Culture and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1881-83 (1991),
which argue against shame sanctions, with Kelley, supra, which argues for shame sanctions.
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To see why visible traits call forth superficial judgments, we must
understand vision's virtues and vices. In his essay The Nobility of Sight,'59
Hans Jonas provides such an understanding. He points out that vision has
been recognized as "the most excellent of the senses" 160 for three related
reasons. First, sight is incredibly efficient because of its synoptic quality.
While the other senses only work over time, sight permits the observer to
take a snapshot of her surroundings.' 6' Second, sight gives one a bigger
picture because it can operate at a remove. Indeed, it is the only sense that
gains with distance: Touch and taste require direct engagement; hearing and
smell require a more attenuated but nonetheless close interaction. Vision,
unlike all of these, requires nothing but the most glancing contact between
the observer and the observed.' 62 Third, because of this temporal and spatial
disengagement, sight is deemed to be more objective. It seems to permit
knowledge "of the thing as it is in itself as distinct from the thing as it
affects [the viewer]." 163 With its promise of fast, expansive, and objective
perception, it is no wonder that we think that "we know it when we see
it," 164 that we think that vision is the sense most conducive to, and
productive of, knowledge.
But Jonas predictably goes on to note that vision has the vices of its
virtues. As it can operate at a distance, it is not forced into a closer
relationship with the things it senses.' 65 Because it does not seem to
implicate the viewer, it diminishes and/or falsifies the interactive
component of perception. 166 (He might have completed his critique by
noting that vision, being quick, misperceives things that unfold over
time.)167 By noting these intrinsic limitations of vision, Jonas uncovers what
another commentator has called the "'false promise of the visible as an
epistemological guarantee." 1
68
When vision's linked virtues and vices are understood, so are its
dangers. 69 Vision is dangerously seductive; it promises knowledge but
159. Hans Jonas, The Nobility of Sight: A Study in the Phenomenology of the Senses, 14 PHIL.
& PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 507 (1954).
160. Id. at 507.
161. See id. at 507-08.
162. See id. at 517-18.
163. Id. at 515.
164. Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (responding
famously to the problem of defining pornography by stating, "I know it when I see it.").
165. See Jonas, supra note 159, at 516.
166. See id. at 515-16.
167. See Carol M. Rose, Seeing Property, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE
HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 267,270-71 (1994).
168. Elaine K. Ginsberg, The Politics of Passing, PASSING AND THE FICTIONS OF IDENTITY 1,
4 (Elaine K. Ginsberg ed., 1996) (quoting Amy Robinson, It Takes One To Know One: Passing
and Communities of Common Interest, 20 CRITICAL INQUIRY 715, 716 (1994)).
169. Carol Rose has considered the role that vision's virtues and vices play in the context of
property theory. Rose notes that "property's visibility ... is especially attuned to letting people
speak to each other, over time, about their relation to place" because "one can read the messages
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never quite delivers on it. That visible characteristics are "cheaply used as a
proxy for other things" 170 provides an often irresistible urge to use them,
with or without the knowledge that they are a reductive proxy. This makes
visible characteristics "especially likely to be a basis for statistical
discrimination and to fuel prejudice from third parties." 171 In this sense,
"we know it when we see it" may be more accurate as a description of how
we operate as human beings than as a prescription for how we ought to
behave. One might thus see vision as incompatible with justice, and
evidence that our culture does so can be found in the longevity of the icon
of blind Justice.172
The second way in which visibility distinctively trenches on the evasive
capacities of its bearers is by exposing them to invisible viewers. In arguing
that visible groups are more vulnerable than invisible ones, I have thus far
focused on the visibility of the group, noting the visible group's
vulnerability to inescapable and superficial judgment. Yet an account of the
oppression suffered by visible groups would be incomplete without an
examination of the relative invisibility of those who observe them.
Discrimination is a dynamic in which a trait held by a victim and an attitude
held by a discriminator interact; just as the victim group is defined by its
trait, the discriminating group is defined by its attitude. Yet, unlike the
victims' traits, which are sometimes corporeally visible, the discriminators'
attitudes are always corporeally invisible. The discrimination suffered by
those with visible characteristics such as race and sex is surely enhanced by
the fact that those who discriminate against them are invisible-that is, by
the fact that although race and sex are corporeally visible, racism and
sexism are corporeally invisible.
To recognize that race and sex implicate themselves in a dynamic in
which visible victims are watched by invisible discriminators is to
recognize that the scopic regimes of racism and sexism are panoptic. As
most famously described by Michel Foucault, such a regime replicates the
of successive generations through the way that property looks." Rose, supra note 167, at 268.
Rose goes on, however, to acknowledge the power of the scholarly "attack on vision as an
objectifying, static model for knowledge-an attack that has disturbing implications for the notion
of property as a persuasive enterprise, since persuasion is necessarily intersubjective and
dynamic." Id.
170. Sunstein, supra note 12, at 2416.
171. Id. at2432.
172. Positive interpretations of the blindness of Justice are that she is blindfolded: (1) to shut
out "'the misleading evidence of the senses,"' Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Images of
Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727, 1755 (1987) (quoting CESARE RIPA, BAROQUE AND Rococo
PIcTORIAL IMAGERY 120 (Edward A. Maser ed., 1971)); (2) to show that Justice stands apart
"from the cares, pleasures, and complexities of humanity," id. at 1756; (3) to shield Justice from
"fear or favor," by precluding her from seeing the "signals a sovereign might send on how to
decide a case" and "the power of the litigants or witnesses who might seek to intimidate her," id.
at 1757-58; or (4) to underscore that "insight and wisdom were not dependent upon what was
perceived," id. at 1758.
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relationship created by Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon-a ring-shaped
building surrounding a tower.173 The inside of the ring was divided into
cells, and each cell had a window through which the individual in the cell
could be observed at all times from the tower.174 The cells were constructed,
however, such that an inmate could never see his observer. Thus, the inmate
knew he was always visible without ever knowing whether he was watched.
Foucault describes the major effect of the Panopticon as "induc[ing] in the
inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assure[d] the
automatic functioning of power." 175 In other words, the Panopticon was a
structure that inspired paranoia in those incarcerated within it and that
deployed this paranoia as a means of control. That paranoia sprang directly
from the interaction between the acute visibility of the inmates and the
invisibility of the putative watchguard in the tower. Because the paranoid
imagination projected an ever-present guard onto the scrim left studiously
blank by the Panopticon's architects, "the surveillance [was] permanent in
its effects, even if it [was] discontinuous in its action." 
176
The physical structure of the Panopticon is merely the instantiation of a
more pervasive social relationship, 177 as reflected in the cases of race and
sex. To be black, or to be a woman, in present-day America is to inhabit a
virtual Panopticon. This is because the visibility of race and sex and the
invisibility of racism and sexism create "naturally" the dynamic that the
architects of the Panopticon sought to replicate artificially. This dynamic is
one in which an actor perceives her visibility to be heightened precisely
because the invisibility of her putative observers causes her own
imagination to act as a perpetual watchguard. Thus, when a black woman
enters a room of people she does not know, everyone immediately knows
she is both black and female without her knowing-immediately or perhaps
ever-whether none, some, or all of them are racist or sexist. This
asymmetry of information is likely to have disquieting effects for her.
Barbara Flagg posits that even if a committee subjected individual
interviewees to the identical intense questions about their competence, a
black interviewee might take particular "exception to that line of
questioning because of the common white stereotype of blacks as not very
intelligent." '78 If the candidate has no prior knowledge of her interlocutors,
"she might reasonably at least wonder whether the questions arise from that
173. See FOUCAULT, supra note 156, at 200.
174. See id.
175. Id. at 201.
176. Id.
177. As Foucault notes, the Panopticon "must be understood as a generalizable model of
functioning; a way of defining power relations in terms of the everyday life of men." Id. at 205.
178. Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953, 975 (1993).
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stereotype, even if they in fact do not." 179 In other words, the invisibility of
racism may cause a rational black woman to entertain constantly at least the
possibility that she is dealing with a racist. Entertaining that possibility may
itself become a liability in her interactions. It is thus not only the visibility
of the observed but also the invisibility of the observer that contributes
negatively to the experience of visibility.
2. The Costs of Evasion
The argument that visibility seriously impinges on a group's evasive
ability is stronger than the analogous argument made in the immutability
context. And the counterargument in the visibility context-which again
looks to the costs of.evasion-appears weaker. For unlike evasion in the
immutability context, evasion in the visibility context seems not to concern
a change in essence but merely one in appearance. Because the costs of
evasion are less drastic, we can expect that invisible groups will be more
likely to take advantage of their option to evade discrimination by
"passing" than mutable groups will by "converting."
This does not mean, however, that those costs are not substantial. I will
divide them into two varieties-epistemic and ontic. Epistemic harms relate
to one's expression, or to how one is known, while ontic harms relate to
one's being, or to how one is constituted.18
There are at least three epistemic harms to passing, all of which have
been ably canvassed by Erving Goffman. The first is the alienation that the
passer feels from both the nonstigmatized group into which he has passed
and the stigmatized group from which he has passed. Passers are uniquely
isolated. The support they get from the nonstigmatized group is not support
they receive for their real stigmatized selves; indeed, they may be
particularly privy to insults against the stigmatized group that circulate only
among "normals." They are also unlikely to get support from the
stigmatized group, which may not recognize the passer as one of its own
and may not accept him if it does. Goffman gives the example of a spinster
masquerading as a married woman, who endures both the negative attitudes
that her married friends direct towards the unmarried, as well as the envy of
other spinsters who do not recognize her for what she is."'
Outside the equal protection context, the Supreme Court has recognized
the isolating effect of passing. In Powell v. Texas,181 the Court noted that the
problem of alcoholism in the United States is exacerbated "by the fact that
179. Id.
180. The lines between these two harms will not always be clear. See infra notes 193-197 and
accompanying text.
181. See GOFFMAN, supra note 43, at 87-88.
182. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
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a very large percentage of the alcoholics in this country are 'invisible'-
they possess the means to keep their drinking problems secret, and the
traditionally uncharitable attitude of our society toward alcoholics causes
many of them to refrain from seeking treatment from any source." 183 The
Court thus acknowledged that discriminatory attitudes toward invisible
groups cause group members to pass, and that this passing alienates them
from potential sources of support. Yet it has not applied this insight,
generated in the Eighth Amendment context, to its analysis of invisibility in
the equal protection context."
The second cost of passing is the sheer work it entails. Goffman gives
the firsthand testimony of the stutterer who must constantly rearrange his
speech and thought to avoid certain words;18 of the visually impaired
person who must greet anyone who looks like his significant other with
familiarity to keep his condition secret from her;186 and of the wife of the
mental patient who cannot allow anyone into her apartment without first
removing material identifying her husband's hospital.'87 Studies of lesbians,
gay men, and bisexuals describe the sheer work of passing as including the
work of (1) "constantly decid[ing] whether or not to tell, whom to tell, and
when to tell"; (2) "constantly monitor[ing] ... emotional responses in
order not to reveal... true feelings"; and (3) "maintaining an image of
being stem, businesslike, efficient, and task oriented" in order to maintain a
safe distance from others. 188
The third epistemic harm of passing is a moral harm. Passing is not
merely a movement from an oppressed position to a privileged one. Rather,
it is a movement that would not be possible without deception. To pass is
always to trespass;'89 the individual who passes always simultaneously
takes on the identity of a liar. When he comes out, he assumes two
stigmatized identities; he is "exposed first in his differentness and secondly
in his dishonesty and untrustworthiness." '90 Thus, "[s]omeone who seems
outwardly quite normal but is later found to have leprosy may not only
183. Id. at 527.
184. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (implying in the equal protection
context that invisibility is empowering without mentioning this disempowering aspect of it);
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976) (same); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686
(1973) (plurality opinion) (same).
185. See GOFFMAN, supra note 43, at 89.
186. See id. at 88.
187. See id. at 89.
188. Joanne DiPlacido, Minority Stress Among Lesbians, Gay Men, and Bisexuals, in
STIGMA AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 138, 148-49 (Gregory M. Harek ed., 1998) (collecting
studies).
189. See Ginsberg, supra note 168, at 3 (noting that passing always has the metaphorical
implication of trespassing a boundary).
190. GOFFMAN, supra note 43, at 95.
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appear blighted by a heinous condition, but may also appear deceitful and
dangerous." 191
A defender of the visibility presumption might argue that these three
harms are inconsequential relative to the harms incurred by mutable groups.
She might maintain that when mutable groups convert, they are changing
the underlying essence of their being, but that in contrast, when invisible
groups pass, they are merely changing the expression of an essence that
remains unaltered. In short, she might contend that the harms of passing are
only epistemic, rather than ontic.
This distinction, however, proves untenable, for passing generates ontic
harms as well. This is true even if we adopt an essentialist view of core
identity," as Janet Halley demonstrates in the case of homosexuals:
[H]omosexuals who experience their sexual desire as immutably
oriented towards persons of their own sex nevertheless may be
coerced to pretend that they conform to the norm of
heterosexuality. Such a result is no mere fib: it is a change. To be
sure, what has changed is not the supposed essence of sexual
orientation, but the representation of it available for social
interpretation. But essences, conceding for a moment their
existence, are not visible to legislatures, judges, employers, or
police. Social agents work with social meaning; the fairness and
indeed the constitutionality of their acts must be measured in the
context of the practical, not the ideal, epistemology of their
decisionmaking 93
Although passing may not require a change in essence, its practical effects
may be tantamount to such a change. It is in this sense that the
191. JONES ETAL., supra note 115, at 35.
192. Edward Stein elucidates the difference between essentialism and constructionism, again
in the context of sexual orientation, as follows:
Essentialists hold that a person's sexual orientation is a culture-independent, objective
and intrinsic property while social constructionists think it is culture-dependent,
relational and, perhaps, not objective.... Essentialists think that being a heterosexual
or homosexual is like having a certain blood type or being a person taller than six feet.
The essentialist would have no problem saying that there were heterosexuals and
homosexuals in Ancient Greece; it is just a matter of whether or not a person has the
relevant properties (such as a certain gene, hormone, psychological condition, etc. or
some combination of these). Even though people in past cultures may have had no idea
what constitutes a gene, a hormone, an Oedipal complex or whatever the relevant
properties are, they either did or did not have such properties, and thus the essentialist
would claim that they were thereby either heterosexual or homosexual (or whatever the
appropriate categories of sexual orientation are). In contrast, while social
constructionists agree that people in all cultures engaged in sexual acts, they think that
only in some cultures (e.g., our culture) are there people who have sexual orientations.
Edward Stein, Conclusion: The Essentials of Constructionism and the Construction of
Essentialism, in FORPMs OF DESnzE: SExuAL ORIENTATION AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST
CONTROVERSY 325-26 (Edward Stein ed., 1990) (citations omitted).
193. Halley, Politics of the Closet, supra note 14, at 934 (citations omitted).
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aforementioned conflation of immutability and visibility in the Watkins
court's discussion of immutability 94 becomes intelligible.'95 In that
discussion, the Ninth Circuit cited the ability of light-skinned blacks to pass
to show that heightened scrutiny did not require strict immutability.'96 The
light-skinned black who passes, of course, is masking rather than changing
his race. But that distinction proves unimportant insofar as "[slocial agents
work with social meaning."' 97 For practical purposes, everyone will treat
the light-skinned black as if he were white.
The passing dynamic becomes even more ontologically fraught if one
suspends the assumption that essences exist. In such a model, expression is
not just an effect of an underlying identity but potentially a cause of it as
well. Thus, when that expression is burdened, the burden is not only an
epistemic harm but also an ontic one.
B. Transformative Power
The discussion of the transformative power of visible groups is also
more complex than the analogous one for immutable groups. Both
discussions, however, implicate the same effects-the infiltration effect, the
auto-identification effect, the exit/voice effect, and the manipulation effect.
1. The Infiltration Effect
The infiltration effect posits that invisible groups have an advantage
over visible groups because they can evade discriminatory gatekeeping and
penetrate organizations. As noted above, visible groups are prone to
superficial visual judgments.' The infiltration effect points out that in
addition to this vulnerability, visible groups are harmed when such
judgments are used for gatekeeping purposes because their superficiality is
preserved by the distancing effect of physical or psychic segregation. In
other words, visual judgments can preclude the social interaction necessary
to reveal their superficiality. Justice Stevens made this point in the
affirmative action context in distinguishing between decisions to exclude
people from educational institutions solely on the basis of their race and
decisions to include them on the same basis:
194. See Watkins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir.), amended by 847 F.2d
1329 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated and affd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
195. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
196. See Watkins, 837 F.2d at 1446.
197. Halley, Politics of the Closet, supra note 14, at 934.
198. See supra notes 159-172 and accompanying text.
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The exclusionary decision rests on the false premise that
differences in race, or in the color of a person's skin, reflect real
differences that are relevant to a person's right to share in the
blessings of a free society. As noted, that premise is "utterly
irrational," and repugnant to the principles of free and democratic
society. Nevertheless, the fact that persons of different races do,
indeed, have differently colored skin, may give rise to a belief that
there is some significant difference between such persons. The
inclusion of minority teachers in the educational process inevitably
tends to dispel that illusion whereas their exclusion could only tend
to foster it. 99
Under this view, persons of different races need to be integrated not
because they are different (as the traditional diversity rationale would
assume),"' but rather because they are not. The problem with excluding
individuals based on race is that it leaves unchallenged a shallow judgment
made on the basis of vision-the judgment that "differently colored skin"
reflects "some significant difference.""20 If racial minorities are included,
the superficiality of that decision will be revealed. If racial minorities are
excluded, however, the information needed to reveal the superficiality of
the discrimination will never be gathered. Thus, the harm in discriminatory
gatekeeping based on visible traits is that it not only reflects but reinforces
stuperficial judgment.
Although the infiltration effect favors invisible groups in this way, the
metes and bounds of that advantage deserve close examination. Most
obviously, that advantage will be conscribed by the invisible agent's fear of
exposure. Any invisible person's advocacy for a stigmatized group may
raise the suspicion that she belongs to that group. 2 To the extent that an
individual's standing in an institution is predicated on the preservation of
her closet, she will have to choose her battles carefully.
A critic might argue that the constraint of feared exposure will not exert
much force in two situations. First, there will be situations in which power
may be exerted with minimal risk of exposure. Our culture has a "respected
199. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 316 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(internal citations omitted).
200. See, e.g., id. at 286 (" [A]ithough its precise contours are uncertain, a state interest in the
promotion of racial diversity has been found sufficiently 'compelling,' at least in the context of
higher education, to support the use of racial considerations in furthering that interest.")
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 311-12, 320 (1978) (recognizing diversity in education as a compelling state
interest, but holding that the racial classification policy at issue was not narrowly tailored to serve
that interest).
201. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 316 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
202. See infra notes 220-221 and accompanying text.
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tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of political causes" 203 precisely in
order to protect the proponent of the message. Anonymous voting is
perhaps the paradigm case, in which an agent may temporarily come out of
her closet because it is nested in the larger closet of the voting booth. 4 The
social presumption against forcing political organizations to disclose their
membership lists is another example.' 5 It should be noted, however, that
these ostensible safe havens are never entirely secure. The privacy of the
secret ballot has been qualified,2 6 as has the privacy of membership lists. 07
In the alternative, the critic might argue that there are situations in
which an invisible agent achieves power not in spite of exposure but
because of it. When a person exposes herself as belonging to a stigmatized
category, she forces those around her to reconcile their understanding of her
with their understanding of the stigma. The advantage that an invisible
agent has over a visible one is that she can allow others to get to know her
independently of her stigma. This means that when the invisible individual
ultimately reveals her stigma, she will be more likely to have the resource
of intimacy at her disposal. Her revelation may thus have a potent
disruptive effect on the prejudicial attitudes of her audience.2"'
The intuition that exposure has salvific potential for the stigmatized
individual and her class runs deep. It was manifest in the buzz of
speculation concerning Justice Powell's gay clerk0 9 after the Supreme
203. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 343 (1995); see also American
Constitutional Law Found. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092, 1102 (10th Cir. 1997) (addressing the
Supreme Court's protection of anonymous political expression); FEC v. Hall-Tyner Election
Campaign Comm., 678 F.2d 416, 417 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting that "[alnonymity has long been
essential to uninhibited political activity in a democratic society").
204. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 343; Meyer, 120 F.3d at 1102; Hall-Tyner, 678 F.2d at 417;
see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, art. 21.3 (declaring the guarantee
of secret ballot or its equivalent to be a basic human right).
205. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (holding that the tax interests
alleged by the city were insufficiently compelling to require the disclosure of membership);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (reversing a civil contempt order compelling the
NAACP to disclose its membership); Adolph Coors Co. v. Wallace, 570 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. Cal.
1983) (denying a discovery order that would have required a gay rights organization to reveal its
members); Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248 (E.D. Ark. 1968) (enjoining a prosecuting
attorney from using the subpoena power to force the disclosure of names of contributors to the
Republican Party).
206. See, e.g., NLRB v. Groendyke Transp., 372 F.2d 137, 142 (10th Cir. 1967) (upholding
the use of voting by mail as satisfying the requirement of secret ballot, despite the fact that voting
by mail does not assure the same degree of ballot secrecy as that provided by use of voting
booths).
207. See, e.g., Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,
367 U.S. 1 (1961) (requiring the Communist Party to disclose, inter alia, its membership lists to
the Subversive Activities Control Board); New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63
(1928) (upholding a statute requiring organizations with oath-bound membership criteria, such as
the Ku Klux Klan, to provide membership lists to the state); see also Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109 (1959) (upholding defendant's conviction for refusing to answer congressional
inquiries into whether he was or had ever been a member of the Communist Party).
208, See SEDGWICK, supra note 103, at 74-78.
209. See id. at 74-75.
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Court upheld a sodomy statute against a due process challenge in Bowers v.
Hardwick.1 The gay clerk, who had not revealed his homosexuality to
Justice Powell prior to oral argument in the case, considered doing so
shortly thereafter to persuade the undecided Justice to take a pro-gay
position."' After the clerk opted not to make this revelation, Justice Powell
cast the fifth, and determinative, vote for the anti-gay position. 12
Commentators have speculated that if Justice Powell had been confronted
with his clerk's homosexuality, he might have reconsidered his beliefs, and
thereby his vote, about homosexual sodomy." 3 That intuition also finds
some support in the fact that poll after poll demonstrates that those who
know an "out" homosexual are much more likely to be pro-gay. 14
But that intuition will not always hold. It seems quite likely that the
revelation of stigma within the confines of an intimate relationship will
generate cognitive dissonance in a listener who is now torn between respect
for the person and disrespect for the class in which the person has just
confessed membership.2 5 Yet the resolution of that dissonance in favor of
the individual is far from a foregone conclusion. As Eve Sedgwick points
out: "I[W]e have too much cause to know how limited a leverage any
individual revelation can exercise over collectively scaled and
institutionally embodied oppressions." 21 6 Moreover, even if the cognitive
dissonance is resolved in favor of the individual, that may not save the
class. The individual may be interpreted as the unstereotypical exception
that proves the stereotypical rule.217 And finally, even if the cognitive
dissonance is resolved in favor of the class, the outcome has to turn on
one's impression of the class.1 '
210. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
211. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 521-22 (1994).
212. See id. at 524.
213. See SEDGWICK, supra note 103, at 77.
214. See Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the
Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283, 313 (1994).
215. See SEDGWICK, supra note 103, at 78-79.
216. Id. at 78; see also id. at 78-82 (noting seven factors that could prevent the clerk's
disclosure from leading to a judicial change of heart).
217. See Jennifer Crocker & Neil Lutsky, Stigma and the Dynamics of Social Cognition, in
THE DILEMIA OF DIFFERENCE: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY VIEW OF STIGMA, supra note 124, at 95,
117.
218. Thus, at least three barriers stood between the clerk's coming out and Justice Powell's
taking a pro-gay position in Bowers. First, Justice Powell would have had to interpret in the
clerk's favor the cognitive dissonance triggered by the revelation, using his positive impression of
the clerk to discredit his negative impressions of homosexuals rather than vice versa. Second,
even if he had done this, he would then have had to interpret the clerk as representing the class
rather than as deviating from it. And finally, even if the clerk had persuaded him to reconsider his
view of homosexuality, Justice Powell would have had to be persuaded that this changed view
made a difference to the outcome of the case. What the clerk actually did say to Powell was that
"the right to love the person of my choie ... would be far more important to me than the right to
vote in elections." JEFFRIES, supra note 211, at 522. Powell's response was "IT]hat may
be... but that doesn't mean it's in the Constitution." Id.
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Thus, while the infiltration effect posits the relative privilege of
invisible groups, a fuller analysis reveals that invisible groups may simply
suffer from the obverse of the problem encountered by visible groups.
Visible groups encounter the problem that their identities (as members of
the stigmatized class) are immediately known, but their personalities (by
which I mean their abilities, their temperaments, etc.) are not. Invisible
groups, on the other hand, have the problem that their personalities are
known, but their identities are not. Both groups thus face difficulties, for
different reasons, in forming coalitions with others. People form coalitions
with others by rubbing elbows with them.2 19 Members of visible groups
have difficulty building such coalitions because the visibility of their stigma
results in physical or psychic segregation-others will not "rub elbows"
with them. Members of invisible groups have this difficulty despite their
integration into mainstreai society because their integration is predicated
on their nondisclosure-others will not rub elbows with "them."
2. The Auto-Identification Effect
The analysis of the auto-identification effect given in the immutability
context is applicable with a few modifications to this context. One could
hypothesize that, as with immutability, visibility would lead to empathy
failure because of the auto-identification effect. If people are visibly
different from us, we are less likely to see ourselves (or our past or future
selves) in them.
This effect, however, must again be qualified by noting that the
epistemic uncertainty of invisibility can spawn not empathy but its
opposite. To see this effect, consider how nongroup members are
differently situated when they attempt to support a visible group as opposed
to an invisible one. A white politician who supports blacks may be called a
"nigger-lover," but she is unlikely to be called a "nigger." A non-
Communist politician who supports Communists, in contrast, is vulnerable
not only to the charge that she is "Commie-lover" but also to the charge
that she is herself a "Commie." Although both politicians must pay the
price of association with a stigmatized group,22' the politician who supports
an invisible group may also pay the price of having membership in that
group ascribed to him.22'
219. See ELY, supra note 14, at 161.
220. See JONES ET AL., supra note 115, at 71.
221. See Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny
for Gays, 96 COLuM. L. REv. 1753, 1807-08 (1996).
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3. The Exit/Voice Effect
The exit/voice effect confronted by invisible groups is an exacerbated
version of that faced by mutable groups. Invisible groups incur lower costs
than mutable groups when they engage in evasion. 2 Thus, it is likely that
the exit/voice effect will take a larger toll on invisible groups than it will on
mutable groups.
The effect differs for invisible and mutable groups in another way. If a
member of an invisible group chooses to exert her voice by converting her
corporeal invisibility to declarative visibility, she has for practical purposes
made an irreversible decision. What distinguishes the declaratively invisible
from the declaratively visible is, quite simply, a declaration that
disseminates knowledge of the underlying trait. The informational character
of declarations makes them hard to retract. The exit/voice effect in this
context thus contains a one-way ratchet-if individuals choose voice (or at
least the kind of voice that requires disclosure of their identity), they are
permanently forgoing exit. This means that, as I have noted elsewhere,"
the exit/voice dynamic in the visibility context may be represented as a
prisoner's dilemma.
Under the prisoner's dilemma, the communally optimal situation for the
two individuals marked by an invisible characteristic is for both of them to
reveal themselves. Yet the parties will have difficulty reaching this
communally optimal point because they lack information about each other.
A prisoner cannot ask the question, "If I reveal myself, would you come
out too?" because that question performs a partial act of revelation even as
it is posed, and the one-way ratchet of the revelation makes retraction
meaningless.
Individuals in the prisoner's dilemma must thus decide on their own
whether to reveal themselves. If an individual decides to do so, there is
always the risk that the other individual will not reciprocate. In that
circumstance, the individual who reveals herself pays the price of
disclosure without the support of the other individual. Conversely, the other
individual evades the harms of visibility but can free ride on the benefits
that accrue to the group through the visibility of the individual who reveals
herself.224 Given this scenario, rational, risk-averse individuals will
determine that the option more likely to empower them as individuals will
be to remain hidden. But if both individuals remain closeted, they will be
collectively disempowered.
222. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
223. See Yoshino, supra note 221, at 1801-02.
224. It is true that the closeted individual must ultimately come out to claim the benefits that
accrue to the group. In the meantime, however, such an individual can free ride on the political
advances made by his out peers.
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A Comes Out A Remains Closeted
B Comes A benefits A benefits greatly
Out B benefits B benefits minimally
(Cooperative Liberation) (A free rides on B)
B Remains A benefits minimally A benefits minimally
Closeted B benefits greatly B benefits minimally
(B free rides on A) (Mutual Disempowerment)
The harshness of the prisoner's dilemma should not be exaggerated, for
it may be tempered in two ways. First, there will be occasions in which
Prisoner A may come out only to Prisoner B, rather than to the public at
large. The one-way epistemic ratchet will operate, but only with respect to
B. If A knows that B will keep her secret, A will thus be protected from
harm even if B does not reciprocate by coming out of the closet. Second, in
cases where the prisoner's dilemma is iterated, some individuals can be
expected to be out at the time A and B play the game. If A knows any of
them, she will not be relying on B alone for potential support after she
comes out of the closet.
4. The Manipulation Effect
Invisible groups are deeply vulnerable to the manipulation effect in
ways that visible groups are not. This vulnerability arises not in spite of, but
because of, the discretion invisible groups have over the expression of their
identities. The fact that the expression of a trait is discretionary does not
mean that its possessor holds that discretion; to the contrary, social actors
can often wrest that discretion away from the possessor of the trait. By
doing so, such actors can control the possessor's identity in a way that
could not be applied to those who bear traits whose expression is not
discretionary.
The distinctive forms of social control that third parties have over
invisible traits concern both their forced disclosure and their forced
repression. The state's forced disclosure of invisible traits may be seen in
the use of Megan's Law to out sex offenders. 25 Conversely, the state's
225. See, e.g., Ronald K. Chen, Constitutional Challenges to Megan's Law: A Year's
Retrospective, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 57 (1996) (discussing the background of Megan's Law, court
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forced repression of invisible traits may be seen in the context of its "don't
ask, don't tell" policy.22 6 These means of controlling and shaping the
identities of invisible groups could not logically be deployed against visible
groups. To force a bearer of a visible trait to expose it would be moot; to
force her to suppress it would be futile.
C. The Harm of the Visibility Presumption
When the analytical framework developed in the context of
immutability is applied to the context of visibility, the results are complex.
The claim that visible groups lack evasive power was buttressed by their
lack of discretion, their vulnerability to superficial judgment, and their
placement in a panoptic dynamic. Yet the costs that evasion imposed on
invisible groups were also dramatic. These costs included the epistemic
harms of alienation, the onerous labor of passing, and the moral burden of
doing so. They also included the ontic harm of identity erasure.
The analysis of transformative power also failed to give clear support to
the visibility presumption. The advantage the infiltration effect gave to
invisible groups was shown to be qualified. The auto-identification effect
again proved too unpredictable to support the visibility presumption (or its
opposite). And the exit/voice effect and the manipulation effect supported
the claim that visible groups were likely to have more transformative power
than invisible groups.
This analysis should demonstrate that the visibility presumption, like
the immutability presumption, is deeply flawed. There is no innate
connection between visibility and political powerlessness, nor is there an
innate connection between invisibility and political power. Rather, the net
effects of visibility will depend on context, sometimes disempowering a
group 7 and sometimes empowering it.2"
At this point, the argument for retiring both the immutability and the
visibility presumptions is technically complete; the presumptions cannot be
justified on either a substantive or a processual theory of judicial review.
But to end the argument here fails to capture the injustice of the
immutability and visibility presumptions. This is because I have thus far
largely ignored the role of the state in participating in the social context in
which the net effects of immutability (or mutability) and visibility (or
invisibility) are determined. When the state participates in the animus
challenges to it, and similar legislation); Robert J. Martin, Pursuing Public Protection Through
Mandatory Community Notification of Convicted Sex Offenders: The Trials and Tribulations of
Megan's Laws, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 29 (1996) (same).
226. See infra Part VI.
227. See JONES ET AL., supra note 115, at 27-35.
228. See id. at 35-36.
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against a group, it is uniquely capable of structuring regimes that maximize
the downsides and minimize the upsides of any of these traits.229 If the
state's animus is directed against immutable or visible groups, the operation
of the immutability and visibility presumptions makes it more likely that
the courts will correct such state animus. If the state uses the mutability or
the invisibility of a group against it, however, the courts will still presume
that such mutability or invisibility empowers the group and therefore will
be less likely to strike down the legislation. Given that the equal protection
guarantee is supposed to protect groups against prejudicial state action, it is
ironic that the courts assume that mutability and invisibility consistently
lead to political power even in contexts where the state itself is providing a
powerful counterexample.
Thus, although I have already demonstrated the illogic of the
immutability and the visibility presumptions, I have yet to demonstrate the
real urgency underlying the illogic. The severe harm that the presumptions
can inflict cannot be understood without recognizing the power of the state
to make a group's mutability or invisibility an immense liability to that
group. To facilitate that recognition, the next Part considers a case in which
the state has structured an invisible group's context so that that the net
effects of its invisibility are deeply debilitating: the "don't ask, don't tell"
policy of the United States military."3
VI. "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL"
The policy of restricting homosexuals from serving in the United States
Armed Forces dates back to World War L31 Prior to the current statute, the
governing standard was that of the 1981 Department of Defense
Regulations, which stated that "[h]omosexuality [was] incompatible with
military service." 2 In late 1992, President-elect Clinton indicated to the
press that he intended to lift the ban on gays in the military, permitting
homosexuals to serve openly with regulations only on their conduct.
3
229. See Peter Nixen, The Gay Blade Unearthed: Unmasking the Morality of Military
Manhood in the 1990s, An Examination of the U.S. Military Ban on Gays, 62 UMKC L. REV.
714, 748-50 (1994) (noting the "catch-22" situation created by prohibiting homosexuals from
making their sexual orientation visible and then refusing to grant heightened scrutiny to review
the military ban because sexual orientation does not appear to be immutable, precisely because it
can be hidden).
230. My example concerns an invisible group rather than a mutable one because the visibility
factor has not been as aggressively challenged as the immutability factor, See supra notes 136-142
and accompanying text.
231. See NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INST., RAND CORP., SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY: OPTIONS AND ASSESSMENT 3 (1993) [hereinafter RAND].
232. Enlisted Administrative Separations: Standards and Procedures, 32 C.F.R. pt. 41 app. A
(1997).
233. See Janet E. Halley, The Status/Conduct Distinction in the 1993 Revisions to Military
Anti-Gay Policy: A LegalArchaeology, 3 GAY L.Q. 159, 165 (1996).
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Opposition to such unilateral executive action, however, proved fierce-a
number of Senators threatened to enact legislation that would override
Clinton's proposed changes.234 Later that year, President Clinton had
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin draft an executive order responsive to
congressional concerns, but Congress ultimately rejected that order and
enacted the first statute governing sexual orientation in the military.35 That
statute and the Department of Defense regulations implementing it
constitute the "don't ask, don't tell" policy.
The crux of the statute generally requires a member of the armed forces
to be discharged if one of three findings is made. First, if "the member has
engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited another to engage in a
homosexual act or acts," the member will be discharged in the absence of
mitigating circumstances. 36 Second, if "the member has stated that he or
she is a homosexual or bisexual," the member will be discharged unless
there is a further finding "that the member has demonstrated that he or she
is not a person who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to
engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts. 237 Third, if "the
member has married or attempted to marry a person known to be of the
same biological sex," the member will be discharged.238 The language
pertaining to the second finding constitutes the "don't tell" portion of the
policy-gays and bisexuals are discharged for coming out unless they can
rebut the presumption thereby created that they have engaged in or are
likely to engage in homosexual conduct. In contrast to the "don't tell"
provision, the "don't ask" provision is strictly a regulatory creation. The
relevant regulation notes that "[a]pplicants for enlistment, appointment, or
induction shall not be asked or required to reveal whether they are
heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual."239
Litigants challenging the "don't ask, don't tell" policy have argued,
inter alia, that the policy violates the equal protection component of the
Fifth Amendment. 4 Although this issue has not made it to the Supreme
Court, all four circuit courts that have considered it have upheld the
constitutionality of the policy.241
By running the "don't ask, don't tell" policy through the analytical
framework developed in Part V, I seek to show in this Part that the policy
234. See id. at 166.
235. See id. at 165.
236. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (b)(1) (1994).
237. Id. § 654(b)(2).
238. Id. § 654(b)(3).
239. Dep't of Defense Directive No. 1304.26, encl. 1, § B(8)(a).
240. See Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 631 (2d Cir. 1998); Phillips v. Perry, 106 F.3d
1420, 1424 (9th Cir. 1997); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256,260 (8th Cir. 1996); Thomasson v.
Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 927 (4th Cir. 1996).
241. See Able, 155 F.3d at 636; Phillips, 106 F.3d at 1429; Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 264;
Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 934.
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ensures that the net effects of gay invisibility are negative. That framework
showed that whether invisibility contributes to or detracts from the evasive
and transformative power of a group depends on context. When the manner
in which the military policy manipulates that context is examined, it
becomes clear that the policy simultaneously dampens the empowering
aspects and amplifies the disempowering aspects of gay invisibility.
Before embarking on that analysis, however, I address two objections
to the use of "don't ask, don't tell" as a case study: the "military
deference" objection and the "sui generis" objection. The military
deference objection is that the deference the courts pay to the military
makes it unlikely that my analysis, even if accepted, would lead the courts
to hold the policy unconstitutional. This objection is supported by the fact
that the circuit courts upholding the policy have all relied in part on military
deference to reach their results, quoting the Supreme Court's statement that
where Congress's authority over military affairs is concerned, "'judicial
deference.., is at its apogee."' 242
The quick response to the "military deference" objection is that the
objection misconstrues the purpose of my case study. That purpose is not to
argue the unconstitutionality of the policy; rather, it is to show how the state
can manipulate the context in which an invisible group operates to ensure
that the net effects of its invisibility are disempowering.
But is the quick response too quick? Even if one acknowledged that
military deference is not damaging to the case study, one could nonetheless
argue that it is damaging to the arguments that the study attempts to
support. If the study shows that the state can make the net effects of
invisibility disempowering, this becomes: (1) an argument for jettisoning
the visibility factor, which then becomes (2) an argument for according
gays heightened scrutiny, which in turn becomes (3) an argument for
finding the policy unconstitutional. Thus, although military deference does
not affect the validity of the case study, it is perhaps natural to ask whether
it affects a plausible end to which the study could be put.
One answer to that question is that the study should not be used to
support further arguments without deep consideration of military deference.
The fact that "don't ask, don't tell" is such an overt example of the state's
deploying the invisibility of gays against them makes the military a good
place for gays to make the first argument noted in the previous paragraph.
As a practical matter, however, litigators should not be enticed into
challenging the policy without considering military deference, which raises
difficulties in moving from the first argument to the second and third
242. Able, 155 F.3d at 632 (quoting Goldman v. Weinberg, 475 U.S. 503, 508 (1986)
(quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981))); Phillips, 106 F.3d at 1425 (same);
Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 261 (same); Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 925 (same).
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arguments. For even in the absence of the visibility presumption, deference
could pose two difficulties: (1) it could preclude courts from granting gays
heightened scrutiny (without which the policy is presumptively
constitutional);243 and (2) even if heightened scrutiny were granted, it could
still preclude courts from finding the policy unconstitutional.2' In other
words, the context in which gays might most easily defeat the visibility
presumption is also the context in which they will have the hardest time
parlaying that victory into a finding of unconstitutionality.
I believe that these difficulties are ultimately surmountable, although I
do no more here than sketch the contours of the ways in which they may be
overcome.245 As to the first, it is hard to argue that military deference
precludes a finding of heightened scrutiny, given that both paradigmatic
heightened scrutiny classifications, race24 and sex,247 were granted
heightened scrutiny in the military context. As to the second, it is at least an
open question whether military deference could save a policy subjected to
heightened scrutiny, given the stringent nature of that review.24s Moreover,
even if courts found that gays deserved heightened scrutiny but deemed the
military policy to survive it, gays could take that finding of heightened
scrutiny to other contexts in which military deference does not apply. This
243. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (noting that a classification subjected to
rational basis review "is accorded a strong presumption of validity").
244. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216, 223-24 (1944) (according race "the
most rigid scrutiny" but upholding Japanese-American internment legislation in a military
context).
245. Again, my treatment of the military deference objection is abridged because it does not
directly affect the validity of my case study, but only the validity of one end to which my case
study might be put. The curtailed nature of this treatment is manifest not only in the synoptic way
my points are made, but also in my bracketing of the issue of whether military deference is
legitimate in the first place. I do no more than mention that the literature against military
deference in its current form is robust. See, e.g., Kirstin S. Dodge, Countenancing Corruption: A
Civic Republican Case Against Judicial Deference to the Military, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1,
17-38, 44 (1992) (noting that "judicial deference to the military ignores the wisdom and cautions
of the nation's founders and the civic-republican ideals that influenced them, and undermines the
nation's ability to maintain and strengthen democratic self-government in our modem,
heterogeneous social and political culture"); Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the
Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499, 563-81 (1991) (critiquing the three
rationales for judicial deference in military affairs: "deference in an emergency, deference based
on the special needs of a 'separate community,' and deference based on the judiciary's relative
incompetence to understand military matters"); Military Ban on Yarmulkes, 100 HARV. L. REV.
163, 170-71 (1986) (arguing, in the context of infringements on religious rights, against the status
quo in which the military deference is a "mechanical sanction of military authority" and
suggesting that deference should still require the military to adduce a robust rationale for its
actions); John Nelson Ohlweiler, The Principle of Deference: Facial Constitutional Challenges to
Military Regulations, 10 J.L. & POL'Y 147, 175-81 (1993) (arguing that strict military deference
need not apply when facial constitutional challenges are concerned, because these are less likely
to threaten military effectiveness than individual personnel decisions).
246. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. 213 (according race-based classifications heightened scrutiny
for the first time in a military context).
247. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion) (according sex-
based classifications heightened scrutiny for the first time in a military context).
248. See supra note 5.
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is because heightened scrutiny is not limited to the context in which it is
granted, but follows the classification into all contexts.249
The last observation, however, raises a related objection, which I call
the sui generis objection. Because heightened scrutiny follows the
classification into all contexts, it makes sense to require that the group's
claim to heightened scrutiny also hold across these contexts." ° This
explains why the heightened scrutiny inquiry asks whether a group is (for
example) politically powerless in all contexts rather than looking only at its
powerlessness in one context. That requirement raises the concern that even
if one finds that "don't ask, don't tell" disempowers gays, that
disempowerment is limited to the military and therefore cannot serve as the
sole predicate for heightened scrutiny.
The sui generis objection can be met by noting that although "don't
ask, don't tell" is a particularly overt manifestation of the way in which the
state uses the invisibility of gays against them, it is not unrepresentative.
The state forges a link between gay invisibility and gay powerlessness
whenever it participates in closeting homosexuals, .making the invisibility
of gays mandatory rather than discretionary."1 But this closeting occurs
whenever the state engages in homophobic lawmaking that makes
invisibility a prerequisite for gays who wish to enjoy the basic entitlements
of a free society. It occurs whenever legal norms are created against the
equal treatment of homosexuals in employment or other spheres, 2 against
249. This is implicit in the very concept of a "heightened scrutiny classification," which
anoints the classification, rather than the context, as being of judicial concern. Cf City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 451-55 (1985) (Stevens, J. concurring)
(criticizing rigidity of existing heightened scrutiny analysis and arguing for more context-
dependent analysis).
250. The prevailing tests of political powerlessness all look to the group's powerlessness in
American society as a whole rather than allowing groups to make the case only on the basis of
local powerlessness. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445 (asking whether a group is unable "to attract
the attention of lawmakers"); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 n.17 (plurality opinion) (asking whether
a group is underrepresented in the "Nation's decisionmaking councils"); United States v.
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (asking whether the group is a "discrete and
insular minorit[y]").
251. See supra notes 155-158 and accompanying text.
252. These legal norms include acts of omission. For example, there is no federal legislation
currently prohibiting discrimination against homosexuals, despite the fact that bills proposing
such legislation have been introduced in Congress for more than 20 years. See Carlos A. Ball,
Moral Foundations for a Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage: Looking Beyond Political Liberalism,
85 GEO. L.J. 1871, 1873 n.9 (1997) (noting that Congress considered proposals for federal
legislation protecting gays as early as 1974 and that the most recent attempt to pass such
legislation was defeated in 1996); see also CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION
AND THE LAW 466 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1997) (noting the longevity of attempts to enact
federal legislation protecting gays) [hereinafter SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW]. Existing
federal legislation either ignores or explicitly excludes the sexual orientation category. Thus, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1996), prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin," id. at
§ 2000e-2(a), but omits any mention of sexual orientation. The Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1996), specifically notes that homosexuality and bisexuality do
not fall within its ambit, id. at § 12211(a).
Assimilationist Bias
same-sex marriage 3 or sodomy, 4 or against gay adoption or custody. 5 If
"don't ask, don't tell" is sui generis, it is not in making the demand that
gays be closeted, but in making that demand explicit.
Perhaps more strikingly, legal norms against the equal treatment of gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals also include acts of commission. In 1993, for example, Colorado passed an amendment
to its constitution whose caption asserted that there would be "No Protected Status Based on
Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation." COLO. CONST. art. II § 30(b). While the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down this amendment on equal protection grounds, see Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996), analogous provisions in an amendment to a city charter have been upheld by
the Sixth Circuit even in the wake of Romer. See Equality Foundation 11, 128 F.3d at 289
(upholding an amendment stating that the city of Cincinnati "may not enact, adopt, enforce, or
administer any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy which provides that homosexual, lesbian, or
bisexual orientation, status, conduct, or relationship constitutes, entitles, or otherwise provides a
person with the basis to have any claim of minority or protected status, quota preference, or other
preferential treatment").
253. Marriage between two individuals of the same sex has never been permitted and is not
currently permitted in any jurisdiction in the United States. See Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding
Heart: Reflections on Using Law to Make Social Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 967, 989 (1997).
254. Eighteen states still have sodomy statutes pertaining to sexual relations between human
beings on their books. Seven states have sodomy laws that apply to homosexual relations only.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (WESTLAW through 1997 Reg. Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
3505 (WESTLAW through 1997 Reg. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN. 1957, art. 27 §§ 553-54 (Michie,
WESTLAW through 1997 Reg. Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.158, 750.338 (West,
WESTLAW through P.A. 1998, No. 20); MO. ANN. STATS. § 566.090 (Vernon, WESTLAW
through 1997 2d Ex. Sess.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 21 § 886 (West, WESTLAW through 1997 1st
Reg. Sess.); TEX. PENAL CODE, § 21.06 (West, WESTLAW through 1997 Reg. Sess.).
Eleven states have sodomy laws that apply to both heterosexual and homosexual relations.
See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(3) (WESTLAW through 1997 Reg. Ses.); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13-411 to 13-412 (West, WESTLAW through 1997 1st Reg. Sess. and 2d Sp. Sess.); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West, WESTLAW through 1997 1st Reg. Sess.); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605
(Michie, WESTLAW through 1997 Reg. Sess.); LA. REV. STAT. 14:89 (West, WESTLAW
through 1997 Reg. Sess. Acts); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (West, WESTLAW through 1997
3d Sp. Sess.); MISS. CODE § 97-29-59 (WESTLAW through 1998 Reg. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
14-177 (Michie, WESTLAW through 1997 Reg. Sess.); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120
(WESTLAW through 1997 Reg. Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (WESTLAW through 1998
Gen. Sess.); VA. CODE § 18-2-361 (Michie, WESTLAW through 1998 Reg. Sess.). It bears
mention that "[e]ven in the majority of states that retain gender neutral language, the ancillary
effects of the sodomy prohibition are directed against lesbian and gay citizens." Hunter, supra
note 14, at 539.
As William Rubenstein notes, sodomy laws not only directly affect lesbians, gay men, and
bisexuals by threatening them with "arrest simply [for] expressing their love for one another," but
also indirectly affect them by providing a "basis for constraining-or denying-[other] legal
rights." SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 252, at 282. For example, a number of
courts have relied on the presence of sodomy laws to argue that sexual orientation cannot be a
heightened scrutiny classification. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance
Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that if homosexual conduct can be
constitutionally criminalized, an identity constituted by that conduct cannot merit heightened
scrutiny); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454,464 (7th Cir. 1989) (same); Woodward v. United
States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (same); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (same).
255. Courts have denied gays, lesbians, and bisexuals custody or visitation rights both by
noting that homosexuality is per se incompatible with such rights and, more commonly, by noting
that a parent's sexuality may be taken into account when it has some connection to his or her
parenting abilities. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 252, at 810-11
(collecting cases).
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Having addressed these two objections, 6 I now apply the analytic
framework developed above to the military context.
A. Evasive Power
The analysis of the evasive power of invisible groups noted that
invisible groups were advantaged over visible groups because: (1) they
possessed more discretion over their identities; (2) they were less prone to
superficial judgments based on their visible characteristics; and (3) they
were less likely to be victimized by panoptic effects. It then noted that
invisible groups were disadvantaged relative to visible groups because their
evasive action generated a series of harms, including: (1) alienation; (2) the
sheer work of passing; (3) moral stigma; and (4) identity erasure. "Don't
ask, don't tell" mutes the evasive advantages and heightens the evasive
disadvantages of invisibility.
1. Evasive Advantages Dampened
While visible groups are generally locked into their visibility, invisible
groups can choose either to remain invisible or to convert their corporeal
invisibility into declarative visibility. This ability to control the
management of their social identity generally gives invisible groups an edge
over visible groups. Social actors, however, may diminish that evasive
advantage by diminishing the discretion of invisible groups. Thus, a
common strategy employed to control invisible groups forces them to
convert their invisibility into visibility-through brandings, scarlet letters,
public notifications, and the like. 7 Conversely, the discretion of invisible
groups may be cabined by precluding them from voluntarily converting
their invisibility into visibility.
"Don't ask, don't tell" exemplifies the latter strategy. It is true that the
statute is carefully drafted not to penalize the act of converting corporeal
invisibility to social visibility per se-homosexual servicemembers will not
be discharged solely for making the statement of self-identification-" I am
gay.' ' 58 Yet this safe harbor-designed to circumvent prohibitions on
speech and status regulation-has proved insecure. A self-identifying
statement raises a rebuttable presumption that the servicemember has
256. It bears note that even if either of these objections were sustained, that would not be
fatal to the argument that the visibility factor should be retired. The state's manipulation of
invisibility to disempower invisible groups underscores the irony that it assumes that invisibility is
always empowering. But even in the absence of state manipulation, invisibility still would not be a
good proxy for political power, as demonstrated supra Part V.
257. See supra notes 155-158 and accompanying text.
258. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2).
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engaged in homosexual conduct; if left unrebutted, the presumption is
grounds for exclusion. 9 And as a practical matter, the presumption has
proved difficult to overcome-in a recent case, the government
acknowledged that of forty-three servicemembers investigated for raising
this presumption, only seven were able to rebut it and remain in the
military.26 Through these means, the policy eliminates the "natural"
advantage of discretion that invisible groups have over visible ones-under
it, invisible groups are locked into their invisibility in a way similar to that
in which visible groups are locked into their visibility.
A proponent of the visibility presumption could argue that permanently
invisible groups are still more empowered than permanently visible groups
because the former may evade superficial judgments while the latter may
not. Yet while the invisibility of gays may free them from certain kinds of
superficial judgment, it entraps them in others. As will be discussed further
below,261 the superficial judgments about gays that justify the policy-that
they destroy unit cohesion, that they trench on the privacy of heterosexual
servicemembers, and that they create debilitating sexual tension-survive
precisely because the coerced invisibility of gays prevents them from being
challenged.
Finally, the proponent of the visibility presumption might point out that
invisible groups generally do not occupy a disempowering position in a
panoptic dynamic. But as demonstrated below, 62 the policy has found a
way around that axiom by depriving all military servicemembers of
privacy. By placing all military servicemembers in a virtual Panopticon, the
military eliminates any advantage invisible groups might have. The threat
of constant surveillance as applied to all servicemembers thus captures even
invisible homosexuals within its panoptic ambit.
2. Evasive Disadvantages Amplified
Just as the policy diminishes invisibility's evasive advantages, it also
exacerbates its evasive disadvantages. We have seen that the evasive harms
of invisibility may be divided into epistemic and ontic harms.263 The
epistemic harms may in turn be subdivided into the passer's alienation from
support communities, the work of passing, and moral harm.
The gay passer is isolated from both communities from which she could
draw support-the straight community to which she pretends to belong, and
the gay community that she has disavowed. "Don't ask, don't tell"
259. See id.
260. See Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280, 1298 (2d Cir. 1996).
261. See infra notes 301-305 and accompanying text.
262. See infra notes 273-276 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 180-197 and accompanying text.
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exacerbates her isolation from both communities. First, the policy heightens
the alienation a gay passer may feel toward the straight community by
making it less likely that the straights with whom she associates will be pro-
gay or openly pro-gay. The policy makes it less likely that servicemembers
will be pro-gay by enunciating homophobic norms-as Kenneth Karst has
noted, "the policy is an authoritative statement stigmatizing
homosexuality," in which "[e]very discharge of a gay soldier is an official
degradation ceremony."264 The policy also makes it less likely that even
staunchly pro-gay servicemembers will express their sympathies. This is
because-as will be discussed further below26 5-the policy cultivates
anxiety among straights that their pro-gay activities will lead them to be
labeled as gay themselves. Given that the cost of that ascription is
exclusion, the in terrorem effects of such anxiety are likely to be
significant. Thus, even though a closeted lesbian could conceivably draw
strength from pro-gay straights, such support is unlikely to be available to
her in the military.
26
The policy also diminishes the support gays might otherwise receive
from other gays. In any context, the gay passer will only be able to draw
direct support from other gays if she engages in selective passing-coming
out only to members of her own group while remaining closeted to others.
The ability of a homosexual to cultivate two such contradictory identities
will depend on the distinctness of her audiences. The military makes it
difficult to preserve this distinction in two ways. First, by forcing all gays
into the closet, the military makes it harder for them to identify each other.
Second, the military makes it difficult for gays to confide in even the gays
they can identify by threatening all gays with witchhunts. Under the old
policy, the military's strategy of witchhunting gays-particularly
lesbians-was well known.267 A lesbian who had been caught would often
be presented with the option of plea bargaining to receive a reduced
punishment in return for turning in others.2 6 This had the effect of using the
support network that gays had built for each other against them. The "don't
ask" prong of the current policy is supposed to protect gays from direct
264. Karst, supra note 245, at 546.
265. See infra notes 306-309 and accompanying text.
266. The gay passer must therefore not only pass as a member of a straight community but as
a member of a straight community marked by intolerance of gays. She may thus feel that to pass
successfully she must engage in homophobic behavior. See Halley, Politics of the Closet, supra
note 14, at 934 n.67 (recounting an interview with a homosexual Marine who stated that to evade
detection, he would try to "'[ble even more vociferous than everybody else' when engaging in
homophobic banter (quoting STuDs TERKEL, THE GOOD WAR: AN ORAL HISTORY OF WORLD
WAR TWO 180 (1984))).
267. See Michelle M. Benecke & Kirstin S. Dodge, Military Women in Nontraditional
Fields: Casualties of the Armed Forces' War on Homosexuals, 13 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 215, 222
(1990).
268. See id. at 224 (" One of the most common tactics used by investigators [wa]s to pressure
women to name others who might be gay in order to save themselves.").
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questioning about their sexual orientation; there is serious question whether
it does even this.2 69 What it does not do is protect gays from such plea
bargaining.270  The Servicemembers Legal Defense Network has
"documented 15 actual or attempted witch hunts under the new regulations
where commanders and inquiry officials asked military members to identify
other servicemembers who were or were suspected to be homosexual."271
Indeed, it has been argued that one of the primary reasons that the military
has reserved discretion to retain servicemembers who have engaged in
homosexual conduct is to preserve the plea bargain opion.27z The fact that
the military can use the threat of such plea bargains against gay
servicemembers is a powerful disincentive for gays to divulge their identity
to other gays.
The second harm of evasion is the sheer work of passing. This burden
is mitigated only when the passer enters a private sphere where she may
doff her public persona to reveal a more authentic private self. Thus, that
burden will be particularly heavy where the private sphere is conscribed.
Current military regulations appear to recognize that some degree of
privacy should be preserved for gays-the "don't ask" portion of the
policy flows from the statement that "sexual orientation is considered a
personal and private matter." 7 3 Yet even a cursory examination of this
privacy reveals how narrowly circumscribed it is. Solicitude for sexual
privacy, while expressed in the regulations, appears nowhere in the text of
the statute. In fact, the congressional "findings" section of the statute takes
great pains to indicate how little privacy actually exists in the military. Thus
the section states that it is "necessary for members of the armed forces
involuntarily to accept living conditions and working conditions that are
often spartan, primitive, and characterized by forced intimacy with little or
no privacy. '  It also points out that the standqrds of conduct for
servicemembers apply "for 24 hours each day beginning at the moment the
member enters military status and not ending until that person is discharged
or otherwise separated from the armed forces." 275 And again, lest there be
any mistake, "[t]hose standards of conduct.., apply to a member of the
armed forces at all times that the member has a military status, whether the
269. See infra notes 291-294 and accompanying text.
270. See Kenneth Williams, Gays in the Military: The Legal Issues, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 919,
926 (1994).
271. Samuel A. Marcosson, A Price Too High: Enforcing the Ban on Gays and Lesbians in
the Military and the Inevitability of Intrusiveness, 64 UMKC L. REv. 59, 88 (1995) (quoting C.
DIXON OSBURN & MICHELLE M. BENECKE, SERVICEMEMBERS LEGAL DEFENSE NErWORK,
CONDUCT UNBECOMING CONTINUES: THE FIRST YEAR UNDER "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL,
DON'TPURSUE" 11 (1995)).
272. See Williams, supra note 270, at 926.
273. Dep't of Defense Directive 1304.26, encl. 1, § B(8)(a) (Dec. 21, 1993).
274. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(12) (1994).
275. Id. § 654(a)(9).
1998]
The Yale Law Journal
member is on base or off base, and whether the member is on duty or off
duty." '76 The picture painted in the statute is one in which soldiers can
expect no privacy, at any time of the day, at any point in their military
tenure. In this way, the policy gives with one hand and takes with the
other-the regulations recognize sexuality as existing in a private space,
while the statute points out that this space barely exists. The logical
consequence of this is that the burdens of passing will be acute-gays are
effectively required to engage in a twenty-four-hour performance of
heterosexuality.
The final epistemic harm of evasion is the moral one, in which the
passer must pretend to be something that she is not. The state exacerbates
this harm both by coercing gays to pass and by forcing them to do so in a
culture that otherwise inculcates honesty as a cardinal value. As one
commentator has recently argued, the policy's bar on homosexual self-
identification requires gays to affirm a heterosexual identity.277 This is
because the strength of the heterosexual presumption makes a
homosexual's silence as pointed and as performative as speech affirming
that she is straight. This compelled lie will take a particularly heavy toll
in a context that holds honesty to be a fundamental tenet of honor.
Explaining why he came out while at the Naval Academy, Joseph Steffan
notes: "The Honor Concept at Annapolis is based on the tenet that personal
honor is an absolute .... .279 Steffan states that if he had remained in the
closet he "would have given up [his] honor, destroying everything it means
to be a midshipman." " By forcing only gays to lie about their identities in
a culture in which lying is held to be deeply dishonorable, the military
inculcates in them a conception of themselves as second-class citizens, not
only because of their homosexuality, but also because of their duplicity.
That it does so in the name of unit cohesion is particularly ironic given that,
as the courts have noted, "[a] relationship built on deception is anything but
a 'bond of trust."' 281
276. Id. § 654(a)(10).
277. See Tobias B. Wolff, Compelled Affirmations, Free Speech, and the U.S. Military's
Don't Ask, Don't Tell Policy, 63 BROOK. L. REV 1141, 1145 (1998).
278. See id.
279. JOSEPH STEFFAN, HONOR BOUND: A GAY NAVAL MIDSHIPMAN FIGHTS To SERVE His
COUNTRY 145 (1992).
280. Id.; see also Holmes v. California Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir.
1997) (noting that Holmes came out to his commanding officer in a memorandum stating: "'[A]s
a matter of conscience, honesty and pride, I am compelled to inform you that I am gay."').
281. Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 953 (4th Cir.) (Hall, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 358 (1996); see also Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968, 979 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (" [Tihe
court deems extraordinary... the almost total lack of concern evidenced in the Congressional
hearings and the Committee reports as to the impact on unit cohesion of the attempt to enforce
secrecy on homosexuals and to enlist them in the perpetration of a hoax on heterosexuals.
Common sense suggests that a policy of secrecy, indeed what might be called a policy of
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In addition to these three epistemic harms, I earlier noted that passing
may lead to an ontic harm-the perception (or actuality) that the passer
does not exist along the closeted axis of his identity. The military
exacerbates this ontic harm by barring gays (and only gays) from engaging
in any protected expression of their identities rather than simply precluding
them from expressing their homosexuality in certain narrowly-specified
ways. The distinction between the two kinds of harms may be seen by
contrasting the "don't ask, don't tell" policy with the uniform regulation
upheld in Goldman v. Weinberger,282 a case often adduced to quash First
Amendment challenges to "don't ask, don't tell., 283 In Goldman, the
Supreme Court held that a military uniform regulation that prevented a
Jewish Air Force member from wearing a yarmulke did not violate the First
Amendment.' But the regulation in Goldman can be distinguished from
"don't ask, don't tell" in two fundamental ways. First, the Air Force
regulation did not single out Jews to bear a particular burden-a Catholic
who wished to wear a comparably obtrusive crucifix would have been
similarly forbidden to do so. Second, the regulation did not bar the Jewish
servicemember from articulating his religious belief or identity in other
ways.85 The harm of not being able to express any identity in a particular
way under the Air Force regulations must thus be distinguished from the
harm of not being able to express a particular identity in any way under
"don't ask, don't tell."
Blocking gays from expressing their identity in any way leads to their
ontic erasure in the minds of straights and possibly in the minds of gays as
well. That the military may be effectively eradicating the identity of gays
when it forces them to pass helps explain a puzzling feature of "don't ask,
don't tell." The puzzle is this-why has the military responded to the
repeatedly articulated fear of straight servicemembers that gays are looking
at them in the showers 6 by adopting a policy that increases the invisibility
deception or dishonesty, will call unit cohesion into question."), vacated, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir.
1996).
282. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
283. See, e.g., Richenberg v. Perry, 73 F.3d 172, 173 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Goldman, 475
U.S. 503); Watson v. Perry, 918 F. Supp. 1403, 1417 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (same), affd sub nom.
Holmes v. California Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997); Thomasson v. Perry, 895
F. Supp. 820, 825 (E.D. Va. 1995) (same), affd, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996).
284. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 509-10.
285. See Air Force Regulation 35-10 par. 1-6.h(3)(f) (1980).
286. See BERSANI, supra note 111, at 16 ("I was not alone in being astonished by the
prominence of shower rooms in the erotic imagination of heterosexual American males. Fear on
the battlefield is apparently mild compared to the terror of being 'looked at' (and you know what
that means for most males)."). As Kendall Thomas notes:
From the media stories on heterosexuals in the armed forces who oppose President
Clinton's proposal to lift the ban on the inclusion of 'avowed' homosexuals in their
ranks, it would seem that straight male soldiers and sailors are haunted by the specter of
the 'gay look.' The scopic scene that appears to trigger the most concern among
straight military men is the spectacle of the communal shower. In interview after
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of gays? As Judge Nickerson wrote in his first Able opinion, this response
seems irrational, because "if indeed there are homosexuals who wish to
peek at naked bodies, they might do so quite as readily when their
orientation is a secret as when it is open."287 The ontic theory that forced
invisibility can have eradicating effects, however, explains that the
military's position actually has a deep, if pernicious, logic to it. The
military is relying on the premise that if gays are not permitted to identify
themselves, they are effectively erased-a military in which gays are
permanently invisible is a military in which the fantasy that no gays exist
can be sustained. Lacking a known source from which to emanate, the gay
gaze is dissolved.
The shower conundrum has led me to focus on one aspect of the ontic
harm of invisibility-that straights can pretend that gays do not exist. A
related but less intuitive aspect of that ontic harm is that gays themselves
may cease to feel as if they exist. The nexus between expression and
identity has been generally recognized in the gay rights movement, as
indicated by the ACT UP slogan "I am out, therefore I am."288 The slogan
makes the connection between speech and status, noting that if a
homosexual is closeted, she may cease in some important way to be a
homosexual. Under this interpretation, the statement "I am gay" is
illocutionary 289 like the statements "J'accuse," "I thee wed," or "I bet
you," it not only describes, but performs, the action named.290 In short, a
lesbian who is denied any expression of her homosexuality may cease to be
a lesbian.
Perhaps one reason why this harm is counterintuitive is that all of the
challenges to the policy are brought by gays who appear to be confident
about their own homosexual orientation. But we will never know how many
more individuals who are not similarly confident have been chilled from
"becoming" gay based on the policy. For such waverers, burdens on
expression may ultimately also be burdens on identity. If so, these burdens
on speech are not simple regulations of homosexual conduct, but also
regulations of homosexual status.
interview, the shower has served as the chief conductor of the straight troop's deepest
anxieties.
Kendall Thomas, Shower/Closet, 20 ASSEMBLAGE 80, 80 (1993) (citations omitted).
287. Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968, 978 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated, 88 F.3d 1280
(2d Cir. 1996). Indeed, one might put the point more strongly-closeted gays are actually more
likely than open gays to be able to engage in homoerotic voyeurism.
288. DOUGLAS CRIMP & ADAM ROLSTON, AIDS DEMO GRAPHICS 102-03 (1990).
289. The term is J.L. Austin's. See J.L. AUSTIN, How To DO THINGS WITH WORDS 98 (J.O.
Urmson & Marina Sbis eds., 2d ed. 1975).




The argument about the transformative power of invisible groups first
noted that the two transformative advantages that invisible groups
ostensibly possessed-the infiltration effect and the auto-identification
effect-might not always work in their favor. It then pointed out that
invisible groups would appear to suffer from two transformative
disadvantages-the exit/voice effect and the manipulation effect. Again, the
"don't ask, don't tell" policy highlights the disempowering dimensions of
all of these effects.
1. The Infiltration Effect
A proponent of the visibility presumption could argue that invisible
groups are relatively empowered by their ability to infiltrate organizations,
as evidenced by the fact that gays have always served in the military. I
noted earlier, however, that this power was likely to be limited by the
invisible group's fear of exposure. The proponent's response to this was
that exposure need not be feared in two cases-the first, in which
individuals can take refuge in safe harbors of privacy, and the second, in
which individuals can use exposure as a transformative tool.
The proponent might point to the "don't ask" provision of the
military's policy as an example of the first case. But Janet Halley has
powerfully demonstrated the multiple inadequacies of that argument. As an
initial matter, the implementing regulations indicate that "don't ask"
creates no substantive or procedural rights, but only provides guidance to
military officials.29 It is thus unsurprising that military officials have on
occasion flatly ignored this guidance.2 92 In addition, the guidance provided
by the policy permits officials to substitute indirect questions for the
prohibited direct ones, allowing the same ends to be achieved through more
oblique means.293 Finally, "don't ask" does not preclude military officials
from initiating investigations based on inquiries made by other
governmental branches, evidence of conduct reflecting a propensity to
engage in homosexual conduct, or evidence of public or private "coming
out" statements.294
The policy's carve-out of certain gay-related activities that will not
constitute "homosexual conduct" would also seem to create a safe harbor.
291. See Enlisted Administrative Separations, Dep't of Defense Directive 1332.14, end. 4,
§ G (Dec. 21, 1993) [hereinafter Enlisted Administrative Separations], quoted in Halley, supra
note 233, at 180 (providing guidelines for factfinding inquiries into homosexual conduct).
292. See Halley, supra note 233, at 180.
293. See id. at 180-81.
294. See id. at 18 1.
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The Department of Defense directives state that officials may not begin
investigations on the basis of conduct such as "going to a gay bar,
possessing or reading homosexual publications, associating with known
homosexuals, or marching in a gay rights rally in civilian clothes." 295 On its
face, this carve-out appears to give considerable power to gays, as it
putatively shields the classically sacrosanct political activities of association
and speech-" [s]uch activity, in and of itself, does not provide evidence of
homosexual conduct." '296 But as Diane Mazur points out, the operative
language in this limitation is "'in and of itself."' 297 Thus, while an
investigation may not proceed on the basis of the fact that an individual
"associat[es] with known homosexuals,"298 all that is needed to lift the bar
is "some concrete, credible fact probative of gay conduct, such as
information that a female servicemember is always seen in the company of
the same woman."299 Mazur goes on to argue that the carve-out was
motivated by a desire to protect heterosexual servicemembers when they
engaged in these activities, rather than to permit homosexual
servicemembers a certain realm of protected activity.00
The proponent's second argument-that gays might use their own
exposure as a powerful transformative tool-requires a more elaborate
response. It is clear that the invisibility of gays has permitted them to rebut
stereotypes about themselves more quickly than would have been possible
if they were a visible group. This is because closeted gays could serve even
in a military that categorically banned gays from service. Working
alongside their straight colleagues, these closeted gays could build up
personal and professional reputations that contradicted the stereotypes of
them. When they came out-or were dragged out-of the closet, the
resource of that intimacy and knowledge could be applied against the
stereotype with telling effects. If gays were visible, this would not have
been a viable strategy. The military would have been able to preserve these
stereotypes by excluding gays, thereby removing the data sample that
would disprove their erroneous hypotheses.
The classic "let them get to know you before you come out" strategy
has led to the retirement of the traditional justifications for why gays are
unfit to serve.0 ' Faced with model plaintiff after model plaintiff,0 2 the
295. Enlisted Administrative Separations, supra note 291, § E(4).
296. Id.
297. See Diane H. Mazur, The Unknown Soldier: A Critique of "Gays in the Military"
Scholarship and Litigation, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 223, 247 (1996) (quoting Enlisted
Administrative Separations, supra note 291, § E(4)).
298. Enlisted Administrative Separations, supra note 291, § E(4).
299. Mazur, supra note 297, at 247-48.
300. See id. at 248.
301. The strategy is not an immediate panacea, given that the military historically has shown
a remarkable ability to sustain stereotypes even while acknowledging contradictory data. Thus, in
the early 1990s, an admiral urged his officers to conduct a purge of lesbians, noting that local
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military has not been able to sustain the stereotype that gay servicemembers
are less able to serve than straight servicemembers. The current policy is
remarkable in that it does not rely on any of the traditional stereotypes that
gays constitute security risks, are mentally unfit, and are more likely to
spread sexually transmitted diseases. 3 Instead, the justifications for "don't
ask, don't tell"-unit cohesion, privacy, and sexual tensionP---primarily
focus not on the gay servicemember but on the straight servicemember.
This can be counted as a pro-gay achievement, as it correctly traces the
source of the dysfunction not to the gay servicemember, but to the straight
one. And, as the proponent of the invisibility presumption would point out,
it is a victory largely predicated on the ability of gays to rebut an
institution's stereotypes through their service within that institution.
Yet that victory is only partial. While the military has altered its
justifications, it has not altered its methodology. It is still resting its case on
negative stereotypes that are unsupported by rigorous empirical data.0" This
commanders had been reluctant to do so because lesbian sailors were generally "'hard-working,
career-oriented, willing to put in long hours on the job and among the command's top
performers."' Karst, supra note 245, at 553 (quoting Jane Gross, Admiral Praises Lesbians but
Urges Their Dismissal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1990, at 24). But such gaps between stereotype and
reality can be expected to close eventually.
302. See, e.g., Cammermeyer v. Perry, 97 F.3d 1235, 1236 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that
Margarethe Cammermeyer, who was discharged under the military policy predating "don't ask,
don't tell," was "a highly decorated nurse" who had received "numerous awards and distinctions,
including the Bronze Star for distinguished service in Vietnam"); Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 59
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting that Joseph Steffan, who was discharged under the old policy, "was, by
all accounts, an exceptional midshipman" whose "exemplary performane ... had earned him
numerous honors and the respect and praise of his superior officers"), vacated, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (en bane); Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc)
(noting that Perry Watkins, who was discharged under the old policy, was "in all respects an
outstanding soldier").
303. See Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 855 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that the
government had abandoned its previous arguments that homosexuals were mentally ill, a greater
security risk, or more likely to spread infectious diseases), rev'd on other grounds, 155 F.3d 628
(2d Cir. 1998); see also Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 924 (W.D. Wash. 1994)
(noting that the government had retired its argument that homosexuals presented a security risk).
304. See Able, 968 F. Supp. at 858 (noting that the government's only remaining rationales
are that the policy secures unit cohesion, promotes the privacy of heterosexual servicemembers,
and reduces sexual tension).
305. It is true that the military has from time to time adduced anecdotal evidence to support
its position. Thus, General Schwarzkopf has opined that "[t]he introduction of an open
homosexual into a small unit immediately polarizes that unit." Policy Concerning Homosexuality
in the Armed Forces: Hearings on S. 1298 Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 103d
Cong. 595-96 (1995) (statement of H. Norman Schwarzkopf, U.S. General); see also id. at 821
(1995) (statement of John P. Otjen, U.S. General) (" [B]ased on my experience, [a] statement [of
homosexual orientation] alone will cause disruption xvithin the unit."). Yet this evidence
contradicts the findings of studies conducted by the General Accounting Office and the RAND
Corporation. The RAND Corporation study noted that there were no serious problems concerning
gays in the military in Canada, Israel, the Netherlands, and Norway, all of which permit gays to
serve openly. See RAND, supra note 231, at 14, quoted in Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp.
968, 978 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996). And both the RAND Report and
the GAO Report concluded that domestic organizations analogous to the military have accepted
homosexuals into their ranks without significant adverse impact. See RAND, supra note 231, at
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time, however, the military has been careful to rely on stereotypes that gays
cannot disprove through infiltration. Because these stereotypes rely on what
"open" or visible homosexuals will do to a unit, an invisible homosexual
cannot, by definition, disprove the stereotype until she comes out of the
closet. At that point, of course, she is generally removed from the military
and the stereotype remains largely uncontested.
2. The Auto-Identification Effect
Because invisibility creates epistemic uncertainty about status, it
heightens the possibility that individuals not identifying as members of a
stigmatized group will be revealed to be group members. The conventional
wisdom is that this heightened possibility will lead to greater empathy
between those individuals and the invisible groups to which they could
belong. I earlier noted that this conventional wisdom does not always
obtain. In some circumstances, it appeared that this very epistemic
uncertainty contributed to the failure of empathy. Homosexuality was
briefly offered up as such a circumstance.
"Don't ask, don't tell" increases the likelihood of that empathy failure
by flaunting the epistemic uncertainty surrounding sexual orientation.
While the military has a stated policy of heterosexual immunity and
homosexual vulnerability, it has also defined homosexual acts in such an
open-ended way that a straight servicemember will not know a priori how
to maintain his straight identity. Such acts are defined to include "any
bodily contact which a reasonable person would understand to demonstrate
a propensity or intent to engage in" same-sex bodily erotic contact.0 6 As
Halley points out, this "reasonable person" standard makes it impossible to
know the protocols of straightness.3 7 This may be particularly true given
the ambiguously sexual nature of the homosocial bonding that occurs in the
military.3 8 Thus, "few servicemembers will be so unambiguously straight
xxiv; GAO, Report to Congressional Requesters, Defense Force Management: DoD's Policy on
Homosexuality (June 1992), quoted in Able, 880 F. Supp. at 978. Rather than resolving this factual
dispute through rigorous testing (by, for example, permitting homosexuals in certain units to serve
openly), the military has chosen simply to assume, rather than to prove, that its position is correct.
In so doing, it has implied that in a matter so serious as the national defense, the military's factual
assumptions should be given deference. See, e.g., Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 926 (4th Cir.
1996) (noting that "it is simply impossible to estimate the damage that a particular change
[affecting unit cohesion] could inflict upon national security-there is no way to determine and
correct the mistake until it has produced the substantial and sometimes irreparable cost of
[military] failure." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
306. 10 U.S.C. § 654(f)(3)(B) (1994).
307. See Halley, supra note 233, at 215.
308. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607, 626-30
(1994) (describing seemingly homoerotic male-bonding rituals). But cf. Mazur, supra note 297, at
252 (contrasting the depiction of military life described in Eskridge, supra, with her own
experience as a servicemember).
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that they will never wonder whether a reasonable person might construe
their actions as homosexual conduct." 309
3. The Exit/Voice Effect
"Don't ask, don't tell" similarly exacerbates the prisoner's dilemma
dynamic. As noted above,310 the deleterious effects of the prisoner's
dilemma on invisible groups may be mitigated in two circumstances. The
first is where a group member can come out to a potential ally without
coming out generally. "Don't ask, don't tell," as discussed earlier,311
minimizes this possibility by threatening all military members with
witchhunts and thereby making intragroup confidences less secure. The
second is where the prisoner's dilemma is iterated. This latter possibility
requires further discussion.
If the prisoner's dilemma is played repeatedly, some individuals will
inevitably publicly declare their homosexuality (i.e., come out). After those
individuals come out, they provide a political base that can support other
invisible individuals in successive plays of the game. To see how this
works, let us say that at Time Zero A and B play the game. Both are rational
and risk-averse, and therefore both choose not to come out. There may be
many more like them that play the game and also remain closeted. If the
sample is large enough, however, someone will eventually come out,
because not everyone is rational and risk-averse. Let us say that at Time
One, C and D play, and C decides to come out. D does not and free rides on
C's visibility. At Time Two, E and F play. In deciding whether to come out,
E and F can figure into their calculus not only each other's potential
actions, but the actions taken by their predecessors. And because C has
come out already, she provides a fixed source of support for E and F. Thus,
even if E and F are rational and risk-averse, it becomes more likely that
either or both of them will come out as well.
When the history of gay liberation in the United States is considered, it
clearly comports with the model of the iterated prisoner's dilemma. The
powerful social norm of "don't ask, don't tell," which long preceded the
military policy, prevented most homosexuals from coming out. Yet over
time, there were individuals who revealed themselves, either because they
were "irrational" in the sense of being altruistic, or because they were less
risk-averse.1 2 Every person who came out thus operated as a resource for
309. Halley, supra note 233, at 215.
310. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 267-272.
312. See LARRY GROSS, CONTESTED CLOSETS: THE POLITICS AND ETHics OF OUTING 21
(1993) (noting that many early "open" homosexuals were already marginal in society and thus
were less concerned with the risks of shouldering the additional stigma of homosexuality).
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others who knew her, making it less likely that an individual in a prisoner's
dilemma situation would have no source of support besides other closeted
gays.
313
The "don't ask, don't tell" policy transforms this iterated prisoner's
dilemma into a series of one-shot prisoner's dilemmas. The moment of
empowerment for gays in the model above occurs when C comes out and
provides a stable source of support for E, F, and all that follow. By
removing C from the military after she comes out, "don't ask, don't tell"
deprives her successors of that support. Under the policy, when E and F
play the game at Time Two, they are not much better off than A and B were
at Time Zero. Of course, the fact that C has come out is important, and C
may well oppose the policy from outside of the military. But because E and
F have seen C punished, and because C cannot work within the military as
a role model or advocate, the beneficial aspects of the iterated prisoner's
dilemma are disrupted.
4. The Manipulation Effect
"Don't ask, don't tell" did not spring spontaneously from the head of
Congress but grew organically out of public culture. In a wide variety of
contexts, straights and gays have formed social contracts like "don't ask,
don't tell" in which an individual's homosexuality will not be the object of
questioning so long as the individual remains silent about his orientation.
14
The ability of our culture to force gays into this Faustian bargain-in which
entitlements are exchanged for identities-is, of course, predicated on the
invisibility of gays. It is only because of this invisibility that the disclosure
of identity becomes a tradable good that cultural norms can manipulate
gays into surrendering.
When this bilateral contract of gay erasure was firmly in place in our
culture, there was no need for the state to specify or enforce that contract. In
a culture that deemed homosexuality to be the sin that dared not speak its
name,315 a statist formalization of that contract would have been at best
redundant, at worst a form of protesting too much. But as gays sought to
counter the social manipulation effect by seizing control of their rights of
self-identification, the social harmony assured by the bilateral contract of
gay erasure began to erode. The state would now have to use its coercive
power to replace the cultural norms that had kept gays in the closet.
"Don't ask, don't tell" must thus be seen as an attempt by the state to
sustain the epistemic contract of gay erasure even as that "contract"
313. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Democracy, Kulturkampf, and the Apartheid of the Closet,
50 VAND. L. REv. 419,440 (1997).
314. See supra notes 251-255 and accompanying text.
315. See SEDGNWICK, supra note 103, at 202-03.
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becomes ever more damagingly removed from any meaningful notion of
consent. Although gays are now less prone than they historically have been
to having their identities manipulated in the broader culture, the military
seeks to retain the anachronism of gay erasure by force of law. To
recognize that the state is doing through coercive means what the culture
can no longer sustain through persuasive ones is to recognize that the state
is exacerbating the manipulation effect suffered by gays.
C. The Invisible Irony of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
The current military policy is carefully crafted to ensure that the net
effects of gay invisibility are disempowering. Although there is no innate
relationship between invisibility and political powerlessness, the military
has forged one through force of law. When gays have sought judicial
redress for this state harm, however, the courts have assumed that the
invisibility on which their harm is predicated actually cuts toward their
political power. This is the irony of the visibility presumption when applied
to cases in which the state has an animus against an invisible group.
That this irony itself has remained surprisingly invisible may be
explained in two ways. First, the "don't ask, don't tell" cases rely on
precedent decided prior to the policy for the proposition that gays are not
entitled to heightened scrutiny. 16 The courts are therefore not required to
apply the test for heightened scrutiny (including the visibility factor) to
these cases. This in turn allows the courts to evade the contradiction
between the assumption that invisibility is always empowering and the facts
they have before them. Second, and probably more importantly, the courts
do not see the contradiction because they have no interest in granting
heightened scrutiny to more groups. The courts will not relinquish their
gatekeeping factors, even if they are proved illogical, unless they can be
reassured that some other limiting principle will obtain. It is to this problem
that I now turn.
VII. RECONSTRUCTING THE HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY JURISPRUDENCE
I hope that I have persuaded the reader that the immutability and
visibility factors may not be justified either on substantive (Part III) or
processual grounds (Parts IV-V), and that the harms of the visibility
presumption can be severe (Part VI). Although these arguments, if
316. See, e.g., Holmes v. California Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 1996)
(relying ultimately on High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563,
574 (9th Cir. 1990)); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256,260 (8th Cir. 1996) (relying ultimately on
Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103-04 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
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accepted, should convince the reader that the factors should be discarded, it
is unlikely that these arguments, without more, will persuade the courts to
do so. This is because the courts' historically tenacious hold on the
immutability factor, and their current retention of the visibility factor,
suggest that these factors are fulfilling a need in the equal protection
jurisprudence. Without identifying that need and providing an alternative
means of fulfilling it, it may be difficult to convince the courts to jettison
the two factors.
I therefore seek in this Part to reconstruct the heightened scrutiny
jurisprudence. This reconstruction proceeds by making three points. First, I
identify the need that the factors are fulfilling in the jurisprudence by
looking back to the moment of their creation. I demonstrate that the factors
were generated to justify the protection of race and sex, and that they have
been retained because of their gatekeeping function in limiting the number
of groups deemed to deserve the courts' solicitude. This suggests that the
courts are unlikely to retire these factors unless they are supplied with an
alternative means of limiting the number of protected groups.
Second, in seeking to discover this alternative limiting principle, I look
to the larger doctrinal context in which the factors are embedded. I show
that if the immutability and visibility factors are removed, the remaining
prongs of the doctrinal test-the history of discrimination prong and the
political powerlessness prong-emphasize classes over classifications,
antisubordination over formal equality. While the Supreme Court appears to
have rejected this class-based view of heightened scrutiny, I argue that
eliminating the discredited factors clears the doctrinal path toward a
reconsideration of the antisubordination interpretation of the equal
protection guarantee. I thus argue that the limiting principle for determining
which groups will be protected should be developed within a framework
that focuses attention solely on disempowered classes. I suggest that the
proper way of constructing such a limiting principle is to refine our
conception of such political powerlessness and to ensure that this analysis is
consistently applied.
My final point focuses on the political feasibility of reconstructing
heightened scrutiny jurisprudence. Although my proposal to replace the
immutability and visibility factors with a refined and consistent political
powerlessness analysis will strike some as parochially directed to serve
indistinct groups, this is not the case. Even disempowered distinct groups
(such as blacks and women), who appear to be privileged under the
immutability and visibility factors, should nonetheless favor the retirement
of these factors. This is because the immutability and visibility factors
support a classification-based analysis that has outlived its usefulness.
Although that analysis promoted the positive assimilation of blacks and
women in an era when the principal harm was segregation, it now impedes
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them in that assimilation by blocking integrative efforts, such as affirmative
action, that reason from an antisubordination paradigm.
A. The Origins of the Immutability and Visibility Factors
Tracing the immutability and visibility factors to their roots
demonstrates that they were formulated in an attempt to isolate the
commonalities between the paradigm groups of race and sex in the early
1970s. That insight generates two points. First, it makes the courts' use of
these factors all the more suspect, as principles derived from a data sample
of two are unlikely to be accurate across all contexts. Second, it suggests
that the longevity of the immutability and visibility factors arises from the
courts' desire to protect race and sex as the paradigm groups and their
related anxiety about having to protect too many groups.
As noted above,317 the Supreme Court has not articulated a clear theory
for why certain classifications warrant heightened scrutiny and others do
not. Rather than operating from a priori principles, the equal protection
jurisprudence has been driven by the groups asking for protection.
Generally, the inquiry has not been, "What principles define groups that are
worthy of judicial protection?" but rather, "Is group X in or out?"
Although certain factors have been generated from the latter inquiry, these
factors have been selected based upon the protected groups at issue rather
than vice versa.
Under this group-driven analysis, new groups are admitted by showing
that they are like groups that have already established their claim to
protection. Viewing this dynamic as characteristic of civil rights politics,
Jane Schacter has dubbed it the "discourse of equivalents," a system of
repressive analogy that deploys the status quo as the normative baseline
against which new claims must be measured.318 Schacter criticizes the fact
that the legitimacy of new civil rights legislation, such as that of gay rights
statutes, is seen to be dependent on how closely analogous the proposed
legislation is to preexisting legislation protecting race, sex, disability, and
religion.319 She correctly argues that the fact that discrimination takes a
form that has no ready historical analogue does not mean it is not worthy of
redress.
Schacter's complaint, made in the context of legislation, is also
applicable to the heightened scrutiny jurisprudence, where the courts have
engaged in such analogical reasoning. Indeed, the courts operate from an
even more restrictive framework than that adopted by the legislatures, as
317. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
318. Schacter, supra note 214, at 283, 285.
319. See id. at291-311.
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the courts' current standards have been generated with primary reliance on
only two groups. To lay out the typical test one last time, the courts
currently deploy a number of factors including: (1) whether the group has
suffered from a history of discrimination; (2) whether the group is currently
politically powerless; and (3) whether the group is marked by an "obvious,
distinguishing, or immutable characteristic[]." 3 20 All three prongs of this
test derive from Frontiero v. Richardson,32' in which a plurality of the
Supreme Court accepted that women, the group asking for heightened
scrutiny, were sufficiently similar to blacks, the paradigm group that had
already received that protection.322 In reaching this determination, the
plurality reasoned that women, like blacks, had suffered a history of
discrimination,' 23 that women, like blacks, were politically powerless,324 and
that women, like blacks, were defined by an immutable3' and highly
320. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (quoting Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635,
638 (1986)).
321. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
322. It may be argued that the visibility factor has an older pedigree. The famous fourth
footnote of United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), directs judicial
attention to "discrete and insular minorities." Professor Louis Lusky, who witnessed the
formulation of the footnote, has advanced an interpretation of "discreteness" that equates it with
"visibility." Lusky, supra note 41, at 1105 n.72. He thus disagrees with the Court's finding in
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971), that aliens constitute a "discrete and
insular" minority, because, inter alia, "many [aliens], who are anglophones, pass unnoticed."
Lusky, supra note 41, at 1105 n.72. If Lusky's view is correct, the visibility factor dates back to
1938.
I agree with Bruce Ackerman, however, that it is "not obvious whether most constitutional
lawyers endow the word 'discrete' with independent significance in their understanding of
Carolene doctrine." Ackerman, supra note 75, at 728-29. Indeed, Justice Stone, the constitutional
lawyer who authored the footnote, appears not to have given Lusky's construction to the word
"discrete." After Carolene Products, the next Supreme Court opinion to refer to "discreteness
and insularity" was a dissent in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 606 (1940)
(Stone, J., dissenting). See also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 n.28
(1978) (tracing references to "discreteness and insularity" in Supreme Court opinions). In his
Gobitis dissent, Justice Stone posited that Jehovah's Witnesses were a "discrete and insular
minorit[y]," thereby manifesting an understanding of the phrase he had coined that is at odds with
Lusky's interpretation. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 606. This evidence shores up the reading of the word
"discrete" that the Graham majority implicitly adopted.
Nonetheless, it might be fairly contended that the word "discrete" may have been
interpreted to mean "visible" by various courts that ignored, misunderstood, or rejected Justice
Stone's subsequent use of the word in a dissenting opinion and relied instead on the text of
Carolene Products. This possibility, however, merely supports my ultimate point that the
visibility factor was derived in part from race, insofar as this interpretation of "discrete" would
only be possible if the paradigm group against which it was interpreted was race-based, as
opposed to the other "invisible" political and religious groups mentioned in the Carolene
footnote.
323. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684-85 (plurality opinion) ("There can be no doubt that our
Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.... [lindeed, throughout
much of the 19th century the position of women in our society was, in many respects, comparable
to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes.").
324. See id. at 685 ("Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring
suit in their own names .... ").
325. See id. at 686 (" [S]ex, like race .... is an immutable characteristic determined solely by
the accident of birth .... ).
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visible 26 characteristic. To those inured to these factors, the analysis seems
unexceptional, until one realizes that the Frontiero plurality is formulating
the test rather than applying it.
It follows from this realization that the origins of the immutability and
visibility factors do little to justify them. When the data sample of groups
from which such principles are generated is small, a pair of analytical
dangers arises. One is that random commonalities between admitted groups
will be used to exclude other deserving groups. This is problematic because
the mere fact that two oppressed groups share a characteristic does not
mean that the characteristic is the constitutive element of their oppression.
To take an extreme illustration, two individuals with the same initials may
be oppressed, but given that it is unlikely that their initials are the source of
their oppression, it would be anomalous to bar those with different initials
from obtaining relief. The other related danger is that even if a
characteristic causes the oppression of two groups, it may not be the cause
of all oppressions. The fact that both blacks and women were historically
denied the right to vote both mirrored and contributed to discrimination
against them. Yet most would view this commonality as too narrow to
constitute a heightened scrutiny factor. 27 Indeed, while the Frontiero Court
noted this commonality,'2 it did not enshrine historical disenfranchisement
as part of its heightened scrutiny test but adverted instead to the more
general criterion of a history of discrimination.
The existence of these dangers makes it important to view with great
caution the transformative moment when analogies transmute into abstract
principles. Although the formalization of these criteria into "tests"
encourages us to accept them as transcendental, we must be mindful of the
often narrow contexts from which they arise, and therefore of their potential
for misapplication in other contexts. In the case of equal protection
jurisprudence, that caution takes the form of noting that the immutability
and visibility factors were generated with only two classifications-race
and sex-in mind. Those two data points were used to draw a line that has
had dramatic implications for all other groups.
A defender of the common law might admit that it was a mistake to
generate principles of exclusion from a data set of two groups without being
overly troubled by this concession. His equanimity might arise from the
belief that the common law has its own internal mechanism to correct such
mistakes. Assuming that some of the criteria so generated are wrong, at
some point a group worthy of heightened scrutiny will not satisfy at least
326. See id. at 686 (" [l]n part because of the high visibility of the sex characteristic, women
still face pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination .... ).
327. But cf. Schacter, supra note 214, at 292 (describing a conservative lobbying group that
argued against pro-gay legislation because blacks, but not gays, were denied the right to vote).
328. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 685 (plurality opinion).
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one of them. Forced to choose between the protection of the group and the
retention of the factor, courts might well reject or reinterpret the factor. The
immutability factor has been challenged in precisely this way.329 That
principles are mistakenly extrapolated from limited data sets may not be
such a problem after all, as the system will purge such mistakes over time
as the data set is expanded.
But general faith in the common law's self-correcting nature may be
misplaced in the specific context of heightened scrutiny, because the
decision to jettison an established factor in order to admit a deserving group
may be impeded by the courts' desire to limit the number of groups
protected. An examination of the origins of the assimilationist bias reveals
not only that the courts view race and sex as the paradigm groupings for
purposes of heightened scrutiny, but also that they are loath to extend
protection beyond these groups. The Frontiero plurality manifested this
restrictive animus by privileging the race-based classification as the
touchstone against which the sex-based classification had to be rubbed.
Although the plurality acknowledged that national origin and alienage were
also suspect classifications, it did not consider whether the sex-based
classification might have been analogous to either of these other paradigms
of oppression.33 Subsequent to Frontiero, the Court articulated this
restrictive animus more clearly. The Cleburne Court declined to give the
mentally retarded heightened scrutiny in part because it would otherwise
"be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other
groups" such as "the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the
infirm." 331 Because of this restrictive animus, courts may be less willing to
challenge factors that they think are incorrect. After all, even incorrect
factors perform the gatekeeping function of limiting the number of groups
protected.
The courts' restrictive animus is obviously open to criticism. It can be
read as an argument against "too much justice,"332 for the fact that many
groups are deserving of the courts' protection is not, in itself, a principled
reason for excluding any one of them. It can also be criticized as leading to
a "first in time is first in right" jurisprudence, which privileges groups that
made their claims before the judiciary imposed an arbitrary cutoff. Still I do
329. See cases cited supra notes 15-18.
330. The narrowness of the frame of reference is somewhat surprising, given that alienage
had been deemed a suspect classification only two years before in Frontiero. See Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971). Had alienage been considered alongside race as an
already-protected group, we could not have had the factors that were derived from Frontiero, for
alienage is neither an immutable nor a visible characteristic. Thus, even if the Court had examined
all the data it had before it at the time, the assimilationist bias would not have been introduced into
the jurisprudence.
331. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,445-46 (1985).




not pursue these critiques here, because it is hard not to sympathize with the
courts' desire to place some limitation on the number of groups to which it
owes extra solicitude. Moreover, the courts are unlikely to accept a solution
that rejects the validity of their restrictive animus. Yet accepting the need
for a limiting principle obviously does not mandate acceptance of the
immutability and visibility factors. The challenge, then, is to find a better
limiting principle.
B. A Refined Political Powerlessness Analysis as a Limiting Principle
Before choosing a limiting principle, I first contextualize the
immutability and visibility factors in a larger debate occurring in the
heightened scrutiny jurisprudence. That debate is one between classes and
classifications.333 The class-based view of equal protection states that the
courts should focus on disempowered classes, like blacks, women, or gays.
The classification-based view states that courts should focus not on classes
but on the classifications that create the classes-such as race, sex, or
sexual orientation. The class-based view can be characterized as
asymmetrical, given that it extends protection to one class within a
classification while denying protection to another-to blacks, for example,
but not to whites. The classification-based view, on the other hand, is
symmetrical, since it treats classes within a classification similarly-if
blacks get heightened scrutiny, so must whites.
The tension between the class-based view and the classification-based
view manifests itself in the standard heightened scrutiny test. Two prongs
of the test-history of discrimination and political powerlessness-comport
with the class-based view. These prongs direct the court's attention to one
class within a classification-blacks, not whites, have suffered a history of
discrimination; blacks, not whites, are politically powerless. The other
prong of the test, which asks whether a group is marked by an "obvious,
distinguishing, or immutable characteristic," advances a classification-
based view. This prong, which contains the immutability and visibility
factors, urges the courts to think in terms of classifications-if blacks are
marked by immutable and visible characteristics, so are whites.
The Supreme Court has resolved this tension in favor of the
classification-based approach. In Adarand Constructors v. Pena,334 a
majority of the Court identified and endorsed the "consistency" principle,
which states that "'the standard of review under the Equal Protection
Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a
333. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv.
1,40-52 (1991).
334. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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particular classification." '' 35 Thus, all racial classifications reviewable
under the equal protection guarantee must be strictly scrutinized?36 As
Justice Stevens noted in dissent, the problem with this consistency principle
is that it tends to overlook the ways in which legislation might legitimately
treat them equally, occluding the difference "between a 'No Trespassing'
sign and a welcome mat." 337 The majority defended against this criticism
by noting that the principle only requires the same standard of scrutiny to
be applied to all classes within a classification, and that this does not dictate
that the same outcome be reached for all classes.338 In practice, however,
the dissent appears to have the better argument, for even if courts are not
formally required to strike down all legislation under heightened scrutiny,
this is precisely what they have done in the (admittedly few) years since
Adarand.
311
I will not pursue this critique of classification-based analysis further, as
my point here is not to provide a comprehensive critique of classification-
based analysis. Rather, it is to underscore that the proposed retirement of
the immutability and the visibility factors clears the ground for a different
kind of analysis. For if these factors are retired, the remaining factors
indicate a class-based analysis. It is also to speculate that if we are to
propose a limiting principle, that limiting principle should arise out of a
class-based, rather than a classification-based analysis.
Merely rejecting a classification-based analysis in favor of a class-
based analysis, of course, mitigates the problem of limitation by eliminating
all groups that are deemed not to be politically powerless and to have
suffered a history of discrimination. Groups such as whites, men, and the
legitimate would all be denied heightened scrutiny. But it also clearly
exacerbates the numerosity problem by permitting disempowered groups
that are not marked by immutable or visible characteristics to ask the courts
for heightened scrutiny. If we are to propose a limiting principle, then, that
principle will have to determine which of these disempowered groups are
eligible for judicial protection.
Before suggesting a reconstructive principle, I emphasize that I set it
forth only in its broadest outlines. The main thrust of this Article is to
demonstrate the need to retire the immutability and visibility factors.
Although I have attempted to conceptualize what might replace these
factors, I have not done so in any detail, because doing so would require
another article. Put another way, I have considered the immutability and
335. Id. at 222 (1995) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94
(1989) (plurality opinion)).
336. See id.
337. Id. at 245 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
338. See id. at 229.
339. See cases cited supra note 5.
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visibility factors with some particularity because I seek to contribute to the
closure of a debate about their legitimacy; in contrast, I only speculate as to
the reconstructive principle because I seek to open another debate.
I propose that the limiting principle should be a refined analysis of
political powerlessness. Currently, the Court has proffered three tests for
political powerlessness. In United States v. Carolene Products, the Court
asked whether groups were "discrete and insular minorities." 34  In
Frontiero, a plurality of the Court looked to whether a group was
underrepresented in the "[n]ation's decisionmaking councils." 34' And in
Cleburne, the Court examined whether the group was unable "to attract the
attention of the lawmakers." 342
There are two major problems with the current political powerlessness
analysis. First, the standards are applied inconsistently across contexts.
Obviously, whatever standard is used, it should be applied to any group that
comes before a court. At the time Cleburne was decided, the Carolene
Products test and the Frontiero test were the two available tests for political
powerlessness. It is hard to believe that the mentally retarded would not
have been deemed politically powerless if either of the extant tests
(especially the latter) had been applied. The fact that the Cleburne Court
decided to apply a different test under which it was much harder to prove
political powerlessness would lead a cynic to speculate that the Court
created a new test to avoid granting the mentally retarded heightened
scrutiny. For a test to be legitimate, it must be applied consistently.
Second, the standards are coarse in the extreme. Even if any one of the
three tests were applied consistently, it would be grossly over- or
underinclusive. No social scientist would determine a group's political
power by looking at only one criterion. As Cass Sunstein has noted, many
other factors can influence a group's political power. These include (and
here I add some criteria to his original list) the following indicia of
transformative and evasive power: (1) the group's income and wealth; (2)
its health and longevity; (3) its freedom from public and private violence;
(4) its ability to exercise its political rights; (5) its education level; (6) its
social position; and (7) the acceptability of prejudice against the group.'3
Thus, my reconstructive proposal is that a multifactor determination of
political powerlessness should perform the gatekeeping function performed
by the immutability and visibility factors. In considering whether any group
340. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
341. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,686 n.17 (1973) (plurality opinion).
342. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,445 (1985).
343. See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 2430 (listing "poverty, education, political power,
employment, susceptibility to violence and crime, [and] distribution of labor within the family" as
potential markers of social welfare).
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should get heightened scrutiny, the courts would be required to consider all
of the factors listed above (and doubtless some others).
This refined political powerlessness test is not a panacea. One obvious
criticism is that it will not prevent the courts from acting on their prejudices
if they wish to do so. Precisely because the test proliferates the axes of
power, some will cut for a group and some against it. It has been said that
"[t]here is nothing like a good balancing test for avoiding rigorous
argument." 344
This, however, is a criticism not of one test or another but of judicial
discretion. We cannot construct a heightened scrutiny test that does not
allow for some judicial discretion. That discretion may always be placed in
service of a judge's prejudice against a group. The goal here is not to
eliminate judicial discretion but rather to find the test that best channels that
discretion into avenues of fair decisionmaking. Tests must be compared
with each other, not with an unattainable ideal in which judges have no
ability whatsoever to express their prejudices.
When properly compared with the current test, the refined test displays
at least five major advantages. First, because the test would have to be
applied consistently across groups, courts would be able to make much
more sophisticated comparative claims. Courts could expect a judicial
database of knowledge along certain axes for every group requesting
heightened scrutiny.
Second, this approach would draw on a thicker conception of political
power. One way to express this point is to note that the refined test presents
for explicit debate factors that are probably in play anyway. For example,
Justice Scalia's recent dissent in a recent equal protection case noted that
gays "possess political power much greater than their numbers" in part
because they "have high disposable income."345 None of the three existing
tests considers a group's income, disposable or otherwise 6 Yet Justice
Scalia is clearly right that income and political power are linked 7 If such
factors should be and are considered, it seems uncontroversial that they
should be considered explicitly.
Third, the refined test encourages us to see that different kinds of power
may be interconnected. To take the example just given, it may be generally
true that gays have higher disposable incomes per capita than straights
344. Rubenfeld, supra note 86, at 761.
345. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 646 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
346. See supra notes 340-342 and accompanying text.
347. See, e.g., ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRAcY AND ITS CRrTICs 114-15 (1989) (noting
correlations between political power and access to money); ANTHONY DoWNs, AN EcONOMIc
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 200-01 (1957) (noting that the voters with the highest incomes
generally have the most political power).
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do."3 Gay empowerment on this axis, however, may have been created by
gay disempowerment on another. The higher disposable incomes of open
homosexuals may be explained by a lack of dependents.49 But this lack of
dependents may be traced in part to social discrimination that prevents gays
from gaining custody of children.35 It is thus reductive for Justice Scalia to
rely on disposable income as a proxy for political power without examining
the connection between that disposable income and homophobic
discrimination.35 Although such connections would not necessarily be
made under my test, the generation of data in various categories makes it
more likely that connections between the categories will be drawn.
Fourth, this approach would allow courts to diagnose the contours of
their disagreements more accurately. For example, blacks are probably
more powerful than gays in terms of the acceptability of negative social
attitudes toward them, while gays are probably more powerful than blacks
in terms of wealth, income, and social position. 352 If two courts agreed with
the preceding sentence, they would understand their ultimate disagreement
as theoretical rather than empirical-that is, as relating to the emphases
they were placing on these different kinds of power rather than on the
factual question of which group had more of which kind of power. If, on the
other hand, they disagreed on the empirical question, that would also show
up under my more refined test.
348. Lee Badgett notes that three recent surveys have found that the incomes of gay men and
lesbians are either comparable to, or greater than, the national median incomes of men and
women, respectively. See M.V. Lee Badgett, The Wage Effects of Sexual Orientation
Discrimination, 48 INUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 726, 729 (1995). Badgett goes on to observe,
however, that these survey results are questionable for a number of reasons, including a sample
skew toward individuals who were "out," white, urban, and well-educated-that is, toward
individuals who possessed attributes that were correlates of wealth. Id. Badgett's own study,
which she believes "constitutes a significant methodological advance over other quantitative
studies," found that gay, lesbian, and bisexual workers earned less than their heterosexual
counterparts, although she notes that the results from the comparison of lesbian to straight female
workers were not statistically significant. Id. at 726. Even if gays do not have higher incomes than
straights, however, they may still have consistently higher disposable incomes. I therefore'assume
for the sake of argument that Justice Scalia is correct in his assertion that gays have "high
disposable income." Romer, 517 U.S. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
349. See Nancy Klingeman & Kenneth May, For Better or for Worse, in Sickness and in
Health, Until Death Do Us Part: A Look at Same-Sex Marriage in Hawai4 16 U. HAW. L. REV.
447, 487 (1994) ("Gay and lesbian couples also have a higher discretionary income... than their
heterosexual counterparts, because they are less likely to have children.").
350. See supra note 255.
351. Another set of interrelated factors in the case of gays is health, income, and social
discrimination. Gays might be expected to have better health care given their relatively higher
disposable income. Given its best reading, however, "health" would also have to include social
resources devoted to the cure of diseases. And to the extent that homophobia has resulted in
government inaction on AIDS, which in turn disproportionately affects gays in this country, gay
"health" cannot be understood without understanding sexual orientation discrimination.
352. See BERSANI, supra note 111, at 62 (citing Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Backlash?, NEW
YORKER, May 17, 1993, at 49).
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Finally, the refined test would be a more powerful heuristic device for
judges. I have elsewhere argued that a purpose of the heightened scrutiny
jurisprudence is to force judges to examine themselves as well as
legislatures for prejudices against groups making equal protection claims."'
Under this reading, the heightened scrutiny test has a didactic function,
forcing judges to grapple with the nature of a group before passing
judgment. The narrower the heightened scrutiny test is, the less likely
judges are to be forced to expand the contours of their existing knowledge
about a group.354
One common response to this proposal is that under my analysis,
disenfranchised prisoners, the illiterate, or the mentally disabled could be
deemed more deserving of protection than gays or racial minorities. This
response is relatively untroubling-precisely the point of having standards
create protected groups rather than vice versa is to interrogate an otherwise
sclerotic hierarchy of oppression. If such groups can make their claims to
heightened scrutiny on a fair and open field of debate, I have no quarrel
with their being granted such scrutiny.
A related concern is that courts will find such a proposal so
destabilizing of that hierarchy that they will not accept it. But if the courts
have become so rigid that they will not engage in this (or some other)
dialogic reassessment of protected groups, that itself is information that
should be public. Exposing that restrictive animus by taking away the
doctrinal cover of immutability and visibility on the one hand and by
demonstrating the courts' rejection of a reasonable dialogic alternative on
the other is thus in itself useful work.
C. Coalition Building
The final point is one about coalition building. It might be thought that
the argument to retire the immutability and the visibility presumptions is an
argument that should only be persuasive to groups that are marked by
mutable or invisible characteristics. The movement to retire the
assimilationist bias in equal protection, however, should have a much
broader appeal. While the assimilationist bias might have been the correct
historical response to a regime in which segregation of blacks and women
was the harm, it does not currently meet the equality needs of those
immutable and visible groups.
353. See Yoshino, supra note 221, at 1765-66.
354. This is perhaps the most direct response to the critique that judges will still express their
prejudices under the refined test, because it questions the critique's premise that all judges have
made up their minds before applying the test. If we see judges as open to persuasion, a thick
description of the group is more likely to assist them in their good-faith deliberations.
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Looking at the origins of the immutability and visibility factors may
explain why the courts have been so accepting of the assimilationist aspect
of these factors. The paradigm case of race is one that historically linked
injustice and segregation-blacks were made a race apart through whites'
unwillingness to share schools, churches, restaurants, hotels, conveyances,
prisons, hospitals, neighborhoods, and cemeteries with them. s5 In
dismantling this status regime, justice and assimilation logically went
together.3 -6 The second paradigm case of sex, which also fundamentally
shaped the doctrine, further encouraged the association of justice and
assimilation in the judicial mind.57 Unlike the race context, the
subordinated group in the sex context was physically integrated into the
dominant group's lives-women lived with men as their wives, daughters,
and sisters.Y Yet they, too, were systematically segregated from many
spheres of life into which the equal protection guarantee sought to
incorporate them. 9 An equal protection doctrine that stressed assimilation
was therefore a predictable response to the problem it was formulated to
remedy, a status regime that enforced itself by segregating on the basis of
difference. It is therefore understandable that the negative implications of
the assimilationist bias inherent in the immutability and visibility factors
would not have been immediately apparent.
This account, however, explains rather than justifies the courts'
embrace of the assimilationist bias. Because the assimilationist response is
355. See Benno C. Schmidt, Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the
Progressive Era. Part 1: The Heyday of Jim Crow, 82 COLuM. L. REV. 444, 472-74 (1982). See
generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1955) (describing
conditions of segregation under Jim Crow).
356. See, e.g., Wendy Brown-Scott, Race Consciousness in Higher Education: Does "Sound
Educational Policy" Support the Continued Existence of Historically Black Colleges?, 43 EMORY
L.J. 1, 44-46 (1994) (describing integrationist and assimilationist assumptions motivating Brown
and subsequent desegregation efforts); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk, and United States
v. Fordice: Why Integrationism Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1428
(1993) (describing the integrationist philosophy as based on the assumption "that once African-
Americans and whites were able to inhabit the same physical environment (the process), African-
Americans and whites would begin to respect each other as individuals and view race as an
irrelevant characteristic like eye color (the ideal)"); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 758, 795-802 (describing the conflicting ideologies of integrationism/assimilation and black
nationalism); Sharon Elizabeth Rush, The Heart of Equal Protection: Education and Race, 23
N.Y.U. Rnv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 25 (1997) (arguing that racially integrated schools am
"necessary for people of all races to begin to value each other's differences and learn to relate to
each other with equal respect').
357. See, e.g., Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, United States v. Virginia's New Gender
Equal Protection Analysis with Ramifications for Pregnancy, Parenting, and Title VII, 50 VAND.
L. REV. 845, 852-54 (1997) (discussing the "equal treatment" model of gender equality as based
on the assumption "that existing governmental and workplace policies can assimilate the excluded
gender because there are no relevant differences between the genders").
358. See Balkin, supra note 14, at 2371.
359. See Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1290
(1987) (discussing the ways in which "separate spheres ideology" kept women out of the public
arena).
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specifically tailored to certain kinds of discrimination on the basis of race
and sex, it works less well when applied to other forms of discrimination
that deploy assimilation's negative aspects. These other forms include
discrimination against indistinct groups, where discrimination may operate
not by setting a group apart but by engulfing and erasing it. In such cases,
the status hierarchy between the dominant and the subordinate group is
reinforced, rather than weakened, through an emphasis on assimilation.
This was the case of "don't ask, don't tell."
Less intuitively, however, the assimilationist response may also fail to
redress some forms of discrimination leveled at formally protected groups.
The assimilationist response, which arguably met the needs of blacks and
women when segregation was the main issue, is now impeding their
equality claims by denying the legitimate claims of difference forwarded by
these groups.360 In other words, the assimilationist response may not be
limited only in scope (i.e., it only protects distinct groups), but also in time
(i.e., it only remedies certain historical problems faced by distinct groups).
To the extent that blacks and women are increasingly understanding their
equality claims to be predicated on a respect for their differences from
whites and men respectively, they too will favor an analysis that focuses on
classes rather than classifications. Thus, even distinct groups may join
indistinct ones in militating for the retirement of these factors.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The projects of American antidiscrimination law in general, and of
constitutional equal protection in particular, have both reasoned
restrictively from the cases of race and, to a lesser extent, sex. Race-based
and sex-based classifications are privileged; other classifications are not.
The immutability and visibility factors defend this status quo.
The crux of this Article argues that these factors cannot be justified
either on substantive or on processual theories of constitutional
interpretation. This is because immutability and visibility are bad proxies
for either substantive inequality or processual powerlessness. Thus, my
negative prescription is that the factors should be retired.
My affirmative prescription is that the courts should turn away from the
corporeal body to the body politic, focusing not on how traits are situated
within individuals but on how groups are situated in society. In that latter
360. See, e.g., Nadine Taub & Wendy W. Williams, Will Equality Require More Than
Assimilation, Accommodation or Separation from the Existing Social Structure?, 37 RUTGERS L.
REv. 825 (1985) (describing the difficulties with a pure equality/assimilation theory of gender
inequality and concluding that requiring assimilation with the male norm does not provide
adequate protection for rights of women).
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inquiry, they should refine their conception of political powerlessness to
describe more richly the situation of groups asking for their solicitude.
Some who agree with the logic of the moves made here may
nonetheless criticize them as naive. They might argue that, if the courts are
merely seeking to restrict heightened scrutiny protection to race and sex,
proffering doctrinal analysis and reasoned alterations is futile. But if this
restrictive animus is indeed the prime mover behind the courts' actions,
forcing the courts to recant their illogical doctrinal arguments has an even
greater urgency. For when this occurs, the brute fact of the restrictive
animus will be laid bare. If I have encouraged readers to confront the
palatability of permitting that animus to control this area of jurisprudence, I
have done my work.

